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T H I S  P U B L I C A T I O N  I S  T H E 
R E S U L T  O F  A  W I D E  R A N G E 
O F  C R O S S - D I S C I P L I N A R Y 
C O N V E R S A T I O N S ,  T A K I N G  P L A C E 
A C R O S S  S Y M P O S I A ,  O N L I N E 
F O R U M S ,  L I V E  E V E N T S ,  A N D 
W O R K S H O P S ,  T O  E X P L O R E  T H E 
T W I S T I N G  T O G E T H E R  O F  M I N D , 
L A N G U A G E  A N D  T E C H N O L O G Y .
O u r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n t o  t h i s  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e m e s  h a s  i t s  o r i g i n s  i n  a  p r e v i o u s  p r o j e c t 
e n t i t l e d  E l e c t r o n i c  V o i c e  P h e n o m e n a  ( w w w . e l e c t r o n i c v o i c e p h e n o m e n a . n e t ) ,  w h i c h  e x p l o r e s 
i n t e r f a c e s  b e t w e e n  v o i c e  a n d  n e w  t e c h n o l o g y ,  a n d  a s s o c i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  s u p e r n a t u r a l .  A s 
a  s p l i n t e r  e n q u i r y  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  c o n v e r s a t i o n s  a t  a n  E V P  ‘ T h i n k  T a n k ’  s e s s i o n  i n  2 0 1 2 ,  w e 
b e g a n  t o  c o n s i d e r  r e s e a r c h  i n t o  h e a r i n g  v o i c e s  a n d  s c h i z o p h r e n i a ,  a n d  i t  w a s  t h i s  s t r a n d 
o f  t h o u g h t  w h i c h  l e d  u s  t o  t h e  w o r k  o f  T i m o t h y  C r o w .  C r o w ’ s  t h e o r y  o f  ‘ c e r e b r a l  t o r q u e ’ 
p o s i t s  s c h i z o p h r e n i a  a s  a  p o s s i b l e  s y m p t o m  o f  t h e  l a t e r a l i s a t i o n  o f  b r a i n  f u n c t i o n  a n d  t h e 
e v o l u t i o n  o f  l a n g u a g e .   T h e  w o r d  ‘ t o r q u e ’ ,  w i t h  i t s  i n f e r e n c e  o f  l a n g u a g e  i n  m o t i o n  a m o n g  t h e 
c i r c u i t r y  o f  t h e  b r a i n ,  a n d  o f  t a l k i n g ,  o f f e r e d  a  t h e m a t i c  f u l c r u m  t o  b u i l d  t h e  p r o j e c t  a r o u n d .
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W E  H A V E  A P P R O P R I A T E D  A N D  R E D I R E C T E D  ‘ T O R Q U E ’ , 
F R E E I N G  I T  F R O M  T H E  S P E C I F I C S  O F  C R O W ’ S  T H E O R Y , 
B U T  M A I N T A I N I N G  I T S  E S S E N C E  A S  A  T W I S T I N G  F O R C E 
W I T H  R O O T S  I N  T H E  C O N J U N C T I O N  O F  T H E  B R A I N  A N D 
L A N G U A G E ,  A N D  W I T H  T H E  A D D I T I O N  O F  A  T E C H N O L O G I C A L 
D I M E N S I O N  –  T H E  T W I S T I N G  O F  W I R E S ,  T H E  T O R S I O N  O F 
T H E  M A C H I N E .  I N  E S S E N C E ,  C R O W ’ S  U S E  O F  ‘ C E R E B R A L 
T O R Q U E ’  A L L O W S  H I M  T O  P O S I T  S C H I Z O P H R E N I A  A S  ‘ T H E 
P R I C E  H O M O  S A P I E N S  P A Y  F O R  L A N G U A G E ’ .  O U R  U S E  O F 
T H E  T E R M  A L S O  A L L O W S  U S  T O  A S K :  W H A T ,  T H E N ,  I S 
T H E  P R I C E  W E  P A Y  F O R  T E C H N O L O G Y ?  D O E S  D I G I T A L 
T E C H N O L O G Y ’ S  V I R U S - L I K E  E M E R G E N C E  F U N C T I O N  L I K E  T H E 
‘ S P E C I A T I O N  E V E N T ’ ,  O R  A C T  L I K E  A  N E W  L O B E  O R  T O R S I O N 
I N  T H E  B R A I N ,  F U R T H E R  T W I S T I N G  I T S  L A T E R A L I Z A T I O N S ? 
In an attempt to articulate a particular type of 
movement and entwining inherent within our 
relationship to technology, we use torque to imply a 
rotating, spiral like force, capable of simultaneously 
pulling you in and spitting things out; of both 
tightening and loosening; exerted both upon, and 
from within, ourselves.  Torque is suggestive of our 
interdependent and transformative experience and 
use of technology which has the potential to both 
dominate and emancipate, through forces that 
morph, duplicate and reconfigure our ‘selves’, via 
online identities and mechanical prosthesis, where 
man and machine can trade places as fulcrum and 
force, tool and maker. In yet another sense, Torque 
is evocative of more distorted, unexpected or even 
sinister forces and movements – the words torture 
and torment, for example, share their etymological 
roots with torque, from the Latin torquere - to twist. 
While retaining our original interest in the 
interrelation of mind, language and technology, the 
entitling of the project has acted in a centrifugal 
manner, allowing contributors to project their 
ideas outward. In some cases these projections 
head deep into human histories – Esther Leslie 
discusses dancer Loie Fuller’s twisting serpentine 
movement of silken fabric as a kind of proto-screen 
or precursor to the rapture and spell of new media 
forms, or Lambros Malafouris uses the figure of the 
turning vase to illustrate his notion of thinking as 
thinging. In others, the authors look to the future 
– Stephen Fortune explores the perfect storm of 
transformative technologies emerging since the 
Industrial Revolution and into new layerings of 
virtual, informatic and geo-political territories 
which may lead to a significant biological shift in our 
brain’s ability to enable us to think for ourselves; 
Alex McLean and Geoff Cox describe conditions in 
which cultural operations with ‘code’ can inform 
our relationship to language and political agency.  
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Misappropriation and the uncanny become 
symptoms of the torsions between mind, language 
and technology in the work of Holly Pester, who 
combines her own artistic misuse of search engines 
and digital technology with Hannah Weiner’s twisted 
use of the International Code of Signals into lyric 
poetry, and in Cécile B Evans practice, who digitizes 
and recasts mundane and almost timeless hand-
held devices – scissors, a screw-driver, a comb – 
into digital form, pushing them ‘to their limits’ as 
things, and finding new emotionally rich terrain for 
us to explore.
Throughout the book, we have been delighted to 
find unexpected overlaps between works, which 
form new and greater resonances for the book as 
a whole. Esther Leslie’s look back at serpentine 
dancers speaks to Kate Sicchio’s text in which 
she discusses her work extending choreography 
into the arrangement and control of technological 
interfaces. Lawrence Abu Hamdan, Hannah 
Proctor, and Imogen Stidworthy each critique forms 
of visualization in technological analysis, reflecting 
on the ideological baggage these enticing forms of 
‘seeing’ possess - and the delineations and modes 
of control they imply.  Holly Pester’s code poetry 
unearths unexpected colonial and patriarchal 
inferences similarly found in the language of brain 
imaging discussed by Proctor and Abu Hamdan. 
And so on.
The inter-relationships for cognition and tool 
are of course not a new phenomena, and nor are 
they new modes of enquiry. As Malafouris’ essay 
articulates, tool making and use, brains, bodies 
and things are in a continual state of exchange, 
and the lines between mind and matter blur 
considerably.  In Malafouris’ theorisations, as with 
Cécile B Evan’s artworks, we see tools, language 
and the mind share a grammatical form – they 
speak to one another, and in this sense it matters 
less which came first because they cross fertilise 
and inform one another, through mutual feedback 
and codependent emergent processes, forging a 
generative interaction that is greater than the sum 
of its parts.
If language moves fluidly across the senses, 
functioning not only in the mind, mouth and ear, but 
also the hand and eye, and evolution can turn a leg 
into a wing or a worm into an human, the question 
of how we might merge and twist with machines 
becomes less strange and more pertinent, perhaps. 
This project is less about the speculative and steers 
away from science fictionalising life, however 
useful such representations are, towards more 
unalloyed analysis and depiction of contemporary 
existence, employing more historical, materialist 
and scientific examinations of the state of things.
Supplementing the essays, we have included 
a variety of artist pages - some of which were 
presented at the symposium and some at the live 
performance event.  We are pleased to be able to 
present the work of Karl Heinz Jeron, Chris Boyd, 
Cécile B Evans, and Benedict Drew as powerful 
semiotic nodes among the more discursive work.  In 
the research process we also encountered the work 
of Emil Alzamora and Dennis Oppenheim and we 
include their work for its inspirational resonances. 
And a special thank you to Anna Munster whose 
symposium presentation from Australia traversed 
multiple media, including printed matter, recorded 
voice and skype to brilliant effect.
There has also been a very generous response to 
the project from thinkers in our immediate circle in 
Liverpool and London, and we are glad to include 
notable contributions here from Robert Sheppard, 
responding to the talk given by Lambros Malafouris 
at the symposium and applying it to the field of 
experimental poetics, and from Mark Greenwood 
who contributed an unforgettable theatrical work 
with The Nodes at our live event in London, and 
drew interesting inferences in his Q&A with Imogen 
Stidworthy. Also thanks to Ste Cole and Hannah 
Silva who translated with skill and sensitivity the 
concerns of the project into a number of workshop 
sessions, co-produced with ourselves, and 
congratulations are due to all who participated in 
these and created highly imaginative works that 
deftly twisted mind, language and technology, and 
made the whole process a joy.
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T O R Q U E  # 1  I S  W E  H O P E  T H E  B E G I N N I N G  O F  S O M E T H I N G  N E W . 
Q U I T E  H O W  I T  W I L L  E V O L V E  I S  A S  Y E T  U N K N O W N  B U T  W E 
E N V I S A G E  A  N O M A D I C  P R O J E C T  T H A T  I N H A B I T S  A N D  P R O D U C E S 
P U B L I C A T I O N S ,  S Y M P O S I A ,  I N S T A L L A T I O N S  A N D  E V E N T S , 
I N  C O L L A B O R A T I O N  W I T H  I N D I V I D U A L S ,  O R G A N I S A T I O N S 
A N D  P L A C E S ,  C R O S S I N G  T H E  F I E L D S  O F  A R T ,  S C I E N C E  A N D 
C O N T E M P O R A R Y  C U L T U R E  –  A N D  I N  S O  D O I N G  P R O M O T E 
S I G N I F I C A N T L Y  N E W  M O D E S  O F  T H I N K I N G ,  D O I N G  A N D  B E I N G .
As we have indicated, torque, torsion, and twisting, 
are a guiding motif for the project – with its 
divergent twirling strands and multi-platform 
character we are trying to achieve a dynamic and 
cumulative interplay between different disciplines, 
participants, processes and media. The symposia, 
live events, workshops and publication have all 
worked collectively to inform and catalyse one 
another, and we hope that this publication with its 
nexus of imagery and theorisations channels this 
further.
We hope this publication contributes something 
to the discourse surrounding the plasticity of 
the brain, the adaptability of technology and the 
malleability of language, and how each offer within 
them, and in their conflations, a powerful potential 
to be moulded, reimagined, and redirected.
The contributors and their work presented each 
offer unique models of navigating this territory, 
of making their own artefacts, writing their own 
scripts, forging critical space and examining the 
blind spots.  
Please note one specific twist to the usual format 
- we have allowed authors to use their preferred 
reference format, rather than stipulating a specific 
style, thus the publication switches between 
endnotes and footnotes, Chicago and Harvard - this 
decision is based on the interdisciplinarity of the 
authors and our confidence in readers ability to 
adapt.
We want to thank all those who directly contributed 
to the project and publication, the majority of 
which are new commissions. And sincere thanks to 
designer Charles Holden and our project partners 
at FACT, Mencap, Rich Mix, Link Editions and Arts 
Council England. Also, to those whose work was 
not present at the events but contributed to the 
publication, including: Lawrence Abu Hamdan, 
Esther Leslie, Emil Alzamora and Amy Plumb 
Oppenheim for assistance with documents relating 
to Dennis Oppenheim. Also thank you to cellist 
Oliver Coates for his new sound work and for his 
performance at Rich Mix, accompanying a new 
video work by Sam Skinner. This work, and other 
project details and research material can be found 
at: www.torquetorque.tumblr.com
S a m  S k i n n e r  a n d  N a t h a n  J o n e s
L o n d o n  -  L i v e r p o o l  /  A u g u s t  2 0 1 4
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I“ N E A R  T O  U S  A R E  W H A T  W E  U S U A L L Y  C A L L  T H I N G S ” ,  T H E 
P H I L O S O P H E R  M A R T I N  H E I D E G G E R  W R I T E S  I N  H I S  F A M O U S 
E S S A Y  “ D A S  D I N G ”  ( T H E  T H I N G )  ( 1 9 7 5 ,  1 6 6 ) .  B U T  W H A T 
D O  W E  M E A N  W H E N  W E  S A Y  O F  S O M E T H I N G  T H A T  I T  I S 
A  T H I N G ?  W H A T  T H I N G S  A R E ?  H E I D E G G E R  T A K E S  T H E 
E X A M P L E  O F  A  J U G .  I  W I L L  U S E  I N S T E A D  A  C E R A M I C  V A S E 
T H A T  I S  ‘ N E A R  T O  M E ’  A N D  T H U S  I  H A P P E N  T O  K N O W 
B E T T E R  ( F I G U R E  1 ) .  L E T ’ S  T R Y  T O  T H I N K  A B O U T  I T S 
‘ T H I N G N E S S ’ .  W H A T  M A K E S  T H I S  V A S E  A  T H I N G  R E A L L Y ?
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Figure 1
One way we could answer that question and come to 
know the ‘thingness’ of that vase is by experiencing 
some of its phenomenal qualities. We could perceive 
its colour, follow the shape of its body, or the ways 
the light is reflected on its exterior surface. If we 
want, we could reach and grasp it. We could feel its 
temperature, weight, or maybe – depending on how 
experienced we are – also sense something of the 
texture and physical qualities of the clay that it is 
made of. Another way to think about the ‘thingness’ 
of this artefact is to try identify its possible function. 
We could, for instance, classify it as a container that 
can be used to hold something within it and name 
it as a vase. We could also perhaps think about its 
origin, about the processes responsible for making 
it the object it is. We could think of the people, the 
actions, the materials, the tools and the places 
involved in its manufacture, and we could also think 
about it in terms of style, texture, value, aesthetic, 
skill, time or technique. We could also try to draw it 
on a piece of paper. Of course, there is a personal 
or subjective element in all these. I, for instance, 
just by looking at this vase can remember persons, 
events, and places associated with it in the past. 
The vase has a life history of which I am a part. As 
a result, this object is mine in a sense that it can 
never be yours. By the same token the vase belongs 
to the potter who made it – on the wheel – or to the 
person(s) who use it in a way that is different from 
my remote sense of ‘mineness’. 
I can go on writing about this vase for hours. But 
even then we would have merely scratched the 
surface of the varieties of our sensuous material 
engagement. Be that as it may, have we done any 
progress with our initial query about what is the 
mode of existence of what we call ‘thingness’ or 
‘thinghood’? Not really. It seems that the answer to 
that question is more difficult than common sense 
and our use of language in everyday experience 
might have it. Heidegger, for instance, maintained 
that things are not what we usually call ‘objects’. 
Things become ‘objects’ when they lose their 
‘thingness’. Reflecting on how a thing retains or 
loses its ‘thingness’ Heidegger comes up with 
the following articulation: “the vessel’s thingness 
does not lie at all in the material of which it 
consists, but in the void that it holds” (Heidegger 
1975, 169). Understanding ‘thingness’ then is less 
about producing a list of primary and secondary 
material or phenomenal qualities and more about 
penetrating the ontological power of this vessel to 
“gather” space and time. But what does it mean 
to say that a thing ‘gathers’? Heidegger introduces 
the term “thinging” as a means of expressing 
the “gathering” or tying together of the vessel’s 
ontological constituents which comprise not just 
the totality of the form-making processes brought 
together in the making of this particular thing, but 
also the material conditions and relations that will 
sustain the vessel’s social, cognitive, and emotional 
life (actual and possible). This idea of ‘thinging’ as 
‘gathering’, I think provides an interesting metaphor 
to think about things. 
My own use of the term thinging tries to retain 
something of this original sense of ‘gathering’ at 
its heart. But I also diverge from the Heideggerian 
phenomenological path, especially relevant to 
one aspect of ‘thingness’ that is typically cast 
in the shadow: the vitality and agency of things 
in human thinking, or else, the cognitive life of 
things (Malafouris 2008c; Malafouris & Renfrew 
2010; Bennett 2010; Sutton 2002). I argue that to 
understand the latter we need first to answer the 
question of what do things do for the mind. Trying 
to do so, I adopt the term thinging to denote, 
more specifically, the act of thinking and feeling 
with, through, and about things. The notion of 
thinging  will be referring to the process by 
which things are presented to us through acts of 
material engagement, rather than, to the process 
by which things are re-presented in us by way of 
internalisation and mental substitution. It follows 
that with thinging the focus falls on a variety of 
material assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004; 
Marcus & Saka 2006) and ecologies (Ingold 2012; 
Hutchins 2010) rather than just on specific objects, 
tools and external representations. Thinging 
embodies culture specific bodily techniques, it also 
extends to sensory and cognitive prostheses and 
interfaces of any kind. 
This description of thinging is probably too general 
to serve taxonomic philosophical considerations. 
But in its lack of analytic precision and closure 
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it opens up new possibilities for transgressing 
some of our common-sense assumptions about 
what minds and things are, and about how they 
relate and connect to each other. The analytical 
value of the notion thinging, then, lies in helping 
us to understand not what things are (as entities), 
but instead, how things come to be, that is, how 
things come to possess ontological specificity or 
multiplicity in the course of their life history. This 
will inevitably vary in different times and places. The 
notion of thinging seeks to encapsulate the major 
phenomenological ingredients of the latter process 
shifting our attention away from the sphere of 
isolated and fixed categories (objects, artefacts etc.) 
to the sphere of the fluid and relational transactions 
between people and things. In doing so thinging, 
on the one hand, frees thinking from a cognitivist 
view of what mind consists of, and on the other 
frees things from a narrowly modernist definition 
of what matter consists of. Thus, so far as thinging 
is concerned no precise and closed definition of  it 
should be expected. Instead, I suggest we stress 
this ontological mixture of minds and things and we 
will see how far it goes before it tears.
I I
In any case, the basic premise that I want to 
communicate through the notion of thinging is quite 
simple: We humans are thingers. Not only most of 
our thinking is thinking with, through and about 
things, it is also, as Henri-Louis Bergson neatly 
puts it more than a century ago in his Creative 
Evolution “a manufacturing kind of thinking” (une 
pensée de la fabrication) (1998 [1911], 137). Humans 
are creators of new things which constantly re-
shape our bodies, re-configure our minds, and 
re-invent our selves (Clark 2007; Malafouris 2008 
a,b; 2010). No other animal has been or can be 
defined as a species on the basis of its relationship 
with the variety of things and material forms that 
it makes. We humans are precisely a species of 
this rather strange sort. Bergson’s designation of 
man as Homo faber rather than Homo sapiens still 
captures an important aspect of that strangeness. 
Let me explain, I say we are strange, not because 
I deny that other animals are capable of thinging - 
we know that to a certain extent they are. Nor do I 
say we are strange because I believe that by making 
things, and by thinking through things we overcome 
the limits of our ‘nature’ and enter into a separate 
‘cultural’ realm. There is no moment in the history 
of human evolution where biology gave way to 
culture. Such a separation between ‘nature’ and 
‘culture’ would contradict the reality of becoming 
as a reciprocal belonging and mingling of the two 
in the process of human evolution (see also Ingold 
& Pálsson  2013; Ingold 2004; Bloch 2012). Instead, 
human becoming has always been inseparably 
linked with the developmental contingencies of 
action. No bodily activity - not even our basic capacity 
for bipedal locomotion - is immune to the situated 
dynamics of real life ontogenetic development. As 
the anthropologist Marcel Mauss neatly points out 
in his famous essay on bodily techniques, there is 
no ‘natural’ way to move our bodies (1973). I would 
like to add there is no ‘cultural’ way either. Instead, 
we should think of the acting body as a relational 
developmental achievement of situated material 
engagement. This opening up of the conditions 
and possibilities of human becoming by way of 
material engagement brings us right at the heart 
of the phenomenon I am trying to capture when I 
talk about human strangeness: we humans have 
made thinging part of our nature. Putting it simply, 
with thinging biological heredity becomes creative 
evolution. 
Instead of simply reproducing ourselves, we rather 
extend ourselves and we construct new cognitive 
and material ecologies for growing and instituting 
our minds. We create things which in turn create us. 
As I will return to discuss in the last part of the essay 
the ontological messiness of this ongoing dialectic 
of co-constitution can be the cause of cognitive 
dissonance and epistemic embarrassment, but 
also the source of inspiration. So what exactly do 
we mean when we say that things make us just as 
much as we make things? This question raises a 
great challenge for all the disciplines involved in 
the study of human ways of being and becoming –
especially for archaeology and anthropology. What 
would make a good example to illustrate the impact 
of thinging in human consciousness? Given that one 
of the leading questions of the Torque symposium, 
from which this essay derives, was about the ways 
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new technologies are ‘twisting together’ moments 
of reading, writing and speaking, I will use the 
practice of writing as a form of thinging. 
I I I
What is the transformative impact of writing 
in human consciousness, self conception, and 
thinking? From Theuth’s invention of writing in 
Plato’s Phaedrus to Google the question of the 
relationship between writing and thinking remains 
open. According to the so-called “literacy thesis” 
the advent of writing has changed the way we think 
about language (Goody 1968; McLuhan 1964; Ong 
1982; Harris 1989). The fundamental idea is simple: 
writing invites reflective and critical thinking. 
Once something is written it affords and motivates 
comparison, questioning and interpretation – 
even skepticism - in ways that the transient and 
context-dependent oral forms of narration and 
communication do not. “Without writing”, Walter 
Ong famously argued (1982, 78) the mind “would not 
and could not think as it does”.
Of course, to say that writing changes the way 
we think does not need to imply any simplistic 
dichotomy between literate and non-literate 
societies. For one thing, there is no clear sense in 
which reading and writing constitute an advance 
on its predecessors’ mental powers. For another, 
the effects of literacy cannot be separated or 
understood independently of their broader 
historical situation, learning environment, and 
skills. Significant differences are to be expected but 
those changes are the relational products of specific 
cognitive ecologies of literacy rather than literacy 
as such (see e.g. Scribner and Cole 1981). As Sylvia 
Scribner reminds us “the single most compelling 
fact about literacy is that it is a social achievement… 
Literacy abilities are acquired by individuals only 
in the course of participation in socially organized 
activities with written language” (1984, 7-8). 
Nevertheless, there is a new kind of consciousness 
emerging within this process of writing. Writing 
more than the passive externalization of speech 
by way of symbolic representations is a radical 
transformation in the perceptual experience and 
thus awareness of language. To perceive speech as 
a linear sequence of words, symbols, and sentences 
opens the door to a new awareness and meaning of 
signification.
Meanwhile, recent discoveries in cognitive and 
developmental neuroscience demonstrate how 
the brain is changed by learning to read and write 
(Dehaene 2009). What is less obvious is how we 
account and interpret those changes, as well as 
how those changes differ from other changes 
that occur as a result of cultural invention and 
practice. David Olson offers a compelling example 
of this exploration into the cognitive implications 
of reading and writing in the last two chapters 
of his book The World on Paper (1994) when he 
describes the origins of subjectivity and the making 
of the literate mind. Differentiating his view on 
the cognitive implications of writing from Merlin 
Donald’s emphasis on the use of different kinds of 
“exographic storage” (1991) as a means of cognitive 
extension he argues that more than extending 
memory the primary impact of those graphic 
practices should be sought in “the new concepts” 
emerging from their use. It is those concepts 
which effect the greatest change in our ways of 
thinking by allowing us to understand language, 
the world and our minds in a new way (1994, 258). 
More recently, the philosopher Richard Menary, 
working on the same question of how writing 
changes the way people think and act outlines 
what he calls “a cognitive integrationist account” 
(2007, 621-22). In brief, Menary views writing as 
a hybrid mental act that involves the co-ordinated 
interaction between different processes (neural, 
bodily and environmental). The basic point of 
Menary’s thesis is that both writing and the ways 
in which the enduring products of this process can 
be manipulated, should be understood as an active 
process of ‘thinking in action’. I certainly agree 
with Menary’s cognitive integrationist model of 
writing, but I suggest it is also important to specify 
how different acts of writing and their products 
(written sentences or other) differ from one socio-
historical context to the other. This means that 
writing letters on the page or in any other available 
medium, must be understood not only as ways of 
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acting and thinking but also as inseparable parts 
of literacy practices and techniques which, as has 
been shown by Scribner and Cole (1981) in their 
famous meticulous study of the Vai people of West 
Africa (Liberia and Sierre Leone), are products of 
given society and historical context. In other words, 
we need to take into consideration the context-
dependent nature of reading and writing skills as 
forms of thinging. That is, we need a comparative 
anthropology of writing, one that is materially and 
practice oriented, but also firmly grounded in an 
image of mind not limited by the skin. Only then 
we can understand the differences or similarities 
between a medieval cleric and a Mycenaean scribe, 
or between the trace of an inscription left by the hand 
on the page and the typing on present day QWERTY 
keyboards. Understanding important transitions 
in the history of human graphic systems, from the 
medieval manuscript to the modern printed text 
to the internet, depend on critically understanding 
the cognitive ecologies and ontologies of the 
materialities and bodily practices involved.  What 
does this mean really? Let’s take one step at a time. 
I return to the basics. Exactly how are things related 
to thinking?
I V 
Consider the following related philosophical query: 
Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world 
begin? I would say that this increasingly popular 
question, raised initially by the philosophers Andy 
Clark and David Chalmers in their famous essay 
The Extended Mind (1998), still sounds odd to many 
people. Surely the human head offers a ‘natural’ 
demarcation line for separating mind-stuff from 
the rest of the world. Why do we need our big and 
metabolically expensive brains if not for taking 
care our thinking? Can this deeply entrenched 
assumption about the boundaries of the mind be 
wrong? Many people working in the sciences of 
the mind from a dynamically based embodied, 
distributed and enactive perspective think that it is 
(Varela et al. 1991; Clark 1997; 2008; Hutchins 1995; 
2010; Thompson 2007; Hutto & Myin 2013; Chemero 
2009; Wheeler 2005; Noë 2004; Sutton 2008; Menary 
2010). I certainly agree with them. 
But how can this be? It is one thing to say that one 
can be wrong about what part of the brain can be 
associated with what kind of mental activity, or to 
disagree about the biological and evolutionary basis 
and function of these associations, it is indeed, 
another to say that most of what we know about the 
human mind is grounded on such a huge ontological 
mistake. How is it possible that a long-standing 
tradition in Western philosophy, psychology 
and more recently cognitive science would have 
repeatedly failed to realise, such an obvious fact of 
human cognitive life, namely, that human thought 
is not merely expressed in things but, instead, it 
comes into existence through them? There are 
many reasons and, obviously, I cannot discuss them 
here at any length. I will just mention the one more 
pertinent to my purpose here and more relevant to 
my purpose in this essay. 
Most of what we know about the human mind, 
but also the ways by which we have come to know 
what we know about the human mind, came about 
without any consideration to the world of things. The 
mind can be aware of things, or perceive things, but 
the mental actions which enable us to think about 
things are seen as different in kind from the physical 
actions we use to grasp and manipulate them. 
Philosophers may have pondered for centuries if 
things exist whether or not an organism perceives 
or is aware of them, but the nature of this awareness 
was never premised in the presence of things, but 
always in their absence. Paradoxically, although 
there has been much debate and discussion about 
whether there can be thought without language, 
the possibility of the co-constitution of minds and 
things, that is, of thinking as thinging has never 
been properly explored or even raised. Though 
this epistemic neglect of things is unfortunate, it is 
hardly surprising. One of the major objectives in the 
study of mind has been to demarcate and insulate 
the mental from the physical and then come up with 
a mechanism able to bridge the huge ontological 
gap left between. To accomplish that material 
culture has to be left out from the cognitive system 
proper. In the place of real things ‘out there’ various 
neural and mental substitutes were created and 
placed inside the cranium. We call those substitutes 
mental, or more recently, neural ‘representations’. 
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I imagine that methodologically speaking, this 
substitution makes good sense if your objective is to 
fit a part of the world inside the brain while lying still 
in a fMRI scanner or to build a computational model 
to account for it. But the ontology of this underlying 
representational logic is weak and its products often 
resemble a lifeless abstraction. More importantly, it 
misleads us to think that all that really matters to 
study the mind and its evolution is to understand 
the nature of the internal mental representations 
and the input/output mechanisms that enable their 
formation, transformation and processing. As a 
result, not only does it often go unnoticed that most 
of our thinking takes place outside our heads, but 
when it gets noticed it seems odd. Much of value in 
the study of mind has been lost.
From the vantage point of archaeology, looking 
carefully at the earliest examples of human 
engagement with the material world one could 
hardly find any reason why the study of the mind 
should simply focus on the brain ‘inside’ the head. 
Rather, what we see in the archaeological record 
suggests both equivalence and complementarity 
of what is ‘inside’ with what is ‘outside’. From the 
coevolution of stone tools and language and the 
freeing of hands to the construction of the first 
compound tools, body ornaments, engravings, to 
the emergence of symbols and writing systems, 
thinging has been playing an active role in human 
evolution extending our bodies and bringing forth 
our minds. There is an abundance of evidence 
testifying that things, like neurons, have played a 
significant role in the making of the human mind. 
Brains, bodies and things participate equally, 
albeit in different ways, in human cognitive life. 
Obviously, I do not mean to question the neural 
bases of cognition or the immense contribution 
of neuroscience methods like neuroimaging in 
delineating how cognition is supported and mediated 
by the brain. I want simply to underline that the 
brain is only part of the story of mind, or to use the 
words of pragmatist philosopher and psychologist 
John Dewey “Hands and feet, apparatus and 
appliances of all kinds are as much a part of it as 
changes within the brain” (Dewey  1916, 13–14).
This is also where Material Engagement Theory 
(MET) comes in (Malafouris 2013; 2004). The major 
objectives are: (a) to explore the varieties of human 
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Figure 2
thinging, and (b) to investigate how those ways 
might have changed since earliest prehistory, 
and what implications they may have for human 
intelligence. Material Engagement Theory wants to 
change our understanding of what minds are, and 
what minds are made of, by changing what we know 
about what things are and about what things do for 
the mind. It enables us to restate the problem of the 
interaction between cognition and material culture 
by placing it upon a new relational foundation. The 
anthropologist Edwin Hutchins (2010), also inspired 
by Gregory Bateson, uses the term cognitive ecology 
to describe a similar kind of relatedness. The 
challenge for cognitive archaeology then becomes 
one of penetrating the ontology of this “relational 
domain” from an object-oriented perspective. 
To achieve this objective, Material Engagement 
incorporates three major working hypotheses, each 
one targeting a different but complementary aspect 
of human becoming - i.e., cognition, signification, 
and agency  (Figure 2): the hypothesis of the extended 
mind, which explores the constitutive intertwining 
of cognition with material culture; the hypothesis 
of enactive signification which explores the nature 
of the material sign not as a representational 
mechanism but as a semiotic conflation and co-
habitation through matter that enacts and brings 
forth the world; and last, the hypothesis of material 
agency which explores agency not as a human 
property but as the emergent product of situated 
activity (asking not ‘What is an agent?’ but ‘When 
is an agent?’)
V 
If all that sounds too complicated let me put it more 
simply using a more familiar phenomenological 
example. Think of a blind person with a stick. Where 
does the blind person’s self begin? This example, 
which I borrow of course from Merleau-Ponty (1962) 
and Gregory Bateson (1973), is one of my favourites. 
It provides a timely and refreshing analogy for the 
profound embodiment and plasticity of the human 
mind. It also helps us conceptualise the ontological 
unity and continuity of minds and things in the 
course of human becoming. Turning touch into 
sight the stick becomes an interface of a peculiar 
transformative sort - what might be called a brain-
artefact interface or enactive cognitive prosthesis 
(Malafouris 2010a; 2008b). Whatever actual form 
the ‘stick’ might have taken in the history of our 
species (from the earliest Paleolithic stone tools 
to the latest information technology), its primary 
function was that of a pathway for thinging. 
Through the ‘stick’, the human species, much like 
the blind man in our example, feels, discovers, 
and makes sense of the environment, but also 
enacts the way forward. Let’s not forget that from 
an evolutionary point of view the main reason we 
have a brain is to move not to contemplate. To begin 
with, moving was thinking. I mean that not in the 
computational sense of developing a brain able to 
produce and control adaptable complex movement. 
Rather, I mean that in the enactive sense of 
developing a mind which is “inextricably linked to 
histories that are lived, much like paths that exist 
only as they are laid down in walking” (Varela et al. 
1991, 205). And it seems fair to say that the reason 
we came to have our meta-cognitive capacities 
for language and reflective thinking is that unlike 
any other animal we gave our movement purpose, 
conscious direction and collective meaning. We had 
to use a stick to accomplish that, something concrete, 
a material scaffold to think through, with and about. 
This unique human epistemic predisposition for 
material engagement can explain why we humans, 
more than any other species, make things, and 
how those things, in return, make our minds what 
they are. It is especially in the latter sense that the 
example of the blind man’s stick encapsulates the 
spirit of Material Engagement Theory. It reminds 
us of something that many people forget, namely, 
that no human mind is ever complete. It is in the 
nature of human intelligence to remain amenable 
to drastic deep reorganization and reconstitution by 
incorporating new technological innovations. 
Let me explain. We are used to thinking of our 
‘sapient’ minds, with all our unique capacities, 
as the apex of human evolution. But I have 
repeatedly emphasised in my writings that this 
vision of humanity as ‘complete’ and ‘fixed’, and 
the concomitant neo-Darwinian ideals of cognitive 
and behavioural ‘modernity’, is certainly wrong. 
My approach to human evolution, instead, sees 
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the human mind as an unfinished project, in some 
sense ‘blind’, and thus, potentially, in a permanent 
state of on-going evolution. I said before that we 
humans are different from other animals in that we 
have made thinging our nature. I would also insist 
that we humans are also a species ‘incomplete’ by 
nature, which also explains our remarkable plastic 
qualities and prosthetic abilities (Malafouris 2013; 
2010b). The extraordinary plasticity of human mind 
and its reciprocal openness to creative evolution 
by way of learning and technology becomes a 
distinctive feature of our species. I am not saying 
that other species are not plastic or intelligent in 
their own special ways. And, obviously, I am not 
just talking about brain or neural plasticity here. I 
take it we all agree that the brain of humans and 
other animals is intrinsically plastic. It changes 
both structurally and functionally in response to the 
environment and experience. What I am proposing, 
and thus, my use of the term ‘creative evolution’ 
which I borrow of course from the famous book of 
Henri Louis Bergson, is that we humans, unlike any 
other species, seem to have more than just a plastic 
mind: we have a mind which is also inextricably 
intertwined with a plastic culture. I am trying to 
gesture towards a different kind of plasticity:  the 
plasticity of a mind not limited by the skin. I call 
that meta-plasticity  -  we have a plastic mind which 
is inseparably constituted with a plastic culture. 
The focus here is on understanding the nature of 
plastic changes, not at the level of the individual, 
but in the broader systemic context (cultural or 
social) where thinging takes place. At this higher 
level of engagement with the material world where 
neural and cultural plasticity interact and exchange 
properties, material culture competes, equally with 
any other brain region, for a place in the human 
cognitive system. 
The actual forces that shape the directions, size and 
connections of neural fibers can only be found ‘out 
there’ into the world. And I argue that best way to 
make sense of that and gain empirical access to 
metaplasticity is to focus on the realm of material 
engagement, that is, where brains, bodies and 
cultures conflate. Human beings, understood as 
real living creatures that move and act in this world, 
are the developmental products of this conflation. If 
you separate the three - if you separate brain, body 
and culture - you end up with a number of overly 
simplified abstractions about lifeless categories. 
I am not denying the analytical value of those 
abstractions for many disciplines; but I do think 
they are misleading when it comes to understanding 
human becoming. The dynamical account of acting 
and thinking that the focus on thinging and material 
engagement brings with it, promises reconnecting 
the brain with the body and beyond, and breaking 
with reductionistic explanations and the cognitivist 
past. This is also where popular ideas like that 
of ‘connectome’ (Sporns 2011) and ‘meshwork’ 
(Varela 1991; Ingold 2008; Knappett 2011) could 
meet the notion of thinging.  A precondition for that 
however, is the recognition that cognition has no 
a priori location. The active mind cannot be easily 
contained. Thinking is thinging.
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Take, for example, Google’s aspirations beyond 
its constitution as the ‘ultimate’ search engine. 
Its construction of and investment in ‘the future’ 
rests on its capacity to reterritorialise this proto-
mind space. This reterritorialisation is attempted 
via a raft of machine learning techniques from 
data mining to dataset training, which claim to 
reveal dimensions of thought and behaviour. This 
move away from search per se toward prediction 
of what “users” desire before they even know 
what they want signals an insidious foray into the 
nonconscious and affective terrain of precognition 
and all its inbetweenness. Networked platforms 
and corporations thus turn toward systems, tools, 
and processes of what I call “neuroperception”; 
that is, a paradigm of perception that sees human 
thought and action emanating from the overlay 
of artificial neural networks on to our forming 
sensorium. This overlay stakes a claim to what are 
actually the indeterminate nonpredictive capacities 
of neurobiological processes. In neuroscience this 
nonpredictability is everywhere referred to as the 
brain’s plasticity. Yet plasticity is not the only facet 
of brains that make the neuroscience of thinking 
indeterminate:
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O U T  T H A T  S H A R E  O F  M I N D  W H I C H  I S  N O N C O N S C I O U S 
O R  P R E C O G N I T I V E  A N D  S T A K E S  A  C L A I M  O N  W H A T  W E 
S H O U L D  B E  T H I N K I N G  A N D  F E E L I N G ,  H O W  W E  S H O U L D 
B E  B E H A V I N G ,  B E F O R E  W E  R E G I S T E R  T H A T  T H I S 
E N T A N G L E M E N T  I S  S O M E T H I N G  W E  M I G H T  I N D E E D  W A N T . 
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In a range of experiments that began in the 1970s 
using electroencephalograms to measure brain 
activity, Benjamin Libet proposed that the brain 
exhibits a ‘readiness potential’ of at least half a 
second before conscious awareness that an action 
or stimulus takes place. This measurement of 
‘evoked potential’ is a sharp positive potential 
appearing in the appropriate sensory region of the 
brain about 25 milliseconds after a skin stimulus. 
Libet’s experiments demonstrated that there is 
an automatic subjective referral of conscious 
experience backwards in time to this time marker. 
In 2008, researchers from the Max Planck 
Institute used fMRIs to watch in vivo brain activity 
of participants making decisions to push a button 
randomly in either their left or right hands. The 
findings were startling, revealing that brain activity 
began in different regions of the prefrontal and 
parietal cortex – depending on whether the final 
decision was a left or right push outcome – up to 
10 seconds before it entered awareness for the 
subject. The researchers concluded that the delay 
presumably reflected the operation of a network 
of high-level control areas that began to prepare 
an upcoming decision long before it entered 
awareness. 
For Libet, these subjective referrals would appear to 
be purely a mental function with no corresponding 
neural basis in the brain: 
John-Dylan Haynes, one of the 2008 researchers 
suggests instead that the ‘neural patterning’ and 
awareness of a decision might be more fruitfully 
understood as both a continuum and in relations of 
feedback with each other: 
I f  y o u  t a p  y o u r  f i n g e r  o n  t h e  t a b l e ,  y o u 
e x p e r i e n c e  t h e  e v e n t  a s  o c c u r r i n g  i n  “ r e a l 
t i m e ” .  T h a t  i s ,  y o u  s u b j e c t i v e l y  f e e l  t h e 
t o u c h  o c c u r r i n g  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  y o u r 
f i n g e r  m a k e s  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  t a b l e .  B u t  o u r 
e x p e r i m e n t a l  e v i d e n c e  s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r t s  a 
s u r p r i s i n g  f i n d i n g  t h a t  i s  d i r e c t l y  c o u n t e r 
t o  o u r  o w n  i n t u i t i o n  a n d  f e e l i n g s :  T h e  b r a i n 
n e e d s  a  r e l a t i v e l y  l o n g  p e r i o d  o f  a p p r o p r i a t e 
a c t i v a t i o n s ,  u p  t o  h a l f  a  s e c o n d ,  t o  e l i c i t 
a w a r e n e s s  o f  t h e  e v e n t !  Y o u r  c o n s c i o u s 
e x p e r i e n c e  o r  a w a r e n e s s  o f  y o u r  f i n g e r 
t o u c h i n g  t h e  t a b l e  t h u s  a p p e a r s  o n l y  a f t e r 
t h e  b r a i n  a c t i v i t i e s  h a v e  b e c o m e  a d e q u a t e 
t o  p r o d u c e  t h e  a w a r e n e s s .  ( L i b e t ,  2 0 0 4 :  3 3 ) 
[ . . . ]  M Y  V I E W  O F  M E N T A L 
S U B J E C T I V E  F U N C T I O N  I S 
T H A T  I T  I S  A N  E M E R G E N T 
P R O P E R T Y  O F  A P P R O P R I A T E 
B R A I N  F U N C T I O N S .  T H E 
C O N S C I O U S  M E N T A L  C A N N O T 
E X I S T  W I T H O U T  T H E  B R A I N 
P R O C E S S E S  T H A T  G I V E 
R I S E  T O  I T .  H O W E V E R , 
H A V I N G  E M E R G E D  F R O M 
B R A I N  A C T I V I A T I E S  A S 
A  U N I Q U E  ‘ P R O P E R T Y ’ 
O F  T H A T  P H Y S I C A L 
S Y S T E M ,  T H E  M E N T A L  C A N 
E X H I B I T  P H E N O M E N A  N O T 
E V I D E N T  I N  T H E  N E U R A L 
B R A I N  T H A T  P R O D U C E D 
I T  ( L I B E T .  2 0 0 4 :  8 6 – 8 7 )
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The notion that neural activity ‘controls’ or 
determines who we are and what we do is a fantasy 
derived from our ways of thinking about thought 
and the brain and is not necessarily borne out by 
these kind of neuroscientific studies. 
However, prediction is good for business.  A good 
example of the contemporary “predictive” trend 
(and an attempt to capture the vagueness of 
‘potential’) is the development and implementation 
of Google’s Prediction API tool. This tool forms 
part of the networked corporation’s self-conscious 
development from “search” toward artificial 
intelligence and marries cloud computing with 
predictive AI. Both Prediction API and the shift to 
prediction as the ultimate goal for Google search 
are indicative of a disposition toward capturing and 
reterritorializing the radical potential of distributed 
(neuro)architectures. Like any API, the heart of this 
application is source code that allows for certain 
kinds of communication functions to occur on or 
between components of a database. In the case of 
the Prediction API, these functionalities allow for 
pattern matching and machine learning. As Eric 
Scmidt, Google’s CEO famously stated:
We can see the mutation of search into prediction, 
chance into determination via statements made by 
Google senior executives over the last few years:
 
“Serendipity” – without the least amount of irony 
– transmutes into “prediction,” becoming the 
resource on which the Google machine lays down 
its artificial neural networks. Today the most 
serendipitous product leaves nothing to chance. 
Welcome to the world of Google’s Glass. 
The 2013 TED talk in which Sergey Brin, Google 
founder, infamously fumbled between his phone 
and pocket, on the one hand, and smoothly and 
transparently slid from Glass to its transducer 
behind his ear, on the other, was revealing of his 
‘vision’ for the next phase of the corporation’s R&D. 
Brin stated that his vision for Google was eventually 
for its engine to be “queryless” – information would 
just come to you when you needed it. Indeed there 
would be no ‘future’ – in the sense of indeterminacy 
– for query, because the potential to vary, to be 
different and, moreover, to change one’s mind while 
thinking, would never be activated. Information 
would just arrive.
I  a c t u a l l y  t h i n k  m o s t  p e o p l e  d o n ’ t  w a n t 
G o o g l e  t o  a n s w e r  t h e i r  q u e s t i o n s …  T h e y 
w a n t  G o o g l e  t o  t e l l  t h e m  w h a t  t h e y 
s h o u l d  b e  d o i n g  n e x t .  ( S c h m i d t ,  E ,  2 0 1 0 ) 
I N  F I V E  Y E A R S ,  G O O G L E  W I L L 
H A V E  B U I L T  ‘ T H E  P R O D U C T  I ’ V E 
A L W A Y S  W A N T E D  T O  B U I L D  - 
W E  C A L L  I T  ‘ S E R E N D I P I T Y , ’ … 
[ I T  W I L L ]  T E L L  M E  W H A T 
I  S H O U L D  B E  T Y P I N G . ’ 
S C H M I D T  I N  F A R B E R :  2 0 0 6 ) 
I F  W E  F I N D  T H A T  A  P E R S O N ’ S 
T H O U G H T S  A R E  V E R Y  C L O S E L Y 
E N C O D E D  I N  T H E I R  B R A I N 
A C T I V I T Y ,  W E  C A N ’ T  M A K E  A 
D I S T I N C T I O N  B E T W E E N  T H E S E 
T H O U G H T S  A N D  T H E  B R A I N 
A C T I V I T Y .  W E  D O N ’ T  N E E D 
T O  A S S U M E  T H A T  T H E Y ’ R E 
T W O  S E P A R A T E  E N T I T I E S 
E X I S T I N G  I N  T W O  D I F F E R E N T 
S P A C E S .  ( H A Y N E S ,  2 0 0 9 )
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What is different about platforms such as Google 
Glass, and indeed any predictive technologies, 
is that they modify the temporal ordering of 
immediated assemblages of technology, body 
and environment into linear sequences. In so 
doing, they shape their ‘events’ into linear order; 
events here being simply things that happen 
relationally in and to bodies, brains, technics and 
their habitats. These kind of temporal inflections 
performed by predictive immedia are ‘captures’; 
they are political because they bring force to bear 
on relations of presentness, pastness and futurity, 
and because such force harnesses us to a specific 
subjectivation reliant upon a proprietary platform. 
Predictive technologies necessitate an unfolding of 
temporality in which we become subjectively aware 
of the next product we want to buy, the next item we 
require more information about, the next restaurant 
we want to eat at, through a simultaneous backward 
referral or “antedating” of our sensory experience 
and a filling in of the temporal gap between desire 
(which is past) and consciousness (which is present) 
by the platform’s predictive capabilities. Predictive 
immediation rolls this gap in to a predicated future. 
The effect is that ‘we’ become conscious of what 
Google knows we already will desire. 
Google’s Glass brings prediction and information 
together in a singular capture of immediation – and 
I mean immediation rather than mediation – such 
that future thought is made to unfold with certainty 
in the now. Such technologies must be thought of 
as new kinds of media, perhaps we can call these 
postmedia insofar as what is at stake is a direct 
and immediate lived experience of their technicity. 
Technologies of transmission and broadcast – 
television, radio and to an extent much of our 
previous experience of the internet at our desktops 
and some of our prior experience of mobile 
interaction – operate by mediation. This is most 
often achieved via the hypermediated functioning 
of screens, speakers, headphones, touchpads 
and so on. However, technologies and platforms 
such as SMS messaging, touchscreen interfaces, 
immersive environments, digital assistants 
and now the full platform of Google Glass offer 
experiences of immediation in which technology, 
body and environment co-modulate at ever faster 
speeds. (In fact, it could also be argued that any 
mediation is always already an immediation at a 
micro-perceptual level).
The actual nonlinearity and desubjectivation of 
networked, immediate events in which something 
might be felt or sensed but does not yet have an 
end point, determination or outcome, can not be 
tolerated by predictive techniques. The politics of 
control enters when predictive techniques invade 
and attempt to determine what is necessarily 
indeterminate and yet nonetheless is experienced 
immediately – nonsensuous, precognitive, 
perception. We should be careful not to imbricate 
recent neuroscientific findings within such a politics 
of control, in spite of the sometimes mechanistic 
and reductive modes of explaining what is ‘in’ the 
W h a t  i f  w e  w e r e  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  b r a i n -
t e c h n i c s ,  t e c h n i c s - t e m p o r a l i t y ,  e x p e r i e n c e -
m e d i a  a s  ‘ e v e n t s ’  r a t h e r  t h a n  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s 
o r  o u t c o m e s ?  I n  w h a t  w a y  m i g h t  a  ‘ r e a d i n e s s 
p o t e n t i a l ’  s u g g e s t  a  n o v e l  u n p r e d i c t a b l e 
b e c o m i n g  o f  t h o u g h t ?  H o w  m i g h t  ‘ b r a i n 
a c t i v i t i e s ’  n o t  b e  a l i e n a t e d  f r o m  ‘ t h o u g h t ’ 
b u t  i n s t e a d  u n d e r s t o o d  a s  n e u r a l  p r o c e s s 
t h a t  b e c o m e s  i n d i v i d u a t e d  a s  t h i n k i n g ? 
“ I m m e d i a t i o n  d o e s  n o t  e x c l u d e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s 
f r o m  t h e  p a s t  o r  t e n d i n g s  t o w a r d  t h e  f u t u r e . 
T h e  t e r m  i m m e d i a t i o n  i s  a  w a y  o f  d r a w i n g 
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  e v e n t  a s  t h e  p r i m a r y  u n i t 
o f  t h e  r e a l .  T h e  i d e a  i s  t h a t  w h a t e v e r  i s 
r e a l  m a k e s  i t s e l f  f e l t  i n  s o m e  w a y ,  a n d 
w h a t e v e r  m a k e s  i t s e l f  f e l t  h a s  d o n e  s o  a s 
p a r t  o f  a n  e v e n t .  I t  h a s  e n t e r e d  i n  s o m e  w a y 
i n t o  t h e  i m m e d i a c y  o f  t h e  m o m e n t  a s  a  f a c t o r 
i n  t h e  e v e n t  n o w  t a k i n g  p l a c e . ”  ( M a s s u m i  i n 
B r u n n e r ,  M a s s u m i  a n d  M a n n i n g ,  2 0 1 3 :  1 3 5 )
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brain. If recent studies suggest that ‘the brain’ is 
already preparing to make a decision before that 
decision is consciously known, then it is the notion 
of consciousness itself that needs rethinking. What 
if consciousness were instead an immediate ‘event’ 
in which determinations from the past and tendings 
toward the future both made themselves felt as real? 
And yet the potential to differ were always, even if 
micro-neurally, held on to as real as well?  Looking 
‘in’ at the brain via neuroimaging techniques would 
then only be a realization of the backwards referral 
of sensory experience; just envisioned from the 
machinic perspective. For where the potential 
to differ is real, where this potential can actually 
transduce into something novel, where potentiality 
and nonlinearity co-habit, prediction arriving before 
the event’s occurrence is impossible.
The increasingly mutable mixing and matching of 
audio, visual images and text, accompanied by the 
tactility of the touch screen and the kinesthesia 
of the interface, quite aside from any more 
insidious predictive technics, already changes the 
body’s perceptual posture, the brain’s activities 
and redistributes their actions in relation to the 
interface, as much as the interface distributes 
information. These considerations can no longer 
be considered extraneous or secondary; they are 
not “merely” contextual. They are inextricable 
from what media do today. The issue is not to find 
a way to rethink the brain in terms of languages 
of media or technical metaphors but to be better 
able to understand media themselves as already 
immediately entangled and lived assemblages. 
Media and technics might be better thought of 
as media-events or technical-potentialities; not 
as outside us but in relation with us – a thinking 
immediated; a brain-screen (Deleuze, 2000: 
366); a technics-in-motion. We require ecological 
approaches for articulating these relationalities. 
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She studied the movement behaviours of silks. 
She observed what happened when fabric, light 
and colour were thrown together in dance. She 
found ways of intensifying shimmer, changing 
each coloured light that hit her body each time 
she struck a move or a pose. She flung around 
her metres and metres of crepe de chine, which 
twirled and let through the light. She let her 
body and its fabric become the surface for magic 
lantern projections. ‘Light and color’, ‘thrown 
great masses of silk was my real representation 
and not dancing at all’, she said of her work.1 
The poet Mallarme described her as a 
‘phantasmagoria of dusk and grotto’.2 She 
froze into orchids, clouds, butterflies, and later, 
becoming more and more abstract, she evoked 
snowstorms or rippling water. Others followed 
in her wake, imitating the same twists and turns. 
1 Sally R. Sommer, ‘Loïe Fuller’, Drama Review, 65, 1975, p. 58.
2 Stéphane Mallarmé, Œuvres complètes, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, n° 65, 1945, p. 308.
M E D I A  B E G I N S  W I T H  T H E  T W I S T I N G  S K E I N S  O F  C H I F F O N 
T H R O W N  B Y  T H E  S E R P E N T I N E  A N D  B U T T E R F L Y  D A N C E R S . 
M E D I A  A S  W E  K N O W  I T ,  A S  W E  K N O W  I T  T O D A Y  I N  O U R  L C D 
S C R E E N S ,  B E G I N S  W I T H  T W I S T S  O F  C L O T H ,  S H A P E S  M A D E 
A N D  R E M A D E  O U T  O F  B O D I L Y  G E S T U R E S  C O M B I N E D  W I T H 
F A B R I C .  O N E  O F  T H E  M O S T  F A M O U S  O F  T H E  S E R P E N T I N E 
D A N C E R S  W A S  L O Ï E  F U L L E R ,  W H O  B E G A N  H E R  C A R E E R 
O N  S T A G E ,  U N D E R  C O L O U R E D  L I G H T S  A N D  R E F L E C T E D 
B Y  M I R R O R S  T O  B A T H E  A N D  M U L T I P L Y  H E R  B O D Y  A N D 
S H E  D E C O R A T E D  H E R  C L O T H I N G  W I T H  P H O S P H O R E S C E N T 
D E S I G N S  T H A T  T W I N K L E D  A L M O S T  I N D E P E N D E N T L Y .
S h e  w a s  t h e  s c r e e n  b e f o r e  t h e  s c r e e n  a p p e a r e d .  A  l i v e  p r e s e n c e ,  i n  m o v e m e n t ,  i t  w a s  a s  i f 
s h e  w o u l d  s q u e e z e  m o r e  m o v e m e n t  f r o m  h e r s e l f  b y  m o b i l i s i n g  c o i l s  o f  l i g h t ,  a i r y  m a t e r i a l , 
a s  e x t e n s i o n s  o f  h e r  g y r a t i o n s .  H e r  p e r f o r m a n c e  w a s  a  m o v e m e n t ,  a  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  m o v e m e n t ,  o f 
m o v e m e n t  b e y o n d  m o v e m e n t  –  a n  o c c u p a t i o n  o f  s p a c e ,  i n  w h i c h  s p a c e  w a s  f i l l e d  o u t  b y  t e x t u r e s , 
f o l d s ,  r e f l e c t i o n s ,  i n t e r f e r e n c e s ,  d i s t u r b a n c e s .  S h e  d e b u t e d  a t  t h e  F o l i e s  B e r g è r e  i n  1 8 9 2 - 3 , 
p l a y i n g  a  h y p n o t i s e d  s u b j e c t .  S h e  s t r u t t e d  a c r o s s  t h e  s t a g e ,  l i f t i n g  u p  h e r  l o n g  s k i r t s . 
T h e s e  m o v e s  m a d e  h e r  r e a l i s e  –  j u s t  a s  d i d  t h e  V i t a l i s t s  i n  t h e  s a m e  m o m e n t  –  h o w  m u c h  o f  a 
l i f e  m a t e r i a l  p o s s e s s e s ,  o r ,  a t  l e a s t ,  i t  m a y  p o s s e s s  i f  m o b i l i s e d  b y  h u m a n  o r  o t h e r  n a t u r a l 
e n e r g i e s .  F u l l e r  d e v e l o p e d  h e r  r e p e r t o i r e  o f  m o v e m e n t s  i n t o  a  s c u l p t u r a l  c h o r e o g r a p h y . 
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Such mobility, such power of torsion, was, in turn, 
captured by the moving arts of film recording, just 
as it was captured by imitators. All of the ‘fathers’ 
of cinema made this type of film: Edison, Dickson, 
Louis Lumière and Paul Nadar. Edison released four 
film versions of a serpentine dance by Annabelle 
Whitford. One of these strips was exhibited at the 
first kinetoscope parlour, which opened in October 
1894 at 20 Boulevard Poissonnière, in Paris. The 
Lumière brothers made a film of a serpentine dance 
in 1897. The performance lasted for fifty seconds 
on a wooden stage. These little films were brightly 
coloured, each frame tinted by applications of paint 
directly on film stock. Not only did the material 
twirl, the colours slid through the spectrum, 
detached from the real world. It was a rainbow 
of sensations, light bent and scattered in many 
hues. The short strips capture the mobilisation 
of material, the swirling forms and transforming 
colours of coils and fans of material as it is twisted 
by girls performing their butterfly and serpentine 
dances. The girls’ bodies disappear periodically, 
engulfed by material. The bodies are elements 
that enable the endless animated flow of material 
to twist and turn and display its material qualities. 
The fabric coils for as long as the film strip coils 
through the projector. Around one third of films 
made in the first twenty years of cinema were 
of this type, garishly hand-coloured and short. 
The girls twist. The cloth twists. The film projector 
twists. The film strip twists through the projector. 
What film twists into being is narrative eventually. 
The fifty seconds becomes fifty minutes, or longer, 
and there is time enough to tell stories with 
beginnings, middles and ends, including various 
twists and turns of plot along the way. The folds 
of cloth mobilised into actions is substituted 
over time by the twists and turns of a storyline. 
At the same time as film capitalised on the 
serpentine dancers, animation came into being, 
and it set in motion films’ turn toward narrative. 
The first narrative animation device was Charles-
Émile Reynaud’s invention, the Théâtre Optique, 
on which he showed his own Pauvre Pierrot and 
other ‘luminous pantomimes’, or animations. 
These strips broke with the repetitive nature of 
movement in previous devices, including his own 
praxinoscope, which had simply spun and spun 
and repeated a single movement – a rat leaping 
on a man, a girl feeding hens, a horse jumping. 
Reynaud’s proto-cinematic plates on a band with 
sprockets allowed for the unfurling of a story. 
The flexible band of animated images could be 
as long as the drawing animator could bear, for 
more seconds of story time could be gained with 
the addition of each further drawing. There were 
between five hundred and seven hundred mobile 
images in Reynaud’s luminous pantomimes, and 
each would twinkle on the screen for a second or 
two. This length of time and ability for variety turned 
movement into action. It permitted the telling of a 
story, with a beginning, middle and an end. The twists 
of the band made possible the twists of a narrative. 
It produced time and filled it with activities. It also 
consumed minutes, not seconds, of attention. With 
this gain in time, the questions begin of what a story 
might be, and unhappy endings, in these early days, 
were as likely as happy ones. Animated optical 
culture begins to tell stories. Inaugurated in this is a 
certain imbrication of two types of inscription, image 
and story, or the visual and the verbal, or the film 
and the book. Animated culture begins its drawn-
out and never completed fate: to supplant the book. 
A story telling machine is in place. Modern humans, 
technologised and mediatised, are animated 
through this story-telling machine. It has colours 
and twists and turns and it contorts and distorts 
for us and in us. We become its punctuation mark 
– its end of the line – as machinic labour, as 
subjects of bureaucracy, as cinema viewers. We 
are instituted by our technologies. We institute 
them in the light of what we have become.
After film, the twisting motion is appropriated 
for television. The dancing bodies and fabric 
will be simulated, in the early days, by Felix the 
Cat, an animated feline from New York. He gets 
broadcasted in 1928, when his rotating 3D 13 
inch papier mache body, his matter, was parsed 
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through the mechanism of a scanner to an electric 
kinescope receiver. Felix the Cat provided the 
first TV test image: he arrived on screens dotted 
across the city, two inches high and composed of 
fat grey lines. Miniaturised, flattened, dis- and re-
assembled, almost immaterially composed of lines, 
Felix greets the viewer from the other side, from 
an elsewhere that is distant to himself too, through 
the interface of TV. Felix span on that turntable 
for a decade, into the later 1930s, as the lines 
narrowed and the focus sharpened and technicians 
strove for improvements in definition. Felix the Cat 
becomes part of media history. In watching him in 
his cartoon appearances, his desperate urban tales 
of thwarted love, hunger, the usual misery of city 
lives, his tail twirling and contorting, sometimes 
even into words or question marks, sometimes 
into things, we find that, like the cat in the corner 
of the room, or the cat on our lap, he will become 
domesticated, that is, part of our home, our modern 
twentieth century homes. His TV image will be 
domesticated too and so thereby will the television 
come to take up a place in the corner of our room, 
or in the centre of it, angling our vision, making us 
all twist our heads towards it. Felix twists on the 
plate for broadcast. In this gyration, this contortion 
of or by animation, its rubber limbs stretching, we 
sit. He slinks. The TV fizzes with energy and life. 
The twisting cloth of serpentine dancers. The 
emergence of twists of film. The twists and turns 
of film develop into narrative. Twisting Felix being 
turned into lines suitable for broadcasting through 
TV. It is not just optical culture that genuflects to the 
gesture of the twist. There is also twist of the radio 
dial. But it is only the hand that is mobilised for this 
twist – the hand twists the dial to make language 
and sound shift, twisting, producing the articulate, 
sliding into the inarticulate. Only James Joyce really 
understood how language was twisted by this media 
technology of radio. Harry Levin observed in 1941 
that Joyce replaced the archangel’s trumpet with 
an electric amplifier and insisted further that the 
‘loudspeaker’ of radio is the medium of Finnegans 
Wake.3 It is indeed a radio book, composed by 
a man who listened to Radio Eireann every day. 
Joyce includes broadcasts at points in the narrative 
and there are direct references to radio, such as:
 
Moreover, the whole book, with its glut of languages, 
its parodies of every style and genre, its code 
mixing and switching, recreates the experience of 
surfing through endless radio stations in foreign 
languages, the blasts of jingles or nonsensical ear-
catching commercials. It catches too the sounds 
of the buzz and fuzz and whelping that occurs 
between tuned in stations. The book is a book for 
the ear, Joyce’s own ear picking up the airs of Radio 
Eireann, which merged with what he claimed was 
the sound of static in his Paris apartment, the 
result of the vibrations of past lives, past voices. 
Modern lives are reoriented around the mobilisation 
of material and of the immaterial, the energy of 
wind and waves, radio waves and electric winds, 
the visions of ambulant colourful stuff, moving 
itself, of lines in movement and broadcast to 
everyone from a hidden abode of production, of 
sounds ripped from the air, and addressing us 
and everyone else. The reorientation is the point, 
to be pulled this way, into the modern mode of 
living, moving, gesturing, flexing one’s self into 
the new now.  Thinking too adapts to this flexing 
motion, as exemplified in Bertolt Brecht’s thinking 
about thought from the second half of the 1930s.
Me-ti; Book of Transformations or Book of Changes 
or Book of Twists and Turns or Book of Turning 
3 Harry Levin, James Joyce: A Critical Introduction, Faber, London, 1941, p. 67.
4 James Joyce, Finnegans Wake, Book 1, chapter 5.
‘ t h e  e a r  o f  F i o n n  E a r w i c k e r  a f o r e t i m e 
w a s  t h e  t r a d e m a r k  o f  a  b r o a d c a s t e r  w i t h 
w i c k e r  l o c a l  j a r g o n  f o r  a n  a c e ’ s  p a t e n t 
( H e a r !  C a l l s !  E v e r y w h a i r ! )  t h e n  a s  t o 
t h i s  r a d i o o s c i l l a t i n g  e p i e p i s t l e  t o  w h i c h 
c o t t o n ,  s i l k  o r  s a m i t e ,  k o h o l ,  g a l l  o r 
b r i c k d u s t ,  w e  m u s t  c e a s e l e s s l y  r e t u r n ’ 4 
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Ways, was not published when Brecht was alive.5 
It emulates writings by the Chinese dialectician 
and anti-Confucian of the classical period Me-ti (or 
Mo-Dzi), who was regarded by many nineteenth-
century scholars as a proto-socialist. The subtitle − 
Book of Twists and Turns, or Turning Ways − stems 
from a Confucian text – the I-Ching – which can be 
translated likewise as the book of transformations. 
Brecht in yoking two divergent things together 
was acting eclectically, but was also enstaging 
contradiction. Such a stance arguably underwrites 
the whole of Me-ti, an attempt to reflect critically on 
the method of thinking contradiction, of dialectics. 
Brecht’s Chinese fascinations – comprising 
philosophy and method as well as theatrical 
practice – deviate from Stalinist dogma, offering 
instead an articulation of the dialectic in terms 
of flow, flux, change, transformation. Given that 
Me-ti’s original effort attempted to establish 
rules of behaviour in relation to socio-political 
considerations, Brecht’s aphoristic mimicries 
foreground the question of individual behaviour 
in the context of collectives. The self too is not 
exempt from this process of contradiction, nor 
disconnected from the larger context, which 
may be riven by the same contradictions:
“Me-ti said: It is advantageous, not merely to think 
according to the Great Method but to live according 
to the Great Method as well. Not to be identical with 
oneself, to embrace and intensify crises, to turn 
small changes into great ones and so forth – one 
need not only observe such phenomena, one can 
also act them out. One can live with greater or fewer 
mediations, in more numerous or less numerous 
relationships. One can aim at or strive for a more 
durable transformation of one’s consciousness by 
modifying one’s social being. One can help to make 
the institutions of the state more contradictory 
and thereby more capable of development.”6
This is the modern flexibility of a post-revolutionary 
self, or a self engaged in the process of 
revolutionising things. The self tears opens its own 
being in order to transform consciousness, to be 
made anew, but it also baulks at institutions, working 
against them, tugging at them, transgressing 
their limits in order to push the settledness of the 
given into contradiction. It is as if the self acts as a 
fulcrum exerting force on the solid mass of what is 
to turn it, twist it into something else. Revolutionary 
politics is prone to borrow its metaphors from 
engineering and physics, in order to express the 
moment and the process of revolutionary change. 
5 Bertolt Brecht, Me-Ti. Buch der Wendungen, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main, 1972.
6 Fredric Jameson, Brecht and Method, Verso, London, 1998, p. 30. See also Sergei Zemlyanoi, ‘Bertold Brecht’s Project for 
Humanity’, in Chto Delat, September, 2009. See also Emily Pethick/Peio Aguirre, Casco Issues X: The Great Method, 2007.
E v e r y  q u e s t i o n  ‘ r u n s  i n  a  v i c i o u s  c i r c l e ’ 
b e c a u s e  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  a s  a  w h o l e  i s  a n 
e n d l e s s  c h a i n  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  a n  i n f i n i t e 
n u m b e r  o f  l i n k s .  T h e  w h o l e  a r t  o f  p o l i t i c s 
l i e s  i n  f i n d i n g  a n d  t a k i n g  a s  f i r m  a  g r i p  a s 
w e  c a n  o f  t h e  l i n k  t h a t  i s  l e a s t  l i k e l y  t o 
b e  s t r u c k  f r o m  o u r  h a n d s ,  t h e  o n e  t h a t  i s 
m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  a t  t h e  g i v e n  m o m e n t ,  t h e  o n e 
t h a t  m o s t  o f  a l l  g u a r a n t e e s  i t s  p o s s e s s o r 
t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  w h o l e  c h a i n .  I f  w e  h a d 
a  c r e w  o f  e x p e r i e n c e d  b r i c k l a y e r s  w h o  h a d 
l e a r n e d  t o  w o r k  s o  w e l l  t o g e t h e r  t h a t  t h e y 
c o u l d  l a y  t h e i r  b r i c k s  e x a c t l y  a s  r e q u i r e d 
w i t h o u t  a  g u i d e  l i n e  ( w h i c h ,  s p e a k i n g 
a b s t r a c t l y ,  i s  b y  n o  m e a n s  i m p o s s i b l e ) , 
t h e n  p e r h a p s  w e  m i g h t  t a k e  h o l d  o f  s o m e 
o t h e r  l i n k .  B u t  i t  i s  u n f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  a s 
y e t  w e  h a v e  n o  e x p e r i e n c e d  b r i c k l a y e r s 
t r a i n e d  f o r  t e a m w o r k ,  t h a t  b r i c k s  a r e 
o f t e n  l a i d  w h e r e  t h e y  a r e  n o t  n e e d e d  a t 
a l l ,  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  l a i d  a c c o r d i n g  t o 
t h e  g e n e r a l  l i n e ,  b u t  a r e  s o  s c a t t e r e d  t h a t 
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Lenin’s metaphor suggests that there is a moment 
of intervention, a holding on to something that slips 
and circles past, smoothly, repelling all too easy a 
grip. The chain is a band that loops and glides by, 
comprised of actions and counter actions, links that 
are promising, those that go nowhere, those that 
are weak and those that are strong and can forge 
more links. In addition, the revolutionary forces 
lay bricks here and there, but are unable to build 
them systematically, to make anything strong, any 
bulwark against the forces of the ruling class. This 
was Lenin in 1902 writing in What is to be Done? 
The problem was one of mass and organisation. The 
dominant class is powerful. History does not seem 
to be in any way on the side of the righteous. Any 
victory must be snatched, almost by a lucky grab 
into the unpredictable complexity of world history. 
Some thirty years later, Walter Benjamin develops 
another metaphor to consider the ways in which 
political activity, and political thinking, might develop, 
with a more dialectical conception of the relation of 
parts in the process of world historical movement. 
In fact he summons up the torque forces of sailing 
to conceptualise the unfurling and the steering 
of historical movement. In the epistemological 
section of The Arcades Project, known as File N, he 
defines the concept of Rettung, rescue or salvation 
of the historical process in relation to a metaphor:
History moves as an absolute, cycling, eternally 
returning the same old oppressions, becoming like 
nature. But the concept, the conceptual moment 
of analysis, of fashioning understanding, is a sail, 
cuts through and yet glides off the wind, utilising it, 
capturing its energies for another defined project. 
The sail must be pulled in to the point where it fills 
up with wind, its luff in line with the wind’s line of 
movement. How does a boat sail? How does it use the 
wind in its sails and the water around it? Wind and 
water, two horizontal forces, cancel out each other’s 
power, but make a torque that tilts the boat one way. 
The buoyancy and weight of the vessel, two other 
equals and opposites, make a torque in the opposite 
direction. Cancelling and balancing, mobilising 
forces and negating them is the art of movement, 
of revolution. To this Benjamin adds the sail as a 
crucial component that directs the energies that 
might otherwise scupper the boat. These energies 
are, he defines elsewhere, the process of history 
which blows on regardless. But the energy can be 
angled, can be taken control of, directed. For the 
theorist, for Benjamin himself, the point is to have 
an angle, to think in relation to a project, and one 
that can develop world history in a certain direction. 
Benjamin’s insistence is that a vocabulary of 
revolution needs to cut its way through the morass 
of poor thinking or corrupted fantasy. The wind 
of history, the angling of the relative towards the 
absolute, is Benjamin’s concern, for otherwise 
there is only the passive, miserably being blown 
by the storm of progress into oblivion. The sails 
are twisted into position. Some twists break things 
off. At a given point quantity turns into quality. 
Torsion, the twisting of the self in response to 
the technologies, the media, the techniques, 
the languages of an environment that comes 
increasingly to be comprised of twisting things, 
of mechanisms that turn repetitively, endlessly, 
7 Lenin, What is to be Done?, Progress, Moscow, 1975, P. 219. 
8 Walter Benjamin, File N, The Arcades Project, Harvard, Cambridge, MA, 1999, p. 473.
9 Walter Benjamin, File N, The Arcades Project, 1999, p. 473.
W h a t  m a t t e r s  f o r  t h e  d i a l e c t i c i a n  i s 
h a v i n g  t h e  w i n d  o f  w o r l d  h i s t o r y  i n  h i s 
s a i l s .  T h i n k i n g  f o r  h i m  m e a n s :  t o  s e t 
t h e  s a i l s .  I t  i s  t h e  w a y  t h e y  a r e  s e t  t h a t 
m a t t e r s .  W o r d s  a r e  h i s  s a i l s .  T h e  w a y 
t h e y  a r e  s e t  t u r n s  t h e m  i n t o  c o n c e p t s . 9
[ N  9 ,  2 ]  R e  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  ‘ r e s c u e ’ :  t h e  w i n d 
o f  t h e  a b s o l u t e  i n  t h e  s a i l s  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t . 
( T h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  t h e  w i n d  i s  t h e  c y c l i c a l . ) 
T h e  t r i m  o f  t h e  s a i l  i s  t h e  r e l a t i v e . 8
t h e  e n e m y  c a n  s h a t t e r  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  a s  i f 
i t  w e r e  m a d e  o f  s a n d  a n d  n o t  o f  b r i c k s . 7
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automatically. It was in its various cultured 
forms, as dance, as animation, as film, as TV test 
transmission, as radio dial, met by the twists 
of dialectical, political critical thought, a pre-
articulation of what twists for us today, endlessly: 
the twisted nematics of the liquid crystal. 
The power of the serpentine dancer to twist, the 
power of Felix to be turned, the power of the radio 
dial to summon up and cancel out languages, is 
captured and regularised in liquid crystal. These 
little animated forms we watch as they twist, in 
torsion, on screens, on the walls, on our desks, 
on the gadgets in our pockets. They twist and 
turn to approximate the colours of nature, when 
an electrical charge shoots through them. It is as 
if they have bodies wracked in pain, hit by Tasers 
that cause them to writhe. Or it is as if they 
dance, like serpentine dancers, swirling, being 
movement and colour, shape and evanescence. 
They are liquid crystals. They twist to participate 
in the making of the screen’s colours. We do not 
see their twist, only the results. We do not see 
their colours, only the pixels that they operate. 
The liquid crystal, with its twisting capacities, was 
captured and dominated. Like an unwilling Proteus, 
these quasi-life forms were interned in machines, in 
order to reveal our pasts and futures, our worlds in 
heightened colours on screens. Liquid crystal’s fleet 
mercurial motions are harnessed by CGI software, 
as function and as look. Its natural opalescence and 
sheen are appropriated by digital aesthetics, so that 
scenarios of rapid transformation, fluid motion, can 
be recreated for delightful spectacular displays. 3D 
modelling and printing, mobilising the supple power 
of the liquid crystal, allows, seemingly, a pulling, 
twisting, stretching, denting and extruding of liquid 
crystals – as if they were clay. Clay was touched 
and twisted into shape by hands, sometimes in 
conjunction with the force of spin. Now the hands 
touch keyboards, or the screen. On the liquid crystal 
touchscreen, fingers dance like the Butterfly dancer 
Annabelle over the surface, flicking, turning, jabbing. 
The liquid crystals have climbed down from the 
screens. They were intimate with the body in earlier 
days, first appearing as watches and calculators. 
Lately they have reclaimed that closeness, residing 
more or less comfortably in every pocket or bag 
as smartphone, tablet, audio device. They demand 
to be touched. Touchscreens, the resistive ones, 
the capacitive ones, or the surface wave ones, 
have various modes of operating the human body, 
whose contact is needed to detonate touch events. 
The resistive screens are content with any hard 
object to press down and make contact between 
two layers in order to change the electrical field.
The other modes deploy the human – or any 
other conductor - and its electrical charges and 
participation in electrical fields, in order to operate 
by discharging electricity in the user or mobilising 
the human to complete electrical circuits or by 
disrupting the flow of waves. Our electricity is 
abstracted. The other side of the screen, the side 
which awaits the touch and monitors the changes 
in electric state on the screen is composed of rare 
earth minerals and metals, such as indium tin 
oxide, which is highly conductive, easy to deposit on 
the glass as a film – sputtered on in vapour – and 
optically transparent. The screen is ever thinner, 
as in Samsung’s Super AMOLED screens, using 
light-emitting and charge-transporting organic 
materials, which has stripped out another layer and 
puts the fingers closer still to what is being touched 
on the screen. We almost reach through to the 
luminous confection of the display. This luminosity 
generates its own self, is a self-reflection of light. 
There was a time when we had to press into the 
screens to make the circuits work and perhaps a ring 
of prismatic colours would flood around the dent. 
Now their smooth surfaces keep us out. Our touch 
leaves a greasy mark that blocks our experience. But 
our eyes dive in. The technology has now developed 
to read the body – fingertip, nail, knuckle. We become 
multiple instruments. Our fingers see as they touch. 
Our eyes touch as we see. Our body is refigured. 
We angle ourselves towards the devices and exert 
the necessary force or have it exerted upon us. 
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‘How happy a Thing can be’ is a new two-part 
work that incorporates both sculptural and video 
elements. How happy features three personal 
effects, mundane personal items - a comb, a 
screwdriver, and a pair of scissors - modes of 
technology with relative immunity to updates and 
upgrades. These objects, 3D printed from digital 
models, are set within the moving backdrop of a 
screen depicting moving mis-en-scenes that allude 
to an alternate location for these objects.
The handheld devices co-exist in a corresponding 
video work in which their digital forms perform 
a choreographed arch that implies they are 
being pushed to their limits. Inspired by tabloid 
breakdowns and mediatized disasters, the objects’ 
paths explore the transient exchange of spirit, in 
both the human condition and our apparatuses, 
endowed through the increasingly overwhelming 
thrust for something more. Their physical and 
digital iterations are identical, allowing a state that 
is at once veritable and indescribable, caught up 
somewhere in the middle blurring the sentimental 
and the anticlimactic.
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‘How happy a Thing can be’ 2014
3D printed plaster, wax sealant
HD video. Dimensions variable.
Courtesy of the artist and 
commissioned by Radar, 
LUA and Wysing Arts Centre
Installation view: 
Annals of the Twenty-Ninth 




I  D O N ’ T  W A N T  T O  B E  A  V E G E T A B L E 
W H A T ’ S  A  V E G E T A B L E  A N Y W A Y  S O 
S H O W  T H E M  S O M E T H I N G  S I M P L E 
T H A T  W A S  S H A P E D  B Y  L O T S  O F 
H A N D S  F O R  A  L O N G  T I M E  A N D  L O O K E D 
A T  A  L O T  V E R Y  I N T E N S E L Y  S H O W 
T H E M  H O W  H A P P Y  A  T H I N G  C A N  B E 
H O W  I N N O C E N T  A N D  O U R S  H O W  E V E N 
H O R R I B L E  S A D N E S S  I S  F L A W L E S S 
W E  S E R V E  A S  A  T H I N G  O R  D I E  I N T O 
A  T H I N G  B L I S S  A N D  W E  T H I N G S 
T H A T  L I V E  B Y  F A L L I N G  A P A R T  W E 
W A N T  T O  C H A N G E  T O T A L L Y  I N  O U R 
I N V I S I B L E  H E A R T S  I S N ’ T  I T  Y O U R 
D R E A M  T O  B E  T O T A L L Y  I N V I S I B L E 
O N E  D A Y  L O O K  W E  A R E  L I V I N G
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How happy a Thing can be, 2014
Animation with Tom Kemp and Maxime Villemard
Models developed with Cay Green 
Courtesy of the artist and commissioned by Radar, 
LUA and Wysing Arts Centre
W H A T  I S  T H E  W E I G H T 
O F  A  T H I N G  A F T E R 
I T  L E A V E S  A  H A N D ? 
H E A V Y  S H I T .
_
W H A T  D O  Y O U  C A L L 
A  L E T T E R  W R I T E R ? 
S O M E O N E  W H O ’ S 
G O N N A  M A K E  Y O U  C R Y .
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W H A T ’ S  T H E  W E A T H E R 
L I K E ?  I T ’ S  R A I N I N G 
O N  M Y  F A C E . 
J U S T  Y O U R  F A C E ?
_
I F  I  T A K E  Y O U R 
P I C T U R E  W I L L  M Y 
P H O N E  W E I G H  M O R E ?
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T E L L  T H E M  A L L  I  K N O W 
N O W .  Y O U  C A N  S H O U T  I T 
F R O M  T H E  R O O F T O P S  A N D 
W R I T E  I T  O N  T H E  S K Y L I N E , 
A L L  W E  H A D  I S  G O N E  N O W .
_
T E L L  T H E M  I  W A S  H A P P Y.
_
I T ’ S  G O T T A  B E  B U L L S H I T . 
Y E A H ,  B U L L S H I T .
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T H E  P O S I T I O N  T H A T  A N 
E P O C H  O C C U P I E S  I N  T H E 
H I S T O R I C A L  P R O C E S S 
C A N  B E  D E T E R M I N E D 
M O R E  S T R I K I N G L Y 
F R O M  A N  A N A L Y S I S  O F 
I T S  I N C O N S P I C U O U S 
S U R F A C E - L E V E L 
E X P R E S S I O N S 
T H A N  F R O M  T H A T 
E P O C H ’ S  J U D G M E N T S 
A B O U T  I T S E L F . 
S I E G F R I E D  K R A C A U E R ,  ‘ T H E  M A S S  O R N A M E N T ’ 1
T h e s e  f r a g m e n t s  w i l l  p r o b e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e 




Hegel’s discussion hinges on a distinction between 
dynamism and stasis – in these sciences ‘the 
movement of consciousness’ is ossified into a ‘dead 
thing’. Considered as an external object the brain 
becomes ‘such an indifferent, natural thing that 
nothing else is to be directly seen in it.’2  But for 
Hegel the brain ‘is nothing in itself, much less his 
[a person’s] true reality.’3 Hegel is implying here 
that when brains are isolated from human activity, 
when they become objects rather than subjects, 
they cease to have any true meaning at all, they die. 
Phrenology and physiognomy reduce subjectivity 
to external appearance isolated from the living 
subject’s interactions with the world: ‘consciousness 
no longer aims to find itself immediately, but to 
produce itself by its own activity.’4 
Phrenology’s founder Franz Joseph Gall conceived 
of the brain as an organ with distinct regions, each 
responsible for a different aspect of mental life. He 
travelled across Europe publicly dissecting brains 
and examining skulls collected from prison and 
asylum inmates, which were thought to demonstrate 
inherent propensities for wickedness or insanity. 
With its emphasis on empirically observable innate 
capacities, this new science exhibited a shift from 
the theological to the biological. But existing 
hierarchies of race, gender and class were upheld. 
The act of observing was not a neutral one – cranial 
bumps can be seen but not heard and the scientist 
was responsible for ventriloquizing them.  
After his death Gall’s brain was donated to a fellow 
scientist, Paul Broca, for examination. It was 
assumed that an eminent ‘man of genius’ like Gall 
would have a correspondingly vast brain. But Gall’s 
was found to weigh a meagre 1198 grams. Broca 
was forced to account for this anomaly which, like 
many others encountered in his research, disrupted 
his claim that brain size was directly linked to 
intelligence and that middle class white men have 
larger brains that women, poor people, criminals 
and ‘primitives’. Broca was adept at working around 
the numerous exceptions to this ‘rule’. As Stephen 
Jay Gould discusses ‘data could never overthrow his 
assumptions.’5
I N  P H E N O M E N O L O G Y  O F  S P I R I T  ( 1 8 0 7 ) ,  G W F  H E G E L  D I S C U S S E S 
P H Y S I O G N O M Y  A N D  P H R E N O L O G Y ,  T W O  S C I E N C E S  T H A T 
D R E W  C O N C L U S I O N S  A B O U T  P E O P L E ’ S  E S S E N T I A L  Q U A L I T I E S 
A N D  D I S P O S I T I O N S  F R O M  T H E  S H A P E S  O F  T H E I R  E X T E R N A L 
F E A T U R E S  –  T H E I R  F A C E S  A N D  S K U L L S  R E S P E C T I V E L Y . 
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1000s of cheap editions of phrenological works 
circulated, alongside pamphlets and leaflets. 
Popular lectures, often fronted by practitioners 
with a flair for showmanship, were well-attended, 
even in small villages. By the 1840s phrenologists 
also functioned as materialist clairvoyants, offering 
advice on the future for a few shillings.6   
In 1825, John Trotter published a satirical travelogue 
under the pseudonym Don Jose Balscopo. The 
novel’s protagonist crashes his hot air balloon in 
the mysterious land of Phrenologasto where he 
encounters a nation of people with heads resembling 
phrenological models – their heads shaved, painted 
white and ‘chalked out by black lines into a variety of 
little fields and enclosures, very much in the same 
style as we see a Gentleman’s estate in England laid 
out on a map.’ The inhabitants of Pheronologasto 
clothe themselves in images of the skulls of their 
ancestors; everyone’s role in society is determined 
by the shape of their heads. When Balscopo submits 
himself to a state examination he is branded an idiot, 
only fit to serve in the lowest ranks of the army. But 
eventually he transcends this prognosis to become 
a distinguished member of society, overturning the 
nation’s assumptions about innate capacities.7
Trotter imaginatively extends the logic of the 
dominant visual technology for understanding 
mental life to the whole of society. The resemblance 
of the phrenological heads to the maps used by the 
landed aristocracy is a pertinent analogy. The prop 
erty owning classes carve up, survey and label the 
land, ensuring their continued dominance over it. 
The land has no inherent properties which designate 
it as the private property of a particular person or 
group; the act of mapping confers such meanings 
on inert matter. Similarly, the phrenologists affix 
labels in such a way that they seem to inhere in 
subjects rather than adhere to them.  
But what would the contemporary equivalent of 
Phrenogasto look like? What are the implications of 
our current visualisations of the brain?8  
Our contemporary Balscopo might be bewildered 
to find himself in this mysterious new territory. For 
there he would not find people with white skulls 
covered in neat black lines moving around in a 
recognisably terrestrial landscape, but fluorescent 
disembodied shapes cast adrift in a featureless 
black abyss. 
B U T  L E T ’ S  R E T U R N  B R I E F L Y  F R O M  B R A I N S  T O  S K U L L S .
P H R E N O L O G Y  H A D  A  M A S S  A P P E A L  I N  B R I T A I N  I N  T H E  1 9 T H 
C E N T U R Y  –  I T  T R I C K L E D  O U T  F R O M  S C I E N T I F I C  E S T A B L I S H M E N T S 
A N D  D O W N  F R O M  T H E  U P P E R  T O  T H E  W O R K I N G  C L A S S E S .
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One of Belliveau’s images made the cover of Science 
in November 1991. The image revealed an increased 
volume of blood in the activated visual cortex. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fM.R.I.) 
produces images by detecting signals from the 
hydrogen atoms of water molecules surrounding the 
vessels that deliver blood to the brain, relying on the 
magnetic properties of haemoglobin. Although the 
subtractive method used to obtain the magazine’s 
cover image was already obsolete by the time the 
journal was published, the image became iconic.10
George Bush Sr famously declared the 1990s to be 
the Decade of the Brain. A glance at the New York 
Times archives during that decade reveals that 
references to fMRI became increasingly common 
as the 90s unfolded11 – from initial reports on the 
existence of this new technology to articles covering 
research into Alzheimer’s, language acquisition, 
drug use and (more disturbingly) evidence of 
biological gender difference.12 The earlier articles, 
written before magnetic imaging technology had 
become familiar, highlight the limitations of the 
procedure. A neurologist at Yale cautions in 1992 
that making assertions about the functioning of the 
brain based on blood flow is ‘an enormous leap’.13 
But these caveats tend to disappear as the decade 
progresses. The fallibility of the technology fades 
from view. 
The tension between the quicksilver flare of thought 
and the static dull mass across which it flashes 
seems to have a visual counterpart in images of 
the brain, which transform a grey lump of flesh 
into a colourful, dynamic, digitized picture. But the 
brightness on display in those images should not be 
mistaken with the qualitative experience of thought 
itself. fMRI might visualize brain function but it does 
not produce images of our emotions and desires, 
feelings and anxieties, hopes and fears. As Gayle 
Rubin notes in a different context, biology can only 
ever tell us so much (as biologists themselves are 
often the first to admit): ‘The belly’s hunger gives no 
clues as to the complexities of cuisine.’14
But the shimmering colours of these images are 
imbued with aesthetic significance. We live in a 
culture in which brightness and darkness, vibrancy 
and the monochromatic, dynamism and stasis have 
profoundly emotional connotations.  
‘No-one can reasonably watch the frenzied, localized 
activity in the brain of a person driven by some 
obsession, or see the dull glow of a depressed brain, 
and still doubt that these are physical conditions,’ 
declares Rita Carter in Mapping the Mind.15 Here 
the movements and lights that appear in fMRI are 
directly equated with mental states.  But this is a 
metaphorical process. Happy brains do not shine 
and depressed brains do not emit a dull glow; the 
dim light produced by the image does not directly 
correspond to a gloomy disposition (however much 
our value-laden language suggests otherwise). 
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The resident doctor hails with confident enlightened 
zeal this ‘Illuminated anatomy, the triumph of 
the age.’17 Castorp refers again and again to the 
‘strands with nodules’ that appear on his X-ray 
image: an empirical testament to his illness. He 
carries his X-ray photograph in his wallet as ‘a kind 
of identification. Like a passport or a membership 
card.’18
But the narrative captures the tension between 
scientific rationality and the queasy, uncanny effect 
its images produce; the physical is metaphysical. 
X-rays do not disenchant the world but imbue it with 
greater mystery. Entering the ‘artificial twilight’19 
of the X-ray room with its sparks and sizzles of 
electrical energy, red lights and green glows, the 
image that emerges is ‘phantom like and hazy, like 
a fog or a pale, uncertain aura,’20 a ‘soft halo of 
flesh… a web of darker spots and blackish ruffles.’21 
The procedure has a haunting, mystical quality. 
By stripping living flesh from the bone, the X-ray 
provides a glimpse into the grave. It functions as a 
premonition of death. The milky frame that appears 
against the translucent darkness is ‘sepulchral’, 
‘funereal’, a ‘gaunt memento mori’.22 For Castorp, 
X-ray images are macabre, moving, otherworldly. 
He likens the experience to a clairvoyant aunt who 
saw people as skeletons prior to their deaths.
But these images also provide strange insights 
into living beings. Gazing at his cousin Joachim’s 
X-rayed form, Hans is distracted by a ‘sack, or 
maybe a deformed animal… like some sort of 
flapping jellyfish.’ This curious creature turns out to 
be his companion’s ‘honour-loving heart’.23 Hans is 
deeply moved by this sight; the heart is more than 
a fleshy organ but the seat of emotions and love. 
He keeps an X-ray photograph of his beloved in his 
pocket and presses it to his lips in her absence - 
‘without a face, but revealing the organs of her 
chest cavity and the tender framework of her upper 
body, delicately surrounded by soft, ghostlike forms 
of her flesh.’24
The neurophilosopher Paul Churchland is similarly 
said to carry an image of his wife’s brain in his wallet. 
Bruno Latour argues that carrying a photograph of 
her face would be no more or less rational as this 
is also a technologically mediated representation, 
albeit a more socially acceptable one. Neither image 
provides a direct representation of the essence of 
subjectivity.25 But the mediations involved here are 
qualitatively different. The more ‘scientific’ image 
is the more abstract. A photograph reproduces 
the world in a recognisable, if distorted manner, 
whereas the images produced by brain scans, like 
the ghostly X-ray visions discussed by Mann, usher 
the viewer into an alien terrain.  
W E  A R E  N O T  R E A L L Y  A T  H O M E 
I N  O U R  I N T E R P R E T E D  W O R L D . 
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The cover story of the March 2014 edition of Scientific 
American is dedicated to ‘The Century of the Brain’. 
The cover image (see page 77) depicts bright folds 
of multi-coloured fibres encasing a glowing yellow 
core. Strange shafts of light and iridescent streaks 
radiate from a disembodied central globule that 
coruscates within its obsidian surroundings.  
When I look at this image I see a sea anemone 
floating above a coral reef, a rapturous heart, an oil 
slick in a dark cavern, a blue fishing net catching 
a lamp, twinkling embers, an alien spaceship 
venturing into the unknown. The garish colours 
employed here do not bare much resemblance to 
the grey matter in our heads and certainly fail to 
gesture towards the world beyond it. It is unclear 
whether the image is generated by machines used 
to analyse brain function or is an artist’s impression. 
The bold glowing cover picture does not seem 
vastly dissimilar from the cover image on Scientific 
American that appeared the subsequent month, of 
distant galaxies.  
What does this image proclaim exactly? Perhaps 
little else than the dazzling innovative qualities 
of scientific discovery as such – So innovative! So 
shiny! So cutting edge! Aren’t the machines and 
brilliant minds that power them impressive? And 
ultimately, of course, beyond our comprehension. 
The injunction is to gaze in awe, to marvel at this 
most advanced form of human knowledge. 
In the Scientific American article itself two 
neuroscientists discuss the emerging technologies 
that might provide new insights into the mysterious 
grey lump in our skulls – as it is invariably described 
in article after article. These scientists are quick to 
point to the limitations of current brain imaging 
technologies which they acknowledge are far from 
transparent representations of consciousness. The 
article is populated by strange, almost mystical 
sounding creatures and materials. They discuss 
needle-like electrodes prodding into the brains 
of animals in laboratories and molecule-sized 
materials that might be inserted into the cerebral 
cortex to track the electrical activity of neurons. 
One of the article’s authors has experimented with 
the larval zebra fish, whose transparent flesh allows 
for its brain activity to be easily observed (although 
how similar this creature is to a human remains 
obscure). The fish’s neurons were genetically 
engineered to flouresce when calcium ions enter 
the cell. Later the article discusses nanodiamonds, 
which are capable of registering the electrical 
fluctuations of a cell and endoscopes which are 
being developed to peer inside skulls, gaining 
access through vessels or arteries.  
To the lay person – or at least to me – the 
descriptions of these technologies evoke something 
intriguing, weird, surprising. They’re engaging to 
read about. But they don’t really tell me very much 
about my brain or myself. Popular science writing 
is grounded in the promise of something to come – 
premised on positivist assumptions about scientific 
discovery. The brain might be grey and mysterious 
today but tomorrow…? Yet amid all the futuristic-
sounding innovations, the problems neuroscience 
faces are old and stubborn – like the fact that living 
brains tend to be encased in bone which makes 
them difficult to see inside. The wholly enlightened 
earth is radiant with triumphant banality. 
In these accounts of new imaging technologies, the 
language is often as lurid as the images. On my 
trawl through the New York Times archives I came 
across a long feature written by Stephen S Hall in 
1999 entitled ‘Journey to the Centre of my Mind’ 
in which the journalist underwent a series of fMRI 
scans. Metaphors abound.   
Images of brain often resemble spaceships 
circulating in a dark galaxy, but in written accounts 
of neuroscientific research it is the scientist who 
is cast as the intrepid explorer venturing into the 
unknown cerebral stratosphere. Non-scientific or 
popular scientific accounts of brain function tend to 
employ tropes from imperialist adventure narratives 
– the brain is the final frontier to be discovered, 
and if we follow the colonial metaphor to its logical 
conclusion, dominated, controlled, exploited.    
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Hall says he embarked on an ‘adventure’ into the 
‘dark wood of cognition’ across the ‘daunting 
frontier’ into his brain. The scientists, he says, are 
like pioneers in covered wagons who have now 
established a ‘beachhead on a vast, uncharted 
continent’. He describes his account as a ‘neuronal 
picaresque’ akin to Dante’s journey into hell. The 
image of his brain is ‘like those aerial shots of 
Southern California’ or ‘like a Chopin impromptu’ 
or like a landscape with a river running through it or 
like ‘the wall of napalm scene in Apocalypse now’ or 
like ‘a neon sign on a cheap diner’.  
The tension Hall describes throughout is between 
the ‘strange commingling of inert anatomy and 
transcendent human qualities.’ But ultimately 
despite all the flashes or rivers or folds that 
he witnesses his brain remains opaque. Those 
‘voluptuous, serpentine folds of cortex’ that he 
describes so lavishly do not ultimately yield very 
much. Somewhere, he opines, the brain must 
harbour childhood memories, the capacity to speak 
foreign languages, pop song lyrics, the contours of 
people’s faces –  ‘all nestled and synaptically etched 
in this bland grey and squishy landscape’ – but 
for all his torturous narrative exertions, for all the 
bright metaphorical images he laces his text with, 
the grey squishiness persists in being grey and 
squishy.26   
If a light is too bright the glare obscures more than 
it reveals.  
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Alongside those pertaining to colour, the OED 
contains the following definitions of grey:
But a third definition suggests a possible means of 
subverting this:
‘Grey is every theory but ever green is the tree of 
life’. This often quoted line from Goethe’s Faust 
insists that scientific abstraction drains reality of its 
richness and beauty. But in the examples discussed 
here, we are bombarded with bright images 
and florid prose to compensate for the obdurate 
greyness of concrete nature. Rebecca Comay 
suggests that the lurid green being proffered in 
Goethe’s formulation invokes ‘the shimmer of a life 
numb to its own suffering and cold to the failure 
on which it feeds’27: Brightness is incapable of 
illuminating the greyness of life. 
For Comay visions of greyness traditionally ‘mark 
the exhaustion of the present – a faded landscape 
in which there is nothing to take over and nothing to 
pass on.’28 Comay explicitly links this monochrome 
image to the repetitive rhythms and apparent 
inescapability of advanced industrial capitalism. 
But she, through a meticulous reading of Hegel, 
suggests an alternative: ‘Far from signalling a 
simple entropy or atrophy of possibilities, it is 
crepuscular grey, not glowing green or gold, that 
marks the chomatic opening to a new beginning; 
it is from the ashes of lost opportunity that Spirit 
quickens.’29  
Theodor Adorno discusses Beckett’s Endgame as 
the exemplary work of art after the Second World 
War. Beckett succeeds in capturing the ‘bombed-
out consciousness’30 that emerges from the debris, 
a smashed subjectivity that can no longer reflect 
on itself. But Adorno discerns a glint of hope in 
Beckett’s work: the terrain in Endgame is not 
empty, it is almost empty. An ‘oblique light’ shines.31 
Beckett specifies that the action plays out under a 
grey light. When Clov looks through his telescope 
he sees ‘grey – grey – grey’ (or perhaps ‘light 
black’).32 The light is feeble, certainly, but it is not 
identical with darkness. In this near darkness, that 
might be aligned with the grey described by Comay: 
‘consciousness begins to look its own demise in 
the eye, as if it wanted to survive the demise.’33 
This dull chink of light is what constitutes the plot 
of Endgame: ‘The tiny bit that is also everything – 
that would be the possibility that something could 
perhaps change.’34 
For Adorno, the greyness of Beckett’s work is 
precisely where its brightness lays:
“If Beckett’s plays, as crepuscularly grey as after 
sunset and the end of the world, want to exorcise 
circus colours, they yet remain true to them... Even 
artworks that incorruptibly refuse celebration 
and consolation do not wipe out radiance, and the 
greater their success, the more they gain it. Today 
this lustre devolves precisely upon works that are 
inconsolable.”35 
Adorno discusses the austerity of modernist art, 
suggesting that a palate that renounces colour has 
more sparkle than the vibrant glare of much popular 
culture: ‘The higher the quality of a work, the 
greater its brilliance, and this is most strikingly the 
case in the instance of those grey-on-grey works of 
modernism that eclipse Hollywood’s Technicolor.’36 
A rainbow-feathered stuffed bird of paradise once 
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d i s m a l ,  g l o o m y ;  s a d ,  d e p r e s s i n g
L a c k i n g  i n d i v i d u a l i t y ,  d u l l  a n d 
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o r  c a t e g o r i z e d ;  n o t  b l a c k  a n d  w h i t e ; 
i n t e r m e d i a t e  b e t w e e n  d i r e c t l y  o p p o s i n g 
n o t i o n s  o f  g o o d  o r  b a d ,  r i g h t  o r  w r o n g ,  e t c .
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functioned as a utopian vision but such an image is 
no longer tenable: ‘The tenebrous has become the 
plenipotentiary of that utopia.’37
In a tenebrous world, visions of the self as 
illuminated splotches in the digital dark provide a 
superficial solace. They map comfortably onto the 
present terrain - detached from human life, the 
convolutions of history and experience that shape 
existence fade into the blackness.  In a similar vein 
to Adorno, Siegfried Kracauer refused to align bright 
lights and colours with intellectual illumination. He 
used the following metaphor to describe the lives of 
white collar workers in interwar Berlin:
“In the Luna Park, of an evening, a fountain is 
sometimes displayed illuminated by Bengal Lights. 
Cones of red, yellow and green light, continually 
recreated, flee into the darkness. When the 
splendour is gone, it turns out to have come from 
the wretched cartilaginous structure of a few little 
pipes. The fountain resembles the life of many 
employees. From its wretchedness it escapes into 
distraction, lets itself be illuminated with Bengal 
lights and, unmindful of its origin, dissolves into the 
nocturnal void.”38
Popular representations of the brain often have a 
similarly dazzling function. But behind the images 
brains continue their fleshy existence. These brains 
do not live in a nocturnal void but are embedded in 
bodies that move about in the world.   
Attending to dull, squishy reality in all its opacity 
might paradoxically reveal more about human 
subjectivity than constantly attempting to proclaim 
that its secrets have already been laid bare under 
the cold, harsh strip lights of scientific rationality.
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What would a poetics of nonsubjectifying relationship look like, in the context of a 
culture which is converging continually on the singularity of language in code? How 
does it feel to read a text which is emerging only as a result of its assimilation into a 
converged culture? Where can radical language operate from, when everything in the 
world is exactly the same?  
In this unfragmentary amalgam I look at the role of poetics in turning language into 
a tactical differential technology, and the continuing necessity of the figure of the 
schizo in cultural critique – drawing on a tradition which has utilized depathologised 
schizophrenia since 1970s, and bringing it into contact with what has been described 
by media theorists such as Henry Jenkins as convergence culture: the increasingly 
complex relationships between three concepts - “media convergence, participatory 
culture, and collective intelligence.”2 Making use of unconventional type and formatting 
decisions to emblematize the simultaneity of ‘writerly’ and ‘readerly’ impulses in 
a performative language practice, I look at the ways a Schizo Culture identified by 
thinkers around the 1970s, can be read alongside our Convergence Culture as media 
converge in digital space, and then look at the ways contemporary writers are melding 
and revisiting schizoid language practices for a convergent era. 
S C H I Z O  C U L T U R E
“ S C H I Z O - C U L T U R E  H E R E  I S  B E I N G  U S E D  I N  R A T H E R 
A  S P E C I A L  S E N S E .  N O T  R E F E R R I N G  T O  C L I N I C A L 
S C H I Z O P H R E N I A ,  B U T  T O  T H E  F A C T  T H A T  T H E 
C U L T U R E  I S  D I V I D E D  U P  I N T O  A L L  S O R T S  O F 
C L A S S E S  A N D  G R O U P S ,  E T C E T E R A ,  A N D  T H A T 
S O M E  O F  T H E  O L D  L I N E S  A R E  B R E A K I N G  D O W N ” 3 
It was in the post-Vietnam post-1968 world that William S. Burroughs, R.D Laing, Giles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, among others pointed out the value of a de-pathologised 
understanding of schizophrenia as a model for breaking down established disciplinary 
and hierarchical lines. The Schizo Culture conference was convened by Semiotext(e) on 
13-16th November 1975 to “narrow the gap between radicalism, philosophy, and art on 
both sides of the Atlantic”.4 The organisers were particularly seeking to ‘overcome the 









no arm and 
perhaps nothing 
except eyes and 
a nose, perhaps 
a pale neck 
which reached 
down, and up to 
just above my 
own head.   The 
hand reaching 
up from the 
shoulder, as 
if to take, but 





It is impossible to break the chain of 
power-heirarchy-impotization-castration 
without assembling a concrete machine of 
another type – diagrammatic conjunction 
of the material, semiotic and social 
flows according to a nonmeaningful, 
non-significant, noninterpretative, 
nonsubjectifying relationship.1
There is an entire technology of power. 
Even the syntactic, relational, and other 
meanings proceed from there. The 
primacy of the micropolitical pragmatics 
over the phonological, syntactic, and 
semantic components of language.  The 
primacy of the formations of power over 
the unconscious.
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contradictions’ and note the strong resonances between the radically non-hierarchical 
operations of New York’s conceptual artists such as John Cage and Robert Wilson, and 
the immersive theoretical approach of continental philosophy from France, in the form 
of Deleuze, Guattari, Michel Foucault, and Jean-François Lyotard – and the different 
languages chosen to reflect on them.
At the heart of this link between arts and philosophy through the institutional means 
of punishment and control, was the idea of chance.  Artists such as John Cage used 
chance operations to break down the control function of language, and open it up to 
poetry, Foucault highlighted the chance mechanisms of power which had pathologised 
schizophrenia, and anti-psychiatrist R.D. Laing observed in the schizophrenic’s 
hallucinatory utterances a pragmatic articulation of our struggle with our subordination 
to chance and fate.  
The use of a notion of ‘schizo’ in the present text then – as in Semiotext(e)’s conference 
– is not to idealise what is clearly a troubling and in itself often punishing condition, 
but to acknowledge ways random operation and incoherence propose different ways of 
thinking – eliding realism and hallucination, the uncomprehensible and experiential, 
with ‘phantasy’ and ‘poetry’, as ways of uncoupling mechanisms of control.  When 
nothing is certain, as Deleuze and Guattari affirmed in their subsequent Schizophrenia 
and Capitalism books, there is no mainstream or centre which can be said to be the 
focus of power – and this is a useful model for culture to operate in.
S T R U C T U R A L I S M  >  D E C O N S T R U C T I O N  >  C O N V E R G E N C E  > 
The deconstruction and post-structuralism of modern continental philosophy 
took thought back to the text – it was the application of the schizoid tendency of 
disorganization on structuralist thought;  the same obsession with the text with which 
Thomas Bernhard subordinated reality to the fate of language in Correction; language 
which shared with identity the truth that it fell apart under its own implications. 
I M P O S S I B I L I T Y  O F  T H E  O U T S I D E
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the closest the commentary at the Schizo Culture Conference 
itself came to predicting the importance of convergence in relation to power was 
what was interesting to me 
was making English less 
understandable, because when 
it is understandable, well, 
people control one-another, 
and poetry disappears…5 
We do not then see phantasy in its true function 
but experienced merely as an inclusive, sabotaging 
infantile nuisance. […] Phantasy is a particular way 
of relating to the world. It is part of, sometimes the 
essential part of, the meaning or sense (le sens: 
Merleau-Ponty) implicit in action.6 
open, waving, 
and the eyes 
staring out at 
the centre of 
me, implacably.
A throat 






one which here 
began below 
the shoulder 
and the sweep 
of the skeletal 
collar bone, 
split across the 
contrad ic t ion 
of open lapel 
and within this 
the chest, and 
distended lips 
and hence the 
mouth’s recess.
a man who […] must force everything he is, in the final 
analysis, to coalesce in one extreme point, force it all 
to the utmost limits of his intellectual capacity and his 
nervous tension until, at the highest degree of such 
expansion and contraction and the total concentration 
he has repeatedly achieved, he must actually be torn 
apart.8
Correction, in the sense of the 
novel, involves the breakdown 
of identity between a concept 
and its object, and so it 




delivered by ‘a man who has the true gift of incoherence’.9  In this talk, Jean-Francois 
Lyotard anticipated the motion of ‘convergence’, describing how the working class 
movement was ‘sucked into’ and instrumentalised by the dominant political system:
The potential for a language which can happen within what Lyotard termed the ‘discourse 
of truth’, (from where control and power are exerted) was dependent on finding a form 
of language of realism which goes beyond or differentiates from ‘versimilitude’ – the 
similarity to the real, the production of a form of the recognizably real in cultural form 
– from a language moment which produces its own reality.  This form of a language of 
non-versimilitudinous, or non-representative, realism, which engages in and forms part 
of the becoming of reality, is now second nature to us in terms of the reality produced by 
code, on which culture converges.
Instead of understanding the role of fragmentation and deconstructed language to 
critique and inform discourses of truth from outside, we can, using Lyotard’s non-
versimilitudinous model of language conceive of a continuous internal motion of 
becoming in which language affirms its own truth – containing the meta-statement of 
its own ‘spontaneity, libido, drive, instinct… savagery, madness…’ – as an hallucinatory 
reality to which culture is necessarily subject. 
During the digital revolution, up-to the late nineties, it was a commonplace notion 
that old totemic media of print, television, radio would be demolished and replaced 
by a new paradigm – from outside. Burroughs saw the existing lines of discipline, 
consciousness and formal adherence breaking down to be replaced by others in 1970s 
– and now, with a ‘convergence culture’ of shared platforms and systematic models, 
that breaking down has revealed a new realism of language in which technologies, 
politics and semiotics, along with disciplinary and control structures continually twist 
or melt back together into the background noise of culture-as-code.  The overflowing 
of the divergent faults within language and identity which delivered the post-modern 
demise of structuralism and binary opposition, are in a sense logically followed by a 
convergence culture which forms a codified plane for mapping these divergences – and 
in turn these must be followed by a tactical and mobile divergence from within which is 
true to the hallucinatory realism produced by language itself.
C O N V E R G E N C E  C U L T U R E 
In a 2012 interview, Kanye West affirms in all seriousness that ‘everything in the world 
is exactly the same’.11 West is referring to his own cultural productions: fashion, music, 
sculpture (even persona), but simultaneously we can quite seriously understand digital 
culture as consisting of an insistent ‘everything’. An ‘everything’ of codifiable and 
irrreducable textiality, or information, in which corporate informational giants such as 
Google and Facebook financialize behaviours, cultures, communications just as they do 
technologies. The background code of the digital’s many dialects of data as analytical 
the teeth point 
back into the 
throat.   Some 
i m p o s s i b l e 
cons t r u c t i o n 
of a mouth I 
looked down 
into: a gaping 
downward from 
its lips and 
the jaw, into 
a tongueless 
mouth which 
i n e v i t a b l y 
consumed the 
entirety of the 
upper body, and 




c a p i t u l a t e d 
under its 
i n s i s t e n c e , 
t a p e r i n g 
away to the 
compromised, 
but nonetheless 
[The working class:] a 
movement which theorized 
itself as being localized outside 
capitalist society was precisely 
being sucked into that system
one should imagine a strategy without exteriority, 
which as far as language is concerned would not be 
outside of the discourse of truth, the discourse of 
power, but which instead of excluding itself, would 
use the rule of that discourse against itself…10
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and control mechanisms, the new literacy as alphanumeric and iconographic hybrid 
engendered by social media channels, the quantification of locales in terms of instant 
population estimates – these are signs of a culture converged again as a singular 
system of signs, inside and pressing at the edge of sprawling and codified text.   
In business the term Convergence implies the coming together of four major 
industries: Information Technologies, Telecommunication, Consumer Electronics 
and Entertainment. In convergence culture, industry also converges in the practice of 
everyday life with the human and geopolitical platforms: semiotics, language, sociology, 
identity etc. The processes by which convergence takes place are everywhere, from 
the circumstance of a cereal packet character who becomes a the lead character of 
a film and gaming francize, whose voice is then supplanted into your sat-nav; to the 
program of identities a teenager proliferates across her Instagram and her Facebook, 
in her meetings with school teachers, the edited digital photos she shows her Nan 
over Sunday dinner, and the slang she uses during a first date; from the layering of 
territory the stack of virtual worlds nationality, identity, law, information-firewall, to 
the convergence of consumption and production at work on tumblr and other mixed-
ownership media-sharing websites.  
Digital convergence is already relational, and diagrammatic in the sense of being a 
result of the breaking down of old lines of distinction, but it also raises the potential of a 
totality of control in that it focuses the source of agency upwards into abstract financial-
power strata – and that even the matter of grass-roots or resistant movements can 
be and are subsumed into a larger and more insidious system of financialization.  So 
a converging culture driven both ‘from the top’ via massive media conglomerates 
formed from digital convergence industries, and ‘from the grassroots’ via user created, 
appropriated, distributed and interpreted content and data, forms a continual mulling 
of power, similar in diagrammatic appearance to a fountain, or a convection current in 
which power rises through the centre and tumbles from its outer edges.
The mulling of control between the upper-echelons of finance and the lower strata of 
grassroots activity is a convection in which the central rule is that of the irrepressible 
abstraction of everything into codified information – data which are drawn up by 
corporate law, shaken free and embodied and reconnected to the social body by 
information activists, drawn into the grassroots by collective re-appropriatory cultures, 
re-re-appropriated and pushed up for mainstream political and commercial means, 
corporate gains.  In this sense, codification is the radiator of culture, pressing it upwards.
in the context 
of this almost 




each static in 
the way of boot, 
just as the wave 
waves in the 
way of a hand.
The whole body, 
as if crouching 
over those boot 
prints, thrust its 
front edge out. 
An insistence 
to that thrust, 
like a crotch 
pushed forward 
insistent except 
also – and in 
keeping with 
the nature of 




“ S O M E  F E A R  T H A T  M E D I A  I S  O U T  O F  C O N T R O L ,  O T H E R S 
T H A T  I T  I S  T O O  C O N T R O L L E D .  S O M E  S E E  A  W O R L D 
W I T H O U T  G A T E K E E P E R S ,  O T H E R S  A  W O R L D  W H E R E 
G A T E K E E P E R S  H A V E  U N P R E C E D E N T E D  P O W E R . ” 12
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C O N V E R G E N C E  A S  M O T I O N
This movement is integrally linguistic in nature, and only possible within language.  Just 
as the work of digital artists engaging deeply with convergence is textual also – exerting 
through code the potentials of experimental language practice in converged media. 
The Ubu-web entry for Takeshi Murata’s film Silver describes how his work “twists and 
stretches a sequence from an old movie into a psychedelic odyssey--a fitting afterlife…” 
Indicating how the codified rendering of analogue film opens the door to a movement 
and transformation which is not cutting/splicing, but instead operates by altering and 
deconstructing the syntactical structure of the movie file – by removing ‘key frames’ 
as grammatical devices; a continual and uninterrupted ambient poetics of movement: 
Atmosphere and ambiguity prevail in our continually present treatment of alphanumeric 
and iconographic language in social media, where entertainment and communication 
converge in the now. Comment feeds are home to multiple readings of a simple image 
– we become analytical anthropologists of the social present. The simultaneous 
operations of control and analysis take place upon a reality which is becoming, and this 
is the feverish activity of the collective poem we hear spoken in the public space when 
people talk with each others’ words as though in agreement but of course not at all, 
clinging to our individuality it  dissolves.  
A R T  O F  C O N V E R G E N C E  C U L T U R E
Artists have explored the convergent character of culture as an impulse combining 
controlling and analytical forms of text.  In Unsound Method (2010), Tim Etchells 
reveals that Joseph Conrad’s novel The Heart of Darkness is a musical score, where 
the frequency of the words applicable to lightness and darkness form a syncopated 
rhythmic relation to one another – setting up a series of non-binary oppositions and 
bifurcations which occlude, reflect and dissolve the original rhythms and interplays of 
the text.
   
of eyes, a nose , 
and movements 
in the case of 
the wave of 
the hand, or 
stillnesses in 
the case of the 
boots – tenuous 







with the lips of 
the mouth and 
the drawn down 
sweep of the 
open lapel and 
beneath them 
the skeletally 
pale collar bone 
– then also a 
leather belt and 
beneath it the 
hips insistently 
8 3
F R U S T R A T I N G  T H E  G A Z E ,  H E R  B E A U T I F U L  F A C E 
N E V E R  S T A Y S  S T I L L  L O N G  E N O U G H  T O  R E A L L Y 
B E  L O O K E D  A T .  I N S T E A D ,  I T  K E E P S  D I S T O R T I N G 
T O  M O N S T R O U S  P R O P O R T I O N S  O R  T U R N I N G  I N T O 
L I Q U I D  R E F L E C T I O N S  …  M U R A T A ’ S  T E C H N I Q U E 
I N V O L V E S  D I G I T A L L Y  C O M P R E S S I N G  T H E  F O O T A G E 
S O  [ I T ]  …  R E C O R D S  O N L Y  T H E  N E T  D I F F E R E N C E 
I N  M O V E M E N T  F R O M  O N E  F R A M E  T O  T H E  N E X T . 
A T M O S P H E R E  A N D  A M B I G U I T Y  P R E V A I L  H E R E . ” 13
Sophia La Fraga reworks Beckett’s Waiting for Godot as emoji-text in W8ING (2014), 
converging the conundrum of Beckett’s language into the codified language of txt-
speak – for  example equating the ambiguous ‘Godot’ with an ‘unknown ID’ icon – and 
converging the theatrical voice with the immediate and performative nature of digital 
literacy. These convergences embrace the new ambiguities of codifiable texts and uses 
them as a program for new interfaces with reality – allowing the textual to play out in 
continual movement: as with the voice of the actor, so the utterance in txt.
L A N G U A G E  C O N T R O L  F I N A N C E
As Benjamin Bratton notes, the word ‘program’ is used to describe the protocols of 
working together that systems have, and that mapping of relations are ‘stacked’ into a 
variety of different territorial possibilities.  A program is essentially the manifestation 
of the linguistic nature of control observed by Burroughs – but, Bratton affirms, the 
linguistic nature of control has been diffused and converged among programs linking 
an immense plurality of layers through which our identity is evaporated – the number 
of functions layered upon the individual ‘user’ as node in the system.
thrust in such 
a way as to 
distend the 
belt itself – this 
same distension 
that forms the 
lips’ gaping and 
the mouth’s 
entire exposure 
– and as the hips 
immed i a t e l y 
gave way back 
to the neck, 
the nose, the 
eyes – and the 
skull-like brow 




and that area 
immed i a t e l y 
below the 
nose and eyes, 
excepting only 
a portion of 
the neck and 
the gesture – 
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Our modern ‘touch’ interfaces and visual surveillance mediums have not only failed to 
break down the link between language and control, but have made concrete, through 
‘programing’ the complete convergence of structures of language with those of 
semiosis, emotion, identity.
Burroughs was right to speak of the breaking down of established hierarchical lines 
and Schizo Culture as the dominant means of evolution for his time, but now we are 
within the broken down remains and these remains have been sucked back into a 
system of programatic power – the upwards motion of what Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi’s 
calls semiocaptial,16 where ‘signs produce signs without passing through the flesh’ 
and ‘Monetary value produces monetary value without first being realised through the 
production of goods’ – towards and into finance, where the feeling of text has become 
ethereal, abstracted from the ambiguities of its production and literally un-real.
C A S C A D I N G  L A N G U A G E
The untimely new gesture of the schizo is to re-introduce the madness, ambiguity 
and fatefulness of language into the contemporary cognitive machine’s interleaving of 
behavior, technology, culture and semiosis – not by breaking down, but by cascading 
within.  An hallucinatory and realist language for our time is one which is dissolving in 
itself and its background ‘codes’ even as it is combining everything. 
The continental, and post-structural, philosophers’ deep immersion in theoretical 
language, combining individual, social and political agency – and an insistence on the 
hallucinatory realism of the text – is an ideological state where always-already codified 
languages are rescued from the void of meaningfulness, into a technological field for 
a diagrammatic play. Here bifurcation and divergence lead to an ambiguity in motion 
similar to Murata’s ‘psychedelic odyssey’ of datamoshed film, removing the stabilising 
syntax or vocabulary. The immersive and experimental mode of writers like Felix 
Guattari, and contemporary writers like Tao Lin and Keston Sutherland in their own way 
also (as I will attempt to show later), take us back into language as a site of distribution 
– echoing the ways in which the poetry of the Language School of poetics affirmed the 
‘realist’ multiplicity and conflict of text:
signifying what? 
– of the hand 
– transparent.
S e c o n d l y 
because this 
would place the 
boots – almost 
a foot in front 
of the eventual 
placement of 
this upper part 
of the face.   It 
was almost as 
though the body 
of the crouched 
figure had been 
poured, or if not 
poured, then 
the body had 
itself fallen, and 
then yielded as 







…words are still the 
principal instruments of 
control. Suggestions are 
words. Persuasions are 
words. Orders are words. 
No control machine so far 
devised can operate without 
words, and any control 
machine which attempts 
to do so relying entirely on 
external force or entirely on 
physical control of the mind 
will soon encounter the 
limits of control.14
As robotics and Cloud hardware of all scales blend 
into a common category of machine, it will be unclear 
in general human-robotic interaction whether 
one is encountering a fully autonomous, partially 
autonomous, or completely human-piloted synthetic 
intelligence…. Ask yourself: Is that User “Anonymous” 
because he is dissolved into a vital machinic plurality, or 
because public identification threatens individual self-
mastery, sense of autonomy, social unaccountability, 
and so forth? ... Given the schizophrenic economy of 
the User - first over-individuated and then multiplied 
and de-differentiate - this really isn’t an unexpected 
or neurotic reaction at all. It is, however, fragile and 
inadequate.15
In terms of language and power in academic and art circles, the convergence of 
continental theory and U.S. art rhetoric is, of course, fully made.  Indeed, the current 
language at large in the arts, “International Art English” (IAE)19, is a linguistic stew 
so heavily influenced by the continental philosophical tradition – that it mimics the 
problems of translating French post-structuralist word-play into English.
This twisting together of traditions in language, to produce what Alix Rule and David 
Levine ‘quite seriously’ define as a ‘new language’ is schizophrenic in its nature and 
production of newness – unreliable, uncodifiable, threatening, and formed around 
an integrally specific and problematic existential experience.  It is the case that IAE 
is a Lyotardian anomaly operating among a codifiable culture, being essentially and 
integrally ‘nonmeaningful, non-significant, noninterpretative, nonsubjectifying’ but 
also interior in the sense of its centrality to ‘power’ and relation to finance. As with 
the schizophrenia identified by Deleuze and Guattari, the power of differentiation 
here is deployed as a form of elite drawing of lines, de- and then re-territorialising 
at will – a language of and for verisimilitude in which the ‘key-frames’ of truth are 
dissolved.
D I V E R G I N G  I N  C O N V E R G E N C E
It is into the context of the all-as-text and text-as-technology implied by convergence, 
that a contemporary schizo poetics exercises the madness of language as a political 
and social agent of multiples.  A schizo poetics which divulges its place within 
convergence culture is one in which language is in a constant state of becoming 
not-itself – and instead a dysfunctional part of the flow of data into capital through 
technology, semiosis and communication.
The schizo poetic interjects a problem or glitch within mainstream codified 
language. In its refusal of static identity, its bifurcation into multiples, its dissolution 
Nothing  here is 
representative; rather, 
it is all life and lived 
experience: the actual, 
lived emotion of having 
breasts does not 
resemble breasts, it does 
not represent them18
Whose realism? Whose reality? …. the realities that 
writing deals with comprise a social body that can best 
be conceived as being made up of conflicting – often 
violently clashing – codes… Unresolved conflict at the 
heart of the real underscores the value of embodying 
multiple perspectives and discourses within a work – 
instead of singling out and harnessing it to the burden 
of ‘standing for’ an uncontested reality.17
furthest but 
yielding least, the 
rest succeeding 
almost solely in a 
wave – signifying 
what? – as it 
cast backwards 
over the gaping 
jaw and belt-line 
gaping, the whole 
torso falling away 
into the mouth or 
crotch with those 
other portions 
of it lost forever.
Thirdly, because 
the bottom half 
of the face was 
separated from 
the upper part 
– the eyes, and 
the bridge of the 




status as a neck 
Many tendencies that IAE has inherited 
are not just specific to French but to 
the highbrow written French that the 
poststructuralists appropriated, or in some 
cases parodied (the distinction was mostly 
lost in translation). This kind of French 
features sentences that go on and on and 
make ample use of adjectival verb forms 
and past and present participles. These have 
become art writing’s stylistic signatures.’21
[The artist] centres in her work a deal 
with a political and sociocultural 
reality, with objects, images, texts 
that move and disturb the status 
by questioning its meaning and 
appearances, by overturning the 
relations between the work and its 
space, and by instituting the viewer 
as an essential component of the 
work’s sense.20
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the contemporary schizo poet is at once emblematic of the temporal qualities of the 
convergent media network, and at odds with the commodification of the persona. 
As Jenkins described in relation to identity-making in Convergence Culture:
Keston Sutherland’s poetry reflects convergence with a shift in his poetic style, 
doing away with the ‘zig-zag and somersaults of fragmentation’ in favour of a 
deeply melded lyric which converges the romantic, the political, the sexual with 
beligerance and anxiety, knowledge and naivety – as an unbroken, not-versified 
flow. Ostensibly Odes to TL61P (2013) is mostly a prose work, but Sutherland 
himself questions the exactitude of the term ‘prose’ to describe something which 
could at an time be other:
Sutherland’s is not simple convergent writing by virtue of its ambiguity between 
prose/verse – the ‘smashable edges’ in his work and the violently reacontextualised 
vocabularies he uses form a schizoid poetics which is active and alive to diagrammatic 
readings. His work implies his discontents as  slippery non-codifiable programs of 
relation problematising a cross-media system of information, entertainment and 
control with sexuality, anxiety, fury and jouissance of language taking the place of 
infernal logics.  
The radical ambiguity of texts here, and as is necessary at the between-state of 
the program, and in the freefall of language devolved from its syntactical and 
hierarchical structure, is one which acknowledges and enacts the depressive, 
dissolutionary abjection. Kristeva highlights the slang and base-ness in De Sade 
and Celine as integrally abject forms of identity creation language, for example 
– observing the movement towards an affirmation of identity which is neither the 
author’s own, nor rejected.  In the context of the programmatic relation, the text 
is itself a between-state of identity and context, the social-media realm is one in 
which identities which are at once our own and not, and prose stylists revisit the 
abject as a kind of realism for semiocapital conditions.
Cooking the booklets in cream over 
the flames of a steamy and amorous 
anaemic in a crematorium, or 
bitterly masturbating for a magic 
bearhug from bond markets 
enduring freedom, or just bugging 
out on leverage in Merryl Lynch, 
it’s the same old same old up the 
you know what; Brief contact is not 
irritating.23
I wonder whether they might not at the 
same time… be something other than 
prose, too? Prose cannot normally be 
imagined to have porous edges liable to be 
penetrated or broken through by lines that 
suddenly qualify as “verse”; I don’t know 
how to conceive it yet, but the function of 
that smashable edge must be somehow to 
introduce a generic contingency or blur, so 
that we are never fully “in prose”.24
by virtue of its 
position above the 
gaping mouth; its 
continuation above 
the eyes, up to the 
skull’s brow, and 
its length.   Were it 
not about the width 
of a neck which 
rose up to those 
parts which were 
– in the context 
of a body which 
has relinquished 
everything but 
i m p l a c a b i l i t y 




here found it.   (The 
nose implacable 
in the long term, 
across the course 
of a life, the eyes 
implacable in the 
short term, in 
the course of a 
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“ E a c h  o f  u s  c o n s t r u c t s  o u r  o w n  p e r s o n a l  m y t h o l o g y  f r o m  b i t s  a n d 
f r a g m e n t s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  e x t r a c t e d  f r o m  t h e  m e d i a  f l o w  a n d  t r a n s f o r m e d 
i n t o  r e s o u r c e s  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  w e  m a k e  s e n s e  o f  o u r  e v e r y d a y  l i v e s . ” 22 
In Taipei (2013) the novelist Tao Lin’s use of abjection and dissolution are integral 
to the continuity of his central character Paul’s becoming, being at once diverging 
from and converging in culture. Tao Lin depicts an outsider lifestyle – on drugs, 
depressed, and when in relatinoships, they are dysfunctional on the point of 
collapse at the peak of their intimacy – in a language, and depicting a detournment 
or twisting of commercial branding and individual identity which points to the 
unsustainable realism and exhaustion of mainstream culture.  In the character’s 
conversations, as with the life of the text, the hallucinatory and the depressive, the 
manic and the freakish emerge from and drop back into their cultural context, and 
are interchangeable with the flows of the real:
The life of this language is continually coming into being as distinct, unique, and 
exerting a one-ness drug and madness experience which is as strikingly convergent 
as, for example, Burrough’s Naked Lunch was strikingly fragmentary.  The notion 
of fading, converging with the background or unconscious of reality, but also the 
continually divergent – the power with which the real hallucinatory consciousness 
impacts upon the world, in a continual slow time-lapse of text.
The fragment is dead, certainly, as a means of disruption – for who can fragment 
liquid, break vapour? This death of the negative of convergence leaves us intimately 
understanding without knowing the returning convergence at work in the 
differentiation of the schizoid treatment of language, where chance and fate are in 
becoming as an innate inter-relation of ambiguous and transparent forms. These are 
not tactics of ‘bringing together’, or of ‘breaking apart’, but of temporality in which 
the bringing together is an idiocyncratic and uncodifyable, illogical concentration – 
a fountain of shadows.  A poetics of energy, transference, and meaning falls apart 
only as it becomes is the usefulness of the schizoid obsessions with language which 
enable it to become – meaning to no end other than to disorganize and decode, or 
uncode the body or current in its upward motion – a fountain of shadows.
conversation.)   So 
beneath instead 
the furrow that 
falls between nose 
and upper lip – the 
face’s neck, if the 
entire face were 
a body, where the 
chin throat and 
jaw were a chest.
...  This would 
appear to be borne 
out by the wounds, 
implacable in 
their own way and 
not very much 
out of proportion 
to my own, and 
also, or rather 
– the soft rain 
mingling with the 
irridecent motion 
of the wound itself 
resulting in a flow – 
which I could relate 
to, nothing more.
the conceit that they existed because a young 
man in Taipei, while eating a bag of Chicken 
McNuggets, allowed himself (despite knowing 
this would definitely increase his unhappiness) 
to realistically imagine his next binge, when 
he would have two bags.  Paul and Erin were 
constructed by the young man’s unconscious, 
for verisimilitude, as passersby in the peripheral 
vision of his imaginary next trip to McDonalds.
Paul and Erin discussed 
their movie in a dialogue that 
sometimes overlapped with 
their inner monologues, which 
they sometimes introduced to 
the dialogue, or abandoned to 
focus on the dialogue, or both 
externalized, like pets into a 
shared space, to observe.25  
“ [ P a u l ]  f e l t  c o n t i n u o u s l y  a r o u s e d  ‘ s o m e w h e r e , ’  i n c l u d i n g  s o m e t i m e s , 
i t  s e e m e d ,  o u t s i d e  h i s  b o d y ,  a  f e w  f e e t  i n  f r o n t  o f  h i m ,  o r  f a r  i n 
t h e  d i s t a n c e ,  i n  a  c e r t a i n  s t o r e  o r  a r e a  o f  s k y ,  o r  i n  a n  o v e r l a p , 
s h i f t i n g  i n  a n d  o u t  o f  h i s  c h e s t  o r  h e a d  o r  t h e  f r o n t  o f  h i s  f a c e . ”
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With that facet of our psyche acknowledged this 
essay will explore what conditions, principally 
technological conditions, are conducive to 
alternative phenomenological dispositions to 
immediacy. Technology is deemed inseparable 
from being human, and accordingly considered 
in broad terms. Much of this essay’s ambition is 
complementary to extended mind theorisations 
(elsewhere elaborated in this publication). The first 
aim is to enable speculation on how the technological 
mediation inherent to our daily lives might speak 
through us in new ways. Our waking hours are 
modulated by the edifices and infrastructures 
wrought through and by our technologies, and 
those same modulations set the parameters for 
what degrees of action (and change) are possible to 
us. To step outside those parameters, should they 
be unacceptable to us, or indeed should necessity 
demand it, entails finding new flows of thought, 
premonitions of alternate modes of being-in-
world, different subjectivities. Such a fundamental 
reorientation regarding ones technologically 
saturated world has been declared an imperative by 
scholars of the post humanities (most stirringly by 
Rosi Braidotti1) - this essay’s second aim seeks to 
link this imperative to historical precedent for such 
reconfigurations of mind.
Hearing voices is a symptom of schizophrenic 
patients. It numbers as one of many forms of 
hallucination which the schizophrenic subject may 
experience. Hallucinations are categorised within 
the ‘positive symptoms’ of schizophrenia. NIMH2 
distinguishes ‘positive symptoms’ thusly: “positive 
symptoms are psychotic behaviors not seen in 
healthy people”. There is a sense of surplus here, 
A N  E A R L I E R  V E R S I O N  O F  T H I S  E S S A Y  W A S  P A R T 
O F  O N G O I N G  E L E C T R O N I C  V O I C E  P H E N O M E N A  B L O G 
( W W W . E L E C T R O N I C V O I C E P H E N O M E N A . N E T ) .  T H E R E 
P R O V E D  T O  B E  S U B S T A N T I A L  R E S O N A N C E  B E T W E E N 
T H I S  E S S A Y ’ S  T H E M A T I C S  A N D  T H E  A U T H O R S 
P R E S E N T A T I O N  A T  T H E  T O R Q U E  S Y M P O S I U M . 
T H I S  T E X T  I S  T H E  O U T C O M E  O F  T H A T  O V E R L A P .
T h i s  e s s a y  w a s  o r i g i n a l l y  w r i t t e n  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  e l e c t r o n i c  v o i c e  p h e n o m e n a 
–  a  p r a c t i c e  u s e f u l  f o r  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  i t  d i r e c t s  t o  a l t e r i t y .  P u s h i n g  p a s t  t h e  f i e l d s 
e s o t e r i c  a n d  o c c u l t  t r a p p i n g s  p e r m i t s  a  f o c u s  o n  a n o t h e r  m a r g i n a l  e x p e r i e n c e  l a d e n 
w i t h  w e i r d n e s s  –  h e a r i n g  a  v o i c e  w i t h o u t  a n  o b v i o u s  s o u r c e  o f  e x t e r i o r  e m a n a t i o n . 
D e c l a r a t i o n s  a n d  c o m m a n d s ,  o b v i o u s l y  n o t  o f  o n e ’ s  o w n  v o i c e ,  i s s u i n g  f r o m  w i t h i n  y o u r 
o w n  s k u l l .  U n r a v e l l i n g  w h y  s u c h  a n  e x p e r i e n c e  i s  e r r o n e o u s l y  c o m m e n s u r a t e  w i t h 
a l t e r i t y  p o i n t s  t o  a n  u n d e r  a c k n o w l e d g e d  w a y  o f  a t t u n i n g  t o  o n e s  i m m e d i a t e  e n v i r o n m e n t .
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that the experiences of hallucinations, delusions, 
and ‘thought & movement disorders’ are excesses 
which non-pathological cognition never needs to 
buffer. Hallucinations are not limited to hearing 
voices, but they are the most prevalent register of 
hallucination diagnosed in schizophrenic patients. 
More importantly however has been recognition 
(accentuated in the last three decades) that voice 
hearing is not limited to patients experiencing 
schizophrenia. The Hearing Voices Network3 
developed following the research of two Dutch 
psychiatrists, Marius Romme and Sandra Escher, 
who had revealed that many more members of 
the population heard voices than had ever been 
previously estimated4. The Hearing Voices Network 
is an important initiative allowing those who hear 
voices to cope with their experiences by naming 
the voices they hear: identifying them through 
historical or emotional points of reference, and 
imbuing the communication with meaning. Perhaps 
most importantly, its a process which provides 
therapeutic benefits to the patient without entailing 
an attendant psycho-pharmaceutical regimen. 
Professor Lisa Blackman worked with the group 
during its formative years. For Blackman “voice 
hearing is a modality of knowing (that) cannot be 
reduced to irrationality or disease”.5 Blackman’s 
earlier research with the Hearing Voices Network6 
establishes that the symptomatic classification 
of voice hearing in conventional psychiatry cannot 
contain or explain the many occasions and 
circumstance wherein voice hearing is part of the 
human experience. 
The non-pathological framing of auditory 
hallucination is a central part of Julian 
Jaynes’ maverick manuscript on the origins of 
consciousness The Origin of Consciousness in the 
Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.7 Jaynes’ thesis 
is transfixing: in his view, prior to approximately 
1000BC humans were not conscious as you and your 
contemporaries are conscious! Through conducting 
a cognitive archeology of early western civilisations 
he arrives at the conclusion that consciousness 
was radically different prior to the advent of written 
cultures, phenomenologically akin to command 
and response utterances relayed between separate 
entities housed within the same skull! It’s a radical 
claim, one that evinced skepticism among critics, 
and it remains no less contentious today. (William 
Burroughs8 and Richard Dawkins, in the God 
Delusion9 have respectively attested to the influence 
and notoriety of the hypothesis). Jaynes’ thesis 
is here adopted as plausible insofar as it affords 
scope for speculation upon our present relation 
to technology. In Jaynes account technological 
disruption, in the form of writing, was the impetus 
for the change in consciousness. Jaynes identifies 
the lack of what we could deem ‘the self’, or 
subjectivity, in cultural artefacts from ancient 
civilisations. He melds this (elsewhere noted10) 
absence of contemporary self consciousness with 
the theories of schizophrenia available to him 
when he wrote the book in the seventies (it’s worth 
noting that many of Jaynes predictions – pertaining 
particularly to aural hallucinations – were 
confirmed by later brain imaging research11). From 
this he posits the bi-cameral mind – a metaphoric 
conception of mind based on a brain where the two 
hemispheres were partitioned and not an integrated 
communicating unit. 
Bicameral humans instead operated by means of 
automatic, nonconscious habit-schemas. When 
habit was insufficient to “novel circumstances or 
stressors facing the human”, the stress gripping 
the Bicameral subject caused neural activity in the 
dominant, habitual, hemisphere to be modulated 
by auditory hallucinations emanating from the 
silent hemisphere. In ‘do or die’ crunch moments 
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Bicameral Humans would hallucinate the orders 
requisite to survival. Jaynes’ cites the attribution of 
volition to Gods in ancient iconography (and within 
the Homeric Iliad) as evidence for such experiences, 
reasoning that persistently hallucinated 
voices would be collectively attributed to some 
consistent emanation. In Jaynes’ account verbal 
communication and societal coordination provided 
the first consensual hallucination. Two things from 
Jaynes thesis are relevant to this essay’s enquiry. 
Jaynes elaborates that the hierarchical organisation 
of societies during this period (10000BC – 1000BC) 
were likewise determined by the tendency to 
hallucinate orders from a loci of subjectivity 
perceived as ‘other’ to one’s internal habitual 
schema. This resulted not just in a panopoly of 
polytheist entities, but also god-kings and the rule 
of law ubiquitous to Mesopotamian (and other 
contemporaneous) civilisations. Second is Jaynes’ 
impetus for the morphing of Bicameral cognition into 
our ‘modern mind’. A lamentation of black swans 
(environmental tumult and writing-as-disruptive 
technology among them) caused Bicameral 
cognition to malfunction. Oracles, divination and 
other cultural mechanisms mushroomed to help 
societies of individuals accustomed to holding 
private dialogue with their gods cope with their 
internal voices falling silent. Writing was crucial 
in the breakdown of the Bicameral mind because 
it weakened what had been an exclusively auditory 
culture prior to its advent. This resonates with other 
scholars12 who have stressed writing as disruptive 
technology capable of rewiring its users.  
Jaynes’ thesis, entertained as plausible, suggests 
that the reoccurrence of a mind reorganisation is 
possible again, given the right conditions. Which 
is not such a radical claim if you’ve read Sherry 
Turkle’s earlier technologically-evangelic texts13 
or are acquainted with entheogenic manifestos 
that treat psychadelics as ‘brain technology’.14 
Speculation on whether our consciousness can be 
transformed with the aid of some technological 
prosthesis has captivated the imaginations of the 
counter culture, philosophers, and libertarians in 
equal measure. Timothy Crow’s concept of ‘cerebral 
torque’15 presents the emergence of prehistoric 
neurotypicality (schizophrenic versus ‘properly 
lateralised’ brains) which followed in the wake of 
genetic changes evincing brain lateralisation. 
In Crow’s account genetic inscription precedes 
societal consequence – in Jaynes’ account 
externalised inscriptions provokes both psychic 
and societal reorganisation. For both authors 
schizophrenia presents a phenomenological 
edge case of import. Their respective periods of 
investigation cover the first two phases of Robert K 
Logan’s succession of extended mind technologies: 
speech, writing, math, science, computing and the 
internet. Logan considers each extended mind 
technology as informatic systems that increase 
in complexity and thus auto-catalytically ensure 
the generation of their successor. Jaynes’ work 
is an interesting foil to Crow’s speculation that 
schizophrenia (or mis-lateralised brains) is the 
‘price paid for language’. Instead Jaynes presents 
a detailed account of societal infrastructure that 
grew around a now superseded paradigm of 
communication and coordination. It would be hard 
to assert whether the emotional, intellectual and 
creative capacities today considered as impaired 
in schizophrenia (at least in Crow’s account) would 
have been likewise aberrant or non-functional 
in a prior extended mind paradigm such as the 
Bicameral Brain society described by Jaynes. In 
the latter’s account there developed numerous 
unintended consequences out of ‘language’ but they 
were only made evident when writing disrupted the 
shared means of parsing reality. In the parlance of 
the complexity theory discourse which underpins 
Logan’s figuration of extended mind, Jaynes thesis 
can be read as a detailed and rigorous rumination 
on the psychic fallout of a bifurcation point in the 
informational complexity of early humanities 
extended mind.  
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In so doing, it provides a benchmark for what 
changes other informatic extended mind overhauls 
could entail. It’s the attunement to alterity, and the 
alignment of corporeally disruptive technology to 
societal upheaval and crisis in Jaynes’ account that 
suggest his framework as pertinent to evaluating 
contemporary circumstances. The contention from 
here on out is that we might just be approaching 
another cognitive reorganisation – and so clarity 
about what criteria constitutes comparable 
conditions is important. The Bicameral subject 
faded because the human subject interacted 
with a changed exterior world, prompting signals 
within the brain to be more integrated. This is the 
contention of Jaynes, that the two brain hemispheres 
would increasingly relate to one another as parts of 
a whole, rather than purely Bicameral. 
Integrated is the key concept here – it suggests the 
tantalising prospect of what might be gained by 
reading the work of media-ecologists who leaned 
towards informatic discourse alongside the thesis 
of Integrated Information. This mathematical 
theory, developed by Giulio Tononi16 and recently 
extrapolated by Max Tegmark17 provides determining 
criteria of the point at which a system becomes 
conscious18 - with integration of information key.19 
If consciousness is a measure of the integration, or 
an epiphenomena coupled to the level of integration 
in a given system, what does that mean for animals 
(humans) that can both enroll external tools (today 
possessed of their own inherent information) into 
their body schema, and who have an ability to 
develop societal and infrastructural abstractions 
– that provide a measure of persistence – based 
on tools where there is a baseline saturation point 
of competency? Integrated Information Theory 
dangles the possibility of a continuum of informatic 
comprehension, between our external world and 
the wetware mechanisms by which that external 
world comes to be sensible and malleable to us. 
What that has to do with ‘the self’ or the ‘modern 
mind’ relative to what (potentially) preceded it 
in the Bicameral Human is that prior changes in 
that integrated information continuum may have 
produced different ‘selfs’ (for want of a better word).
To conceive of the ‘modern mind’ parsing reality 
as a system of brain-body-world is consistent with 
the embodied cognition perspective of cognitive 
science. The idea has gained purchase with some 
neuroscientists and AI researchers, precisely 
because it lets you conceive of an organism’s 
existence in its immediate environment in ways 
different from the “brain in the vat” conception that 
the cartesian mind-body split (and its conceptual 
descendants) entails. Gilbert Simondon’s theory 
of inviduation20 offers conceptual purchase on the 
“-world” portion of the brain-body-world system. 
Individuation is the process by which subjects 
become distinguished (as in distinct, rather than 
renowned) from their environment. In Simondonian 
terms, what the subject individuates from is termed 
the pre-individual: a set of extra-bodily forces – a 
milieux – including societal norms, technology, 
and interactions with human and non human 
others. Importantly, the pre-individual precedes 
and exceeds any individuated entity. Simondon 
considers technology as a fundamentally 
inseparable part of being human. His ‘general 
phenomenology of machines’ emphasises the 
agency of technology and resists accounts which 
treat technology as mere utility. Technology is 
inherent to how ‘we are’ in the world around us. 
Simondon’s ‘pre-individual’ goes a step beyond 
a comparable concept: Jakob von Uexküll’s 
UMWELT.21 The UMWELT was nicely described by 
Dawkins in his ‘middle world rumination’, which is 
quoted at length. 
9 4
16. Tononi, “Consciousness as Integrated Information: A Provisional Manifesto.”
17. Tegmark, “Consciousness as a State of Matter.”
18. Again Jaynes was prescient in this regard – Christian Koch posits the measure of consciousness as correlated to the level of 
      integration inherent to a system – http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2013/11/christof-koch-panpsychism-consciousness/
19. Tegmark adds three additional criteria - independence, dynamics, and utility principle
20. Simondon, “Gilbert Simondon.”
21. von Uexküll, “A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds.”
Both the Umwelt and Simondon’s individuation 
are expansive in terms of what they encompass 
– the human subject is but one of many entities 
individuating in the world. For the purposes of 
this essay I’m conflating one’s self with one’s 
individuation, and a reading of that theory would 
elucidate that some nuance is elided in such a 
conflation.23 Individuation lets us entertain the 
self as we assume one another to experience 
it: as a process, not the definitive outcome. This 
consequential figuration of self is somewhat 
aligned with neuroscience and cognitive science. 
Both approaches assure us, in their own way, that 
‘the self’ is an epiphenomena of the mechanisms 
of cognitive activity. Simondon’s inclusion of 
technology within his milieux of exterior forces 
(that co-constitute our interior sense of self - our 
individuation) allows us to comprehend beyond 
the phenomenological limitations which Dawkins 
intimates in the above passage. As the breadth and 
complexity of our instrumentation sophisticates 
the topography of ‘middle world’ accessible to us 
is transfigured. We should expect this to impact 
our sense of self, given the feedback occurring 
between the world exterior to our perception and 
our construction of our own ‘middle worlds’. From 
a Simondonian perspective, you could consider 
writing as a new technological factor in the pre-
individual fields which the Bicameral Subject was 
accustomed to individuating from.
The slow development of writing into a ubiquitous 
technology reordered pedagogy, politics, societal 
organisation and many other domains which 
were likewise part of the collective pre-individual. 
Each brain-body-world system could integrate 
the sum total of incoming information in different 
means. Daniel Dennet likens the reorganisation 
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“ W H A T  W E  S E E  O F  T H E  R E A L  W O R L D  I S  N O T  T H E  U N V A R N I S H E D 
W O R L D  B U T  A  M O D E L  O F  T H E  W O R L D ,  R E G U L A T E D  A N D 
A D J U S T E D  B Y  S E N S E  D A T A ,  B U T  C O N S T R U C T E D  S O  I T ’ S 
U S E F U L  F O R  D E A L I N G  W I T H  T H E  R E A L  W O R L D .  M I D D L E 
W O R L D  —  T H E  R A N G E  O F  S I Z E S  A N D  S P E E D S  W H I C H  W E  H A V E 
E V O L V E D  T O  F E E L  I N T U I T I V E L Y  C O M F O R T A B L E  W I T H  –  I S  A 
B I T  L I K E  T H E  N A R R O W  R A N G E  O F  T H E  E L E C T R O M A G N E T I C 
S P E C T R U M  T H A T  W E  S E E  A S  L I G H T  O F  V A R I O U S  C O L O U R S . 
W E ’ R E  B L I N D  T O  A L L  F R E Q U E N C I E S  O U T S I D E  T H A T ,  U N L E S S 
W E  U S E  I N S T R U M E N T S  T O  H E L P  U S .  M I D D L E  W O R L D  I S 
T H E  N A R R O W  R A N G E  O F  R E A L I T Y  W H I C H  W E  J U D G E  T O 
B E  N O R M A L ,  A S  O P P O S E D  T O  T H E  Q U E E R N E S S  O F  T H E 
V E R Y  S M A L L ,  T H E  V E R Y  L A R G E  A N D  T H E  V E R Y  F A S T . ” 2 2
22. Dawkins, “Why the Universe Seems So Strange.”
23. One might more productively consider the self as the provided interface we have to our individuation
to the epiphany one can experience shifting from 
procedural programming to coding in LISP.24 
Dennet’s contribution is important as it suggests 
that abstraction (in the form of writing) could 
change perception more fundamentally than the 
genetic changes that permitting lateralisation and 
language in the first place. The Bicameral subject 
began to atrophy as it was supplanted by a different 
register of consciousness. Jaynes was working 
archaeologically and there are limits to how far 
you can believe educated and rigorous guesswork 
– for guesswork it shall always remain. But maybe 
we could sketch how a comparable crisis of utility 
confronts our contemporary subjectivity:25 the 
rational sense-of-self? This is not a discussion of 
how the internet massages and tweaks your neural 
plasticity, but more an overview of how the sum 
effects of the present day technological condition 
might resemble the conditions which accompanied 
the millennia long breakdown of the Bicameral mind. 
The ‘year 0’ is accordingly further back than the 
advent of computing and the internet. Simondon’s 
analysis suggests the state of industrialised labour 
at the turn of the 20th century as a point of origin. 
This period roughly approximates to western society 
in the aftermath of decades of industrial revolution 
- a period where an assemblage of technologies 
had become embedded into everyday life and 
practice. Time had been disciplined. Social strata 
were shifted, independent of the need for plague or 
war. Within this period of technological rupture, and 
corresponding afterglow, Simondon contends that 
an embodied relationship to technology had been 
lost. Simondon deems that ‘corporeal schemas’ 
were requisite to a knowing, rather than utilitarian 
(or reactionary), relationship to technology. 
Said schemas were lost in the shuffle, following 
industrial revolution. A marker was laid down in 
terms of how technology operated within the pre-
individual milieux.
The turn of the 20th century, roughly concurrent 
with the aftermath of aforementioned corporeal 
rupture, was also a period of intense interest as 
far as historians of the psychological sciences 
are concerned. It was in this period that empirical 
interest in mediumship, seance and mesmerism 
and other spiritualist pursuits was to irrevocably 
alter the trajectory of the psychological sciences. 
Lisa Blackman’s research26 of this period takes us a 
step beyond the contentions of the Bicameral Brain. 
Jaynes’ efforts established voice hearing as a vestige 
of a since supplanted mode of consciousness. To 
Jaynes, fringe and para-psychological aspects 
of cognition were remnants left over from the 
Bicameral Brain period, like the appendix of the 
mind. The flux of mind intimated by individuation 
lets us entertain that those proclivities are not 
hard coded for redundancy, but perhaps latent 
faculties awaiting the right environmental 
affordances. Blackman’s scholarship focuses on 
how topics which we today consider the preserve 
of parapsychology – telepathy, hypnotic suggestion, 
communicating with the dead – were serious topics 
of research. 
The rationale which saw those experiences 
dismissed as marginal was explicitly tied to 
constituting the normalised subject – the baseline 
or ratified individuation if you will – with which 
we are accustomed to today. She notes that “new 
technological forms and practices demanded a 
subject who could ‘pay attention’ in ways which were 
integral to new labour and educational practices”.27 
A subject that could impose their will on reality 
was closest to ideal in that regard, and all else 
that didn’t fit as snugly found itself pathologised, 
a trajectory that intensified in the latter half of 
the last century.28 Where Jaynes endeavoured to 
depathologise voice hearing, Blackman’s work 
(and that of Luciana Vieira Caliman29) unearths 
the reason why voice hearing was pathologised, 
unpicking the gendered and colonial assumptions 
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27. Ibid.
28. Caliman, “A Biologia Moral.”
29. Ibid.
of a subject capable of imposing their will on reality. 
It helps account for some of the more effusive and 
occluded forces operating within the pre-individual 
field from which a subject can emerge. These are 
aspects which this essay has neglected to cover 
in the depth they require, but which are crucial to 
account for. It’s those viscous and uneasy to account 
for factors that have firewalled aspects of human 
phenomenological experience from the same 
empirical enquiry applied to other unknowns. In 
other cases they have hobbled the mechanisms of 
enquiry. Moreover it highlights the psychological 
(or psychic) consequence of technologies that was 
becoming ubiquitous in peoples lives and which was 
significantly reordering labour practice, their daily 
infrastructure and surrounding environment. 
Let’s consider that the ubiquity and indispensability 
of disembodying (in Simondons meaning) 
technology to everyday existence first experienced 
during the post-Industrial period has intensified 
since the invention of computers and subsequent 
digital media and communication technologies. 
Let’s entertain that this period is comparable in 
trajectory and intensity (if not yet equivalent in 
duration) to the period which saw the breakdown of 
the Bicameral mind in terms of a powerful change 
to the pre-individual milieux. The driving imperative 
in removing the pathology of voice hearing lets us 
accept that there are faculties and functions of 
mind which escape the bounds of ‘what once made 
sense’. Such acceptance may be crucial to better 
adapting to our digitally mediated existence. 
The Jungian model figures individuation as how the 
individual self develops out of an undifferentiated 
unconscious. If the ‘individual self’, the modern 
mind (one of many potential individuations), is on 
the wane, in terms of the purchase it affords us on 
our new technological milieux (like the Bicameral 
individuation that preceded it), then it follows 
we need new frameworks, new metaconcepts 
– in short, alternative individuations. A crucial 
step to formulating such individuations involves 
acknowledging the psychic continuum between our 
minds and our digital technologies. If we’re taking 
Simondon’s work as our model for psyche, there’s 
no need to invoke the singularity and panpsychism 
(though it would no doubt be intriguing to do so). 
Let’s entertain that there is a homology between 
neurological loops that produce perception, 
computational loops that produce outputs from 
delimited inputs and individuating loops that 
produce subjectivity in tandem with our exterior 
socio technological milieux. Joe Banks’ work 
on Electronic Voice Phenomena highlights the 
practice as indicative of the brain’s pattern seeking 
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T y p e  o f  l o o p
Simple & indefinite 




Interactive and indefinite 
T y p i c a l  l o c a t i o n
Event loops in GUIs, servers ...
Counting, sorting, input and output
Transforming grid and table structures
Searching and sorting of tree or 
network structures
Goal-seeking algorithms
User interfaces or interaction 
B o u n d i n g  c o n d i t i o n
No bounding conditions 
Bounding conditions determined 
by a finite set of elements 
Multiple bounding conditions
Depth of possible recursion 
(memory or time)
Loop ends when some goal has 
been reached 
Bounding conditions change 
during the course of the loop 
prerogative. Faced with a random stream of noise 
the human brain imposes pattern and order on 
what it hears, discerning voices and artefacts 
that are not present on the media (a process 
described as auditory pareidolia and apophenia). 
Banks’ ambitious contention is that all aesthetic 
knowledge is indebted to fundamental pattern 
recognition mechanisms comparable to apophenia, 
thus ‘the capacity to form such illusions is shared 
by all people as an important part of normal 
perception’.30 And here is an intimation of 
consensual hallucination once more, again helping 
us fathom how Jaynes’ Bicameral Human might 
ever have existed. 
If the brain is considered as an information 
computing unit then one can reason that these 
faculties emerged in order to help us make sense 
of a complex and noisy world. The contrast with 
hearing voices in technological media, so the case 
against the veracity of EVP states, is that this innate 
illusory perception is permitted to stray beyond 
it’s boundary conditions. Apophenia of this sort is 
superficial access to one facet of the schizophrenic 
form of individuation which both Jaynes and Crow 
made use of. In Deleuze and Guattari’s long co-
writing collaboration schizo-analysis is employed 
for the access it provides to generative surpluses 
and ‘lines of flight’ that exceed the presumed 
operative delimitations of a given body – be that a 
corporeal, institutional or abstract body. Author 
Grant Morrison, spoke of Chaos Magick initiates 
employing Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) 
as a lifestyle choice31 choice (likely as a means of 
attaining something akin to Robert Anton Wilson’s 
model agnosticism32). In both the practice of EVP 
artists and the disposition of Morrison’s chaos 
magick initiate there is a flaneur like figuration 
of a subjects capable of sampling a register of 
perception not universally supported or engaged 
with. By toying with the gates and threshold of ones 
perceptual feedback loops novelty can be unveiled.
In many of the instances described previously there 
is a subject gorging on apophenia - albeit in delimited 
form (only in the occult trappings of Chaos Magick 
is schizophrenic perception figured as a habituated 
practice designed to reorient ones disposition to 
the world). Accounting for what curtails ongoing 
engagement with this register of reality seems 
relevant. Boundary conditions, as described in 
Adrian MacKenzie’s typology of loops33 (reproduced 
above), can frame such delimiting factors. In an 
effort to understand the agency of digital loops 
(a means of algorithmic computation and thus 
production) MacKenzie posits that understanding 
the boundary conditions by which loops are delimited 
grants useful purchase on digital processes which 
might otherwise evade perception – whether by 
dint of their speed or their execution nested within 
stacks of software. In the aforementioned homology 
of loops, this methodology is of most relevance 
to individuating loops that produce subjectivity 
in tandem with our exterior socio technological 
milieux. Seeking boundary conditions in the latter 
category requires the greatest effort given that 
we’re dealing with fuzzy categories like societal 
norms, optimal patterns of labour fomented by 
technological affordances & market imperatives, 
and cultural zeitgeists creolised into accepted 
wisdom. But we might find it productive to seek 
the boundary conditions which a given individuated 
subject cleaves to. It could account for why a 
commonality of sense-of-self exists. It could go 
someway towards answering the question which 
Lisa Blackman pursues in much of her recent 
research - “how do we live singularity in the face 
of multiplicity?” For each loop, there are boundary 
conditions which determine its termination. For 
instance, some pre-individual boundary conditions 
are identifiable in the registers of cognition and 
perceptual experience bracketed as pathological or 
paranormal, including possession, schizophrenia, 
mesmerism and voice hearing.
Entertaining the homology between differently 
instantiated loops and their respective boundary 
conditions is important to reconciling ourselves 
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to the unacknowledged faculties and functions of 
mind mentioned previously. The pattern recognition 
loops at the root of our perception evade conscious 
apprehension – we are never aware of the fact that 
some of what our eyes see is partly imaginary. 
It’s a de-privileging of individual volition that may 
be entirely appropriate to existing and surviving 
as an interplanetary species. Importantly, the 
critical discourses of cultural studies, feminist 
studies, science and technology studies (and others 
with affinities to the ‘posthumanities’) direct our 
attention to the non neutral production of systems 
– a fact that counters the ‘single engineering 
paradigm’ idea that they provide a panacea to the 
ills of the world – as advocates of algo-regulated 
governance would advance. We can posit that there 
exists loops of pattern detection and response 
which likewise evade our conscious apprehension 
at many levels – neurological, technological, 
societal. This patchwork of nested loops are 
stitched together by our bounded self and make 
an ever present sense to us because we possess a 
standardised individuation. Here again entertaining 
a notion of psychic continuum is useful: there may 
be no material link between these digital loops and 
our neural wetware, but the former constitute that 
from which our individuated self emerges. Mike 
Jay,34 in a discussion on schizophrenic influencing 
machines, notes that the psychosis of a century 
ago appears remarkably prescient relative to our 
coexistence with technology today.
 
This sounds quite similar to Brian Rotman’s 
examination of “subjectivies operating in 
electronically patterned infrastructure”.35 Rotman 
is another author who considered how technology 
could change our conscious selves. Over the course 
of ‘Becoming Beside Ourselves’36 Rotman drills 
into what codifying speech, a contiguous analog 
experience, into discreet symbols entailed.37 He 
extrapolates out these ramifications to 21st Century 
digital media and its capabilities of making many 
more registers of corporeal experience discrete. 
His research drive is in the same ballpark as Jaynes 
and Simondon. He is intriguing to our purposes 
because he articulates what a future individuation 
might resemble. For Rotman, it is a parallel self – a 
hypothetical future subjectivity emerging alongside 
parallel computing: something that he believes 
will radically reorient our internal selfs relation 
to the pre-individual field exterior to it. Rotman 
considers body-brain humans as kinaesthetic, 
corporeal, entities. As such this future orientation 
is engaging bodily capacities which already inhere 
within us all – said capacities have been merely 
awaiting the appropriate ensconcing affordances 
in order to be made manifest. We don’t yet possess 
that individuation, but Rotman deems we can 
discern it in what he calls ‘”ghost effects”’: media 
effects, technologically induced agencies, emergent 
epiphenomena of mind plus pre-individual 
technologies.
Following Rotman’s exhortations we should seek 
areas where ‘ghost effect’ hauntings may transpire, 
sites of contestation which perhaps foreshadow 
the breakdown of the post Bicameral mind. The 
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“ O U R  W O R L D  I S  N O W  M E D I A T E D 
I N  P A R T  B Y  T E C H N O L O G I E S 
T H A T  F A B R I C A T E  I T  A N D 
P A R T L Y  B Y  O U R  O W N 
M I N D S ,  W H O S E  P A T T E R N 
R E C O G N I T I O N  R O U T I N E S 
W O R K  C E A S E L E S S L Y  T O 
S T I T C H  D I G I T A L  I L L U S I O N S 
I N T O  T H E  P R I V A T E  C I N E M A 
O F  O U R  C O N S C I O U S N E S S . ”
34. Jay, The Reality Show
35. Rotman, Becoming Beside Ourselves, 128.
36. Rotman, Becoming Beside Ourselves.
37. Logan also followed a similar enquiry in ‘The Alphabet’
dectection of such sites can be aided via the work 
conducted on ‘Stacks’ and “Stacktivism’. In said 
discourse, “‘The Stack’ designates “the chain 
of interconnected activities and technologies of 
current and historical significance that spread far 
beyond the individual”.38 It affords the necessary 
agency to technology, and retains a concern for the 
subjects entanglement with increasingly ubiquitous 
technologies. In the stack, subjects become Users, 
as in the figuration deployed by Benjamin Bratton.39 
Bratton likewise deploys the language of 
individuation, and his latest piece on the Black 
Stack makes a case, in the context of the “just-so” 
stories entertained thus far, for several conditions 
which one might identify as correlative to those that 
precipitated the Bicameral Breakdown milennia 
ago. Bratton’s account of the Black Stack, a 
conceptual edifice yet-to-come (“not the platform 
we have, but the platform that might be”40), 
treats the User as one of seven infrastructural 
layers. In so doing Bratton teases out the nature 
of existing within vertical stacks and traditional 
nation states (whose horizontally delimited 
territories operate perpendicular to the Stack). 
Furthermore, Bratton identifies the geopolitical 
complexities of stack existence as entailing crisis 
for those who inhabit the position of the User:
These composite users, constituting a disposition 
perhaps better suited to thriving in the today’s 
techno-social landscape, echo technological 
affordances pulling forth the bodies latent proclivity 
towards parallelism, just as Rotman speculated 
might happen.
In framing it thusly Bratton re-articulates the 
problematic how does the subject cope with ‘living 
singularity in the face of multiplicity’. The ‘linear 
self’ individuation made perfect sense against 
a backdrop of a passing epoch of technology 
(language-writing-maths). This triumph was 
remarkable in how it suppressed capacities within 
the human brain-body-mind system that were 
amenable to non-sequential modes of parsing 
reality. The question of how do we maintain 
singularity in the face of multiplicity is inverted, 
begging instead the quandry of “why persist in 
‘sequential-self’ individuation?”
Bratton considers that “the neoliberal subject 
position makes absurd demands on people as 
Users... (and) elaborate schizophrenias already take 
hold in our early negotiation of these composite 
User positions.”43 The positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia, surplus processes which the existing 
common individuation never need buffer, present 
themselves as cookie-cutter alt-individuations 
which suddenly seem more appropriate to our 
current context – as indeed Mike Jay’s account 
of influencing machines noted (albeit somewhat 
toungue in cheek). Moving in parallel with Jay’s, 
Bratton’s rigourous analysis spins out the stakes 
“ t h e  S t a c k  ( a n d  t h e  B l a c k  S t a c k )  s t a g e  t h e 
d e a t h  o f  t h e  U s e r  i n  o n e  s e n s e :  t h e y  d o  s o 
b e c a u s e  t h e y  b r i n g  t h e  m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  a n d 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  o t h e r  k i n d s  o f  n o n h u m a n 
U s e r s  ( i n c l u d i n g  s e n s o r s ,  f i n a n c i a l 
a l g o r i t h m s ,  a n d  r o b o t s  f r o m  n a n o m e t r i c 
t o  l a n d s c a p e  s c a l e ) ,  a n y  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f 
w h i c h  o n e  m i g h t  e n t e r  i n t o  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i t h  a s  p a r t  o f  a  c o m p o s i t e  U s e r . ” 41
“ T h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  U s e r  t h e n  m a p s  o n l y 
v e r y  i n c o m p l e t e l y  o n t o  a n y  o n e  i n d i v i d u a l 
b o d y .  F r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  p l a t f o r m , 
w h a t  l o o k s  l i k e  o n e  i s  r e a l l y  m a n y ,  a n d 
w h a t  l o o k s  l i k e  m a n y  m a y  o n l y  b e  o n e . ” 42
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of seeking alternate individuations into the shifting, 
crisis riven, geopolitical stakes of our times – tumult 
that may usher forth new individuations. Many 
of the issues at stake in Bratton’s discourse are 
topics taken up and engaged by critical technology 
artists, including the keen minds in the orbit of 
Stacktivism. EVP as praxis, process or methodology, 
can intervene in this field through its powerful 
phenomenological link to historical alternate 
individuations – voice hearing and the posited prior 
register of consciousness that it once instilled. 
In Immaterial Bodies: Affect, Embodiment, 
Mediation Lisa Blackman infers the processual 
coping evident within the Hearing Voices Network 
as “an experience of the self as more divided and 
distributed, of the ‘other’ as part of me, and of 
living with automaticity as part of the spectrum of 
experience”. Automatism (perhaps best evinced in 
the studies of automatic writing) is another concept 
that Blackman excavates, and it intimates another 
route to seeking shadow individuations relevant to 
future subjectivities.
That speaks to the sense of being weighed upon by 
our data doubles, a ghost effect well surfaced by 
data artists (for instance, Networked Optimisation45 
provides a poignant intersection of the receding and 
advancing technological paradigms discussed in 
this essay). Such data personhoods are described 
by Bratton as “an aggregate profile that both is and 
is not specific to any one entity”. The data emissions 
you incur through interacting with distributed 
systems can do work when combined in aggregate 
with others, independent of your volition, but with 
likely consequence for your future degrees of 
agency or action.46 Within the pre-individual field 
of digitally patterned subjectivities there are likely 
many automatisms which we don’t acknowledge. 
Such automatisms are perhaps ‘ghost effects’ which 
evade perception because their boundary conditions 
haven’t been explicitly named, perhaps cannot 
be named, either because their delimiting factors 
are proprietary statistical profiles, or precisely 
because their boundary conditions care not for 
delimitation of a body to which we are accustomed 
(say for instance, our encapsulating membrane of 
skin). Automaticity describes the phenomenological 
encounter with automatisms. As such is a valuable 
methodology to deploy in understanding the 
frission of nascent system subjectivities which 
may result from alternative individuations.
Integrated Information Theory posits that 
“consciousness is the way information feels when 
processed in certain ways”. If consciousness is what 
it feels like when information is being processed 
in certain ways, what then is Automaticity? 
The unconscious brain is still processing that 
information, we just don’t ‘feel it’. Automaticity 
designates the liminal encounters with information 
processing (of which we are unaware), transpiring 
among the distributed systems that comprise 
ones extended mind. Automaticity and extended 
mind could be fruitfully combined to describe 
the phenomenological qualities of systems 
subjectivities. We might imagine those uncanny 
encounters with digital technology & systems, 
when they ‘move you’ without your willing it to be 
so, as instances of extended mind automatisms. 
The aforementioned data doubles constitute 
unconscious information processing that affects 
our lived existence, albeit not to the same intensity 
& integration as the unconscious computation 
proceeding within our bodies and inside our skulls. 
Should some future arrive where those distributed 
systems are sufficiently integrated with our wetware 
then perhaps something like a Borg like collective 
consciousness would be on the cards. 
A more likely alternative than that existential body 
horror is an accommodation of the anticipative 
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“ a  s e n s e  o f  a u t o m a t i s m . . .  e x p e r i e n c e s 
w h e r e  a  s u b j e c t  m i g h t  f e e l  t h a t  t h e y 
a r e  b e i n g  d i r e c t e d  o r  g o v e r n e d  b y 
a n  i m p e r c e p t i b l e  f o r c e  o r  a g e n c y ,  o r 
e v e n  b y  a  s e c o n d a r y  p e r s o n a l i t y . ” 44
44. Blackman, Immaterial Bodies.
45. Networked Optimization.
46. Burrows, “Living by Numbers: Metrics, Algorithms and the Sociology of Everyday Life.”
intelligence and predictive regimes of Google and 
other leading machine learning vendors. Such 
a future arrives with no fanfare – a Ballardian 
shrug at the propsect of “dynamically-priced 
queues for confession-taking priests, and 
therapists and brain cycles”.47 As those feedback 
loops cease to be abject they are rendered 
less amenable to extended mind automatisms.
What has been presented and discussed is the 
possibility that a neoliberal subjectivity, or sense 
of self, presently finds itself at odds with its 
surrounding technological milieux, and it must 
adapt or die like the Bicameral Mind before it. 
At times this essay has taken too much liberty in 
presuming a homogeneity of ‘sense of self’ among 
the subjects of any given population, not to speak of 
the diversity of senses-of-self distributed globally. 
What the author would assert without caveats is 
that our subjective selves are coupled with, and co-
constituted by, systems. These are both systems that 
are recognisably mechanistic in their materiality 
– such as digital technology - but also forms of 
organisation that have generated from systems 
thinking – logistics to name but one example. The 
Stacktivism discourse,48 Critical Engineering49 and 
Grey Media50 are useful in elaborating upon the 
latter. With that noted, presuming a homogeneity of 
a ‘sense of self’ has been necessary, as if computing 
and the internet are to provide the technological 
tipping points for an individuation better suited 
to survival as a transplanetary species, then 
the Eurocentric51 origin of both technologies 
(and the bureaucratic organisation that accrued 
around them) merits accounting for and a critical 
disposition. Automaticity, with its genealogical 
links to the period which first cast the mold of the 
attentive subject, provides an intriguing entry point 
for those who wish to trace the topology of future 
embedded and embodied system subjectivities. 
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E X C E R P T  F R O M  S O U N D T R A C K
“ P E R H A P S  I  S H O U L D  H A V E  S T A Y E D  O N  T H A T  R O A D  -  T H A T 
R O A D  B A C K  T H E R E  -  S E E  I T  -  S E E  H O W  I T  W A S  C R O S S E D 
O V E R . . . D O U B L E  C R O S S E D  I N  T W O  P L A C E S . . .  I  M A D E  A  D E T O U R 
–  C H A N G E D  D I R E C T I O N .   W H Y  D I D  I  F E E L  A  C U R V E  C O M I N G ,  I T 
W A S  A  S T R A I G H T  C O U R S E ?   B U T  I  M A D E  A  S L I G H T  T U R N  -  T H E N 
T H E  M O M E N T U M  S T A R T E D  -  I  M A D E  A N O T H E R  S L I G H T  T U R N , 
T H E  M O V E M E N T  T H E N  W A S  C I R C U L A R  -  E A C H  O P E R A T I O N 
D E S T R O Y I N G  T H E  P R E C E D I N G  O N E .   A N D  T H A T  L A N D . . . A L L 
T H A T  L A N D  A H E A D  O F  M E ,  F I N A L L Y  G O T  T O  A C T U A L  S P A C E 
-  A C T U A L  T I M E .   I  L E T  I T  A T T A C K  M E  -  O V E R P O W E R  M E  - 
I  L E T  I T  T U R N  M Y S E L F  I N  O N  M Y S E L F .   F I R S T  T W I S T ,  T H E 
D E T O U R  T H A T  S T A R T E D  T H I S  C O N T I N U E D ,  C I R C U L A R  P A T H 
-  T H I S  R O A D  T H A T  G O E S  N O W H E R E . . . H O W  I  R E M E M B E R  T H A T 
F E E L I N G  -  T H A T  T E M P T A T I O N  T O  T W I S T  M Y  M I N D  -  T O  T W I S T 
M Y  T H O U G H T S  A R O U N D  -  I ’ M  S U R E  I T ’ S  L I K E  C O M M I T T I N G 
M U R D E R ,  B E C A U S E  I  K N O W  T H A T  I T  T A K E S  A  T W I S T E D  M I N D 
-  A  M I N D  T H A T  C A N  T U R N  A G A I N S T  I T S E L F . . . T O  S T A Y  O N 
T H I S  C O U R S E .  I  W A N T E D  T O  S H O W  Y O U  S T R A I G H T ,  C L E A R 
L I N E S  B Y  N O W  -  A L L  T H I S  T R A V E L L I N G  -  I  W A N T E D  Y O U 
T O  L O O K  D O W N  A  C L E A R  R O A D  A N D  S E E  T H E  B E G I N N I N G 
A N D  T H E  E N D ;  T O  S H O W  Y O U  A  T H O U G H T  W E L L  T R A V E L L E D 
I N  S P A C E  -  B U T  I ’ M  S H O W I N G  Y O U  T H I S  A S  I T  I S ,  I  W A N T 
Y O U  T O  S E E  W H A T  T A K E S  A  T W I S T E D  M I N D  T O  R E C O G N I Z E . ” 
1 0 6
Transcript from Mind Twist, 1975 Courtesy Dennis Oppenheim Studio/Archive
1 0 7
1 0 8
L    A        W
          R      E
     N        C    E
A     B          U
H       A
    M    D        A
                N
A U R A L  C O N T R A C T : 
F O R E N S I C  L I S T E N I N G  A N D 
T H E  R E O R G A N I Z A T I O N  O F 
T H E  S P E A K I N G  S U B J E C T
F i r s t  p u b l i s h e d  i n  F o r e n s i s  -  T h e  A r c h i t e c t u r e 
o f  P u b l i c  T r u t h ,  2 0 1 4 ,  S t e r n b e r g  P r e s s
P u b l i s h e d  h e r e  w i t h  p e r m i s s i o n  f r o m  t h e  a u t h o r
1 0 9
In an article titled “Mengele’s Skull,” Thomas 
Keenan and Eyal Weizman suggest that in the mid-
eighties international justice entered a new era. The 
authors claim that unlike the seminal 1961 trial in 
Jerusalem of Adolf Eichmann, which was archetypal 
of an era defined by eyewitness testimony, in the 
mid-eighties international justice became a stage 
for a different type of narrative; “a second narrative, 
not the story of the witness but that of the thing in 
the context of war crimes investigation and human 
rights.”1 The authors claim that what catalyzed this 
new era into existence was the exhumed remains of 
the German SS officer and Nazi physician Joseph 
Mengele.
One year before the forensic examination of 
Mengele’s remains, a piece of legislation was 
passed in British criminal law which unknowingly 
also marked a crucial and forensic shift in the 
conventions of testimony. The 1984 Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) ordered all police 
interview rooms to be equipped with audio recording 
machines, so that all interrogations from then on 
would be audio-recorded instead of transcribed 
into text. The passing of this law unintentionally 
catalyzed the birth of a radical form of listening that 
would over the next twenty-eight years transform 
the speaking subject in the process of law. This 
legislation fundamentally stretched the role of the 
juridical ear from simply hearing words spoken 
aloud to actively listening to the process of speaking, 
as a new form of forensic evidence. This essay is 
dedicated to understanding the type of listening that 
this moment in 1984 inaugurated; I seek to amplify 
both its origins and its role in the contemporary 
juridical and political forums, in which we see the 
fragile balance of fundamental human and civil 
rights predicated on listening and the voice, tipping 
into an uncertain future which calls into question 
the very means through which we can negotiate 
politics and the law.
N I N E T E E N  E I G H T Y - F O U R
Code E of PACE was seen as a solution to claims that 
the police were falsifying confessions and altering 
statements made during interviews, as prior to 
this point all statements were simply written down 
“verbatim” by the police officers and then signed 
off on by the suspect. Were it not for a handful 
of linguists practicing a rare strand of forensic 
phonetic analysis, PACE would have remained a 
simple and transparent article of legal reform. 
Instead, the act exponentially increased the use 
of speaker profiling, voice identification, and voice 
Fig. 1. “Subject is not sure.” Screenshot from Layered Voice Analysis 6.50 which examines micro 
fluctuations of voices to corroborate what the subject is saying. Source: www.LVA650.com
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prints in order to, among other things, determine 
regional and ethnic identity as well as to facilitate 
so-called voice lineups.
Prior to PACE, if it was suspected that someone’s 
voice was on an incriminating recording - for example 
a bugged telephone conversation in which there was 
discussion of an illicit act, or a CCTV surveillance 
tape of a masked bank robber shouting “Hand over 
the money” - that person was asked to come to the 
police station and give a voluntary voice sample. 
After PACE, doing so was no longer voluntary, and 
all such recordings were added to a growing audio 
archive of cassette tapes. This archive quickly 
became accessed by the little known scientific field 
of forensic linguistics; this unexpected convergence 
thereby added the voice as a new medium through 
which to conduct legal investigations. Soon the 
forensic listener was required not only to identify 
voices, but to investigate background sounds in 
order to determine where, with what machine, and 
at what time of day a recording had been made - 
thus enabling a wide range of sonic frequencies to 
testify.Legislation similar to PACE was adopted by 
many other countries in the mid-1980s, resulting 
in the permanent installation of audio recording 
machines in police interview rooms around the 
world. As in Britain, these policies resulted in the 
establishment of independent forensic audio labs, 
and today there are even postgraduate university 
programs devoted to the field.
Cassette recorders placed in all police interviews 
reorganize the voice as evidence and therefore 
PACE, as we will see throughout this essay, is for 
my research what Mengele’s skull became for 
Keenan and Weizman, i.e., representative of an 
epistemic and technological shift that emerged in 
the mid-eighties and which gave rise to new forms 
of testimony based on the analysis of objects rather 
than witness accounts. Yet in the case of forensic 
listening there is a crucial difference: here there is 
no clean shift from witness account to the expert 
analysis of objects because the witness account and 
the object under investigation are the same thing. 
The voice is at once the means of testimony and the 
object of forensic analysis.
JP French Associates, the United Kingdom’s most 
prominent independent forensic audio laboratory, 
has worked on over 5,000 cases since 1984. Its 
founder, Peter French, told me in reference to PACE 
that “whereas up to that point [...] I had a trickle of 
work coming in, all of a sudden it was as though 
there had been a thunderstorm and it started 
raining cassette tapes.”2 However, this overnight 
transformation of the voice as a legal object of 
investigation must be seen in the greater context 
of the role of the voice in law at large. In other 
words, would this thunderstorm have happened 
if the voice was not already such a central part 
of legal negotiation and process? Moreover, it is 
this very fact of the voice as being central to the 
formation, mediation, and practice of the law that 
makes it such a complex article of evidence. It is 
my argument that the PACE legislation formalizes 
a regime of listening that was always present within 
law: that the initiation of audio recording machines 
in police interview rooms drew upon, brought to the 
surface, and professionalized a way of listening to 
the voice specific to political and legal forums.
J U S T  V O I C E S
For the law to acquire its performative might, it must 
be delegated to the voice. For the law to come into 
effect it must be announced and it must be heard. 
Writing alone is inadequate to carry out the burden 
of legislation, which must first be committed to 
speech. As a site where speech acts, the trial allows 
us to understand how the voice serves to activate 
certain forms of governance and control.
In the United States Supreme Court to this day there 
is a vocal tradition that I find quite revealing: when 
the clerk enters the courtroom at the beginning 
of the day he/she inaugurates the proceedings by 
striking the gavel onto the woodblock then waiting 
for silence, before announcing, “the Honorable, 
the Chief Justice, and the Associate Justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States” — and then, 
for four seconds, he/she interrupts his/her own 
speech and sings out “OYEZ OYEZ OYEZ” — before 
returning to his/her declaration that the court is now 
sitting and that God is now blessing the honorable 
court. Then with a second strike of the gavel he/she 
sits down. In this situation, we see the means by 
which the law is vocally summoned into existence. 
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A legal space is endowed with the right to carry 
out justice only when certain announcements are 
made. These announcements, in combination with 
other oaths and speech acts, function as a juridical 
amplifier, the switch that makes legally inaudible 
speech audible. These acts operate through the 
voice in order to transform words from the normal 
conditions of communication to the extraordinary 
conditions of testimony. And yet something more 
than the speaking of words is found in the clerk’s 
call. In those four seconds when his annunciation 
shifts from a prescribed set of spoken words to the 
ineffability of nonverbal sounds - “Oyez Oyez Oyez” - 
we see that it is not simply language that legislates 
but also the extra-linguistic elements of the voice 
itself.
The legal action habeas corpus offers us some 
insight into the use of the voice as both a verbal and 
a nonverbal instrument. This ancient writ, which 
translates to “may you have the body,” stipulates that 
a person under arrest must be physically brought 
before a judge. The judge must see and hear the 
suspect live. The voice is a corporeal product that 
contains its own excess, with this corporeal excess 
announcing to the court the absolute presence of the 
witness. This bodily excess of the voice resides not in 
its linguistic functions, but in its nonverbal effects; 
such as its pitch, accent, glottal stops, intonations, 
inflections, and impediments. As byproducts of the 
event of language, these effects reveal other kinds 
of evidence, evidence that may evade the written 
documentation of legal proceedings but does not 
escape the ears of the judge and of those listening 
to a trial in the space of the courtroom.
These paralinguistic elements of testimony produce 
a division of the voice, which in turn establishes two 
witnesses within one voice: one witness speaks on 
behalf of language and the other on behalf of the 
body. Often the testimony provided by each of these 
two witnesses is corroborated by the other, but they 
can also betray one another - an internal betrayal 
between language and body, between subject and 
object, fiction and fact, truth and lie. This betrayal 
exists in a single human utterance in which the self 
gives itself away. This splitting of the voice into two 
selves, or into two witnesses, can also be seen as 
an extension of the well-established legal principle 
of testis unis, testis nullus, which translates to 
“one witness, no witness,” and which means that 
testimony provided by any one person in court 
is to be disregarded unless corroborated by the 
testimony of at least one other. The law, it seems, 
requires a certain doubling of testimony, and this 
doubling even extends to the single witness. In the 
eyes of the law, the testimony of the single witness, 
whether the suspect or the survivor, has to be split 
into language and its bodily conduit for it to be 
considered testimony at all.
This doubling of testimony marks the terrain which 
was occupied by forensic linguists and acousticians 
within the field of law after 1984. In the cases of 
forensic listening that I will discuss here, we will see 
how these professional listeners became the expert 
witnesses speaking on behalf of the paralinguistic 
attributes of a person’s testimony. After 1984 these 
were the people called in to corroborate and resolve 
the inherent division of the legal voice, formalizing 
an acoustic practice inherent to jurisprudence.
A U S C U L T A T I O N
The audio cassette recorders at the center of 
the PACE policy show how technology is also 
inextricably linked to what I claim is a historical 
audio event. The phonograph, the first machine to 
ever record and reproduce audio, is usually cited 
as the technology that revolutionized listening 
and persists to continually condition the way we 
listen today. Yet the mode of listening and audio 
Fig. 2. One of René Laennec’s original stethoscopes. 
Source: Science Museum/Science & Society Picture Library.
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discourse employed by these forensic analysts of 
sound, despite their dependence on technologies 
for voice recording, owes its origins more to a piece 
of technology that predates the phonograph: the 
stethoscope.
The invention of the stethoscope by René Laennec 
in 1816 formally inaugurated the practice of 
auscultation (listening to the inner sounds of the 
body). Laennec’s work to classify the sounds of the 
body is a major contribution to medical diagnosis 
and the image of the stethoscope is now a symbol of 
the medical profession at large. As an international 
symbol of medical treatment the stethoscope 
communicates medicine as a terrain of care and 
a space where the concerns of the patient can be 
heard. It symbolizes the human communication 
between doctor and patient. Yet its material legacy 
is quite different. What the stethoscope actually did 
was to allow the doctor to bypass the testimony of 
patients and instead communicate directly with their 
bodies. It was a technology that allowed doctors to 
no longer depend on the subjective accounts of their 
patients’ illnesses. 
Understanding how to interpret sounds from 
hearts, stomachs, and lungs meant that the doctor 
could communicate with the objective truth of the 
body, as this emerging acoustic lexicon was thought 
of as a collection of voices which, unlike the speech 
of the patient, didn’t lie; these were voices which 
couldn’t dramatize, embellish, and exaggerate their 
condition. The stethoscope shifted the medical ear 
from listening to the patient’s self-diagnosis to 
listening to the sounds of the body.
Just like forensic listening, the stethoscope pits the 
subject against itself as simultaneous testimonies 
can be emitted from the body and from the speaking 
voice. In auscultation there exists a very literal 
example of this doubling of the voice. Egophony 
is the name given to the process whereby, while 
listening to the lungs with a stethoscope, the patient 
is asked to say the letter “e.” If the lungs are clear, 
the doctor listening with the stethoscope will detect 
the spoken “e” (“ee”) as sounding like an “ee.” 
Adversely, if the lungs contain fluid or a tumor, the 
patient’s spoken “e” will sound like a phonetic “a” 
(“ay”). The “e” sound is transmuted to an “a” sound 
through the body. 
This “e” to “a” transmutation shows us the 
ways in which the voice becomes doubled in 
the medical ear and how one voice can produce 
multiple accounts of itself. The example becomes 
increasingly literal when we examine the name 
for this auditory event, egophony. Literally ego 
-“the self” and phone - speech sound. Yet this 
self-identifying speech sound (ego-phony) could 
also be understood as ego-phony - the fraudulent 
self. And when we combine all these definitions we 
arrive at a name for a form of listening that almost 
perfectly describes the intentions of auscultation, 
i.e., detecting a fraudulent (phony) speech sound 
(phone) which betrays the self (ego).3 The paradox 
of the stethoscope is that it simultaneously 
produces an objective distance from the patient and 
a deeper proximity to their body. As a nonelectronic 
device it simply connects a material path through 
which vibrations can be channeled from the inner 
body of the patient directly to the eardrums of the 
doctor. This distanced yet deep material form of 
human contact is also characteristic of forensic 
listening, whereby one listens not to the semantics 
of language but to the molecular constitution of 
individual phonemes. 
This shared practice of listening which transmutes 
subject into object reveals a direct lineage from 
auscultation to forensic phonetics. Auscultation 
offers the law, as it offered medical practice, the 
promise of amplifying the objective aspects of an 
otherwise deeply subjective account of an event. 
Yet in such cases one can adequately listen to only 
one aspect of the voice at a time; the qualities of the 
voice as object mute the subjective and semantic 
enunciations or vice versa. The shift from one form 
of listening to another can happen insidiously and 
invisibly and yet, as we will see throughout this 
essay, its political impact and effect on the listened 
to populace can be radical.
During my 2010 interview with the forensic linguist 
Peter French he told me: “Last week, a colleague 
and I spent three working days listening to one 
word from a police interview tape.”4 Statements 
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like this exemplify French’s radical approach to both 
listening and the theoretical paradigms that 
surround audio culture. Unlike many sound 
theorists who focus on sound’s ephemeral and 
immaterial qualities, French’s approach is markedly 
material. The contemporary dominant school of 
audio culture is heavily influenced by Don Ihde’s 
1976 text Listening and Voice: A Phenomenology 
of Sound, which puts forward the impossibility of 
fundamentally grasping sound.5 The continuing 
prevalence of this school of thought is demonstrated 
in the 2009 book Sounding New Media by Frances 
Dyson, who states in the introduction: “As Don Ihde 
pointed out decades ago ‘a sound is always multiple, 
always heterogeneous, being neither visible or 
tangible, sound is never quite an object, never a full 
guarantor of knowledge.’”6 Yet French’s formulation 
renders sound dissectible, replicable, physical, 
and corporeal in its object quality. What allows 
French’s radical approach to sound is the forensic 
intensity at which he listens, which allows the audio 
object to reveal a large amount of information as 
to its production and its form: the space in which 
it was recorded, the machine that recorded it, 
geographical origin of the accent, as well as details 
of the age, health, and ethnicity of a voice.
Yet as with all cases of legal, social, and ethnic 
profiling, French walks a thin ethical line. Ironically, 
what allows French to maintain his credibility 
in a time in which law enforcement increasingly 
reaches out to forensic linguistics in odious forms 
of surveillance and profiling that target huge 
swathes of the population, is his ability to listen 
better. French understands the limits of what can 
be detected through the voice and therefore avoids 
exploiting the law’s generally increasing demand 
for the empty promises of forensic science and its 
ignorance regarding their practical capacity.
Forensic listening is now being applied more than 
ever before. Its application is primarily on two 
fronts: speaker profiling of asylum seekers and 
developing voice-activated algorithms for the 
security industry. Today it is applied on such a 
scale that law enforcement agencies and security 
services cannot often afford the expert listening of 
people like Dr. French. Hence, frighteningly, we are 
entering a time in which there is both an 
overcapacity demand for the governance of the 
voice, and an inadequacy of authentic means of 
producing such a governance. In other words, we 
have now entered a sorry phase where bad listening 
(and therefore bad evidence) is flooding the forum.
Fig. 3. Dr. Peter French profiling a voice. 
Photo: Lawrence Abu Hamdan, 2009.
Fig. 4. “Two You.” The image documents voiceprints 
(voice fingerprints) of two different voices saying the word 
“you.” The means by which one can read this image and 
make comparisons between the two different voices is 
by understanding that the horizontal axis is time and the 
vertical axis is frequency. The contour lines then illustrate 
the amplitude of a specific frequency at a specific time in the 
pronunciation of the word “you.” In the use of cartographic 
techniques to produce voiceprints we can see clearly the 
interrelation of the control over both voice and territory.  
Image source: Ira M. Freeman, Sound and Ultrasonics 
(London: Random House, 1968). 
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J U R I S - D I C T I O N
What we will understand as I develop explanations 
of the most recent and prolific examples of forensic 
listening is that it is not simply governance of the 
voice that has been made more pervasive but also 
the employment of these modes of listening in the 
control of territory and the production of space. 
Their use as agents of spatial control is made 
clear if we take a closer look at legal terminology 
and practice, in order to see how forensic listening 
becomes a technically instantiated and formalized 
process of fundamental legal concepts. If we divide 
the term “jurisdiction,” which connotes a territorial 
range over which a legal authority extends, we see 
that “juris” refers to a legal authority or right and 
“diction” refers to speech. “Diction” in linguistics 
is also defined as the manner of enunciating 
and uttering sounds and words, indicating not 
simply speech but the process of enunciation 
and amplification of words. By understanding the 
etymology of the term jurisdiction, we see that 
the law itself operates as a speech space in which 
those within its range of audibility are subject to its 
authority.
As a fundamental principle of legal governance, 
jurisdiction reveals to us the power of sound in the 
construction of the space and time of the law. Much 
like the radio in the workplace, the audio medium 
affords the law a means of controlling space 
and interpolating its subjects while remaining 
predominantly out of sight. In the following example 
we will see how the law’s practices of auscultation 
are radically remixed and used to amplify the scope 
of the legal frontiers of a given juris-diction.
  
By 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom 
were entrenched on two fronts in the War on Terror. 
These wars forced mass migrations that became 
the catalyst for immigration authorities around 
the world to turn to forensic speech analysis 
to determine if the accents of asylum seekers 
correlated with their claimed national origins i.e., 
to see whether people originated from areas which 
would mean that they were legitimately entitled 
to asylum. On a scale similar to the 1984 PACE 
act, this produced a huge proliferation of forensic 
listening, this time employed to help determine 
the validity of asylum claims made by thousands 
of people without identity documents, particularly 
in Australia, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom.
In most of the countries listed above the protocol 
is as follows: a telephone interview is organized 
between the asylum seeker and a private company 
run by forensic phoneticians based in Sweden: 
Sprakab. Using anonymized analysts (which 
many claim are actually former refugees with no 
linguistic training) the claimant’s voice is elicited, 
recorded, and analyzed and subsequently a report is 
produced and given to the immigration authorities. 
The confidence in, and the rapidly increasing 
predominance of, this kind of investigation within 
immigration law is troubling, given that its accuracy 
has been called into question by many forensic 
linguists, phoneticians, and other practitioners 
around the world.7 One of the main concerns of this 
group of linguists is to advocate for the idea that 
citizenship is a bureaucratic distinction and that the 
voice is a socially and culturally produced artifact 
that cannot be tidily assimilated into the nation-
state.
In undertaking extensive research into this 
politically potent form of listening I heard many 
shocking accounts of vocal discrimination and 
wrongful deportations - none more so than that 
of Mohammed, a Palestinian asylum seeker who, 
after having the immigration authorities lose his 
Palestinian identity card, was forced to undergo 
an accent analysis to prove his origins. During his 
deportation hearing he was told by the asylum 
tribunal that he was lying about his identity and 
the judges paid particular attention to the way that 
he pronounced the word for tomato. Instead of 
“bandora” he said “banadora.” This tiny “a” syllable 
is the sound that provides the UK border agency 
with the apparent certainty of Mohammed’s Syrian 
origin: a country only twenty-two kilometers away 
from his hometown of Jenin in Palestine. Therefore, 
in designating this syllable as a marker of Syrian 
nationality, the border agency implies that this 
vowel, used in the word tomato, is coterminous 
with Syria’s borders. The fact that this syllable 
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designates citizenship above an identity card that 
contradicts it forces us to rethink how borders are 
being made perceptible and how configurations of 
vowels and constants are made legally accountable.
Locating this Syrian vowel in the speech of a 
Palestinian surely proves nothing more than the 
displacement of the Palestinians themselves. In 
other words, the instability of an accent, its borrowed 
and hybridized phonetic form, is testament not 
to someone’s origins but only to an unstable and 
migratory lifestyle, which is of course common 
among those fleeing from conflict and seeking 
asylum, often spending years getting to the target 
country and living in diversely populated camps 
along the way. Moreover, it should be remembered 
that in such camps one may want to conceal the 
origin of one’s voice because of the continual fear 
of persecution.
When calling for ways in which to implement better 
practice in cases of language analysis for the 
determination of origin of undocumented and illegal 
migrants (LADO), forensic linguist Helen Fraser 
says that we “need to clearly separate linguistic 
data from potentially biasing background on the 
applicant’s ‘story.’”8 Clearly in this expression of 
objectivity we see how linguists want to auscultate 
the accent and go beyond the potentially traumatic 
and pathetic “story” of a person’s flight; preferring 
to find in their speech another type of testimony. 
However, my argument is that for adept forensic 
listeners this accent object (linguistic data) should 
also be heard as a “story” in itself, one that could 
reveal an account just as traumatic. In other words, 
for listeners who are not content with drawing a 
border around a single phonetic article, the accent 
should be understood as a biography of migration, as 
an irregular and itinerant concoction of contagiously 
accumulated voices, rather than an immediately 
distinguishable sound that avows its unshakable 
roots neatly within the confines of a nation-state. In 
the clear distinction between biographical data and 
linguistic data, we see how this policy is used as a 
practice which does not seek to excavate the life of 
an accent, and ultimately only highlights the virtual 
impossibility of locating its place of birth.
Like all practices of auscultation, the forensic 
analyst’s can be understood as operating in the 
excess of the speaker’s intentions. Yet due to issues 
of mimicry, contagiousness, and survival, the life of 
an accent is possessed to a greater or lesser extent 
by every living person it has ever come into contact 
with, especially influenced, of course, by the one 
voice with which it is presently in dialogue. Such a 
cartography of a voice is thus further complicated by 
the very presence of the cartographer and his/her 
own voice. In the case of Mohammed, his rejected 
status is owed to an interviewee whom Mohammed 
claims was an Iraqi Kurd and whose Arabic dialect 
was so different to his that he had to shift his 
way of speaking simply to be understood and to 
understand.9 Listening is never simply a passive, 
objective, and receptive process, but rather an act 
that plays a fundamental role in the construction 
and facilitation of the speech of the interlocutor 
(whether subject or object). Therefore what 
becomes amplified in such investigations is not the 
true identity of the sonic object under investigation 
but the political potency of the listening itself and 
the agency of the listener. In other words, the 
results of this forensic listening tell us little about 
Mohammed’s accent but a great deal about the 
contemporary political context in which this audio 
investigation participates.
The form of listening that is presented in the case 
of Mohammed shows us that in its attempt to move 
away from the subjectivity of the speaker and to 
objectify their voice, another layer of subjectivity 
becomes established: that of the expert listener 
or interpreter of sounds. The forensic listening 
paradox is perfectly performed in this case, whereby 
in an attempt to hear objectively, the listener’s 
own subjectivity emerges and is made distinctly 
audible (through the way his listening acts upon and 
transmutates the subjectivity of the interviewee). 
This then allows one to ask the question: as an 
intersubjective process, can listening ever be 
objective? Will listening always be tainted by the 
subjectivity of that which listens? In attempting 
to answer these questions we quickly reach the 
fundamental paradox and the empty promise of 
forensic listening. Perhaps the only way to detach 
oneself from any given situation is to listen, as 
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Dr. French does, to a single syllable for three days, 
until the sound becomes completely abstracted 
from humanity and the culturally preprogrammed 
prejudice of the ear.
T H E  R I G H T  T O  S I L E N C E
In attempting to establish a correlation between 
voice and citizenship we encounter another vocal 
legal paradox. In criminal charges against a citizen 
of the United Kingdom, the criminal is afforded 
the right to protection from self-incrimination; 
commonly known as the right to silence (or in 
the United States as Miranda rights). This is a 
fundamental legal right not to speak if you feel 
that your speech would in some way incriminate 
you. When hearing the specific words of the right to 
silence issued by the police you know that your voice 
has been placed in custody and that your voice has 
crossed the threshold between normal conversation 
and liable speech. However, with speech profiling 
becoming a more and more widespread form of 
investigation, it is not only our words that can 
incriminate us but the phonological content of 
our voices as well. Therefore, just as our speech 
is being mutated by the legal system we must 
ourselves fight to rephrase the legal diction so that 
it remains transparent about the ways in which our 
voices are placed under custody and investigated. 
My proposal for altering the way the law speaks 
to us entails changes from the moment of one’s 
arrest onwards, and therefore entails amending the 
right to silence. In the United Kingdom, the revised 
version might read: You do not have to say anything. 
But it may harm your defence if you do not mention 
when questioned something which you later rely on 
in court. Anything you do say, including the way you 
say it, may be given in evidence against you.
Yet even if these alterations to the right to silence 
were to be made, we would still need to understand 
that this fundamental legal right is only afforded 
to the citizen; the asylum seeker, for example, has 
no recourse to silence, as the burden of proof lies 
not with the prosecutor in such cases but with the 
claimant themselves: in other words, if they don’t 
speak they will be deported. Without the right to 
silence, the asylum seeker is forced to speak to 
the law; they must make themselves audible to the 
system and yet they remain without control over the 
conditions of how they are being heard. What they 
do retain, however, is the human right to freedom of 
expression and it is my argument that this policy of 
listening contravenes this fundamental right.
These forensic speech analyses force us to redefine 
our right to freedom of speech, a concept that must 
now be extended to encompass not only the words 
we speak, but also the sonic quality of our speech 
itself. The voice has long been understood as the 
very means by which one can secure and advocate 
one’s political and legal interests, but these 
recent shifts in the law’s listening affirm that the 
stakes and conditions of speech have altered in a 
nontransparent way. This shift is seemingly minute 
yet, as we see in the voice analyses of asylum 
seekers, can have a dramatic impact on people’s 
lives. Therefore, the more radical the practices of 
listening at the core of legal investigations become, 
the more they herald the advent of a moment to 
redefine and reshape the political conventions of 
speech and sound in society. Now it seems that the 
battle for free speech is no longer about fighting to 
speak freely, but fighting the control over the very 
conditions under which one is being heard.
T H E  W H O L E  T R U T H
The latest development in forensic linguistics, and 
hence the closing example of this essay, is the 
product of the combined labor of mathematicians 
and speech scientists to produce computer 
algorithms that allow users to automatically profile 
voices for a variety of different applications. The 
most prominent of these applications is “voice stress 
analysis,” the premise of which is that, through a 
frequency analysis, the physiological conditions of 
stress are made audible by the nonverbal elements 
of a voice. This technology is said to be able to 
determine all sorts of psychological verdicts based 
on jittering frequencies, glottal tension, and vocal 
intensity, all regardless of language.
At Delft University in the Netherlands a team of 
linguists and computer scientists are developing a 
kind of “trauma-o-meter” application for emergency 
calls whereby the algorithmic listening software 
would determine the priority of a call depending 
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on the level of stress detected in the caller’s voice. 
The idea behind this is that the tension of the vocal 
chords produce “jitter,” which in linguistics relates 
to fluctuations in pitch, and that the level of stress 
a person is undergoing can be observed in the 
intensity at which these minute fluctuations occur. 
Therefore the scale of the emergency is legible as 
affect on the body that witnessed it. Regardless of 
what is being said, the first response to the event 
will then be a response to the body of its witness. 
In building a hierarchy of trauma this machine also 
produces a chain of command that situates the 
paralinguistic aspects of the voice as an authority 
over the words that the caller wishes to relay. The 
stress the body undergoes here is considered the 
objective truth of the event; yet in my next example 
these same physiological attributes are taken to 
reveal the opposite - a lie.
A piece of software called Layered Voice Analysis 
6.50 (LVA 6.50), developed by Israeli company 
Nemeysesco Ltd, is the major application of this 
new form of forensic voice profiling: it is currently 
employed as a lie detection method by the Los 
Angeles Police Department, Russian and Israeli 
governments, and insurance companies all over the 
world. In the United Kingdom, Harrow council and 
many others are using it to measure the veracity of 
benefit claims made by disabled citizens. Harrow 
council claims they have saved roughly £330,000 
of benefit payouts in the first seven months of 
using this software.10 Lynn Robbins, director of the 
company Voice Analysis Technologies LLC, the main 
retailer of the software, told me in an interview 
that based on analysis of the body as it resonates 
through the voice, LVA 6.50 can not only determine 
whether a person is lying, but is able to deliver a 
whole series of verdicts - detecting, for example, 
embarrassment, overemphasis, inaccuracy, voice 
manipulation, anxiety, and whether or not the 
interviewee is attempting to outsmart his/her 
interlocutor; in the future, I was told, it will even be 
able to hear sex-offending tendencies.11
Commander Sid Hale is piloting the software for 
the Los Angeles Police Department and explains: 
“Unlike the polygraph we don’t need to cooperate 
with the suspect, we don’t need to wire them up 
with skin responses or respirators, it does it in 
real time.”12 This idea of being able to access 
the body of the person who is the object of one’s 
interest without touching it is very attractive to law 
enforcement agencies, just as it was to doctors who 
first used the stethoscope at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Reports from that time say that 
one of the benefits of the stethoscope was that it 
meant doctors no longer needed to press an ear to 
the patient’s body, and hence it provided them with 
a hygienic distance from the potentially diseased 
patient. In LVA 6.50 we see how this technology 
produces and appropriates this hygienic, physical, 
and objective distance. One key, politically sensitive 
effect of the fact that LVA 6.50 can operate without 
physical interaction - the voice analysis might be 
conducted during a telephone conversation, or 
using a prerecorded sample - is that testing can be 
undertaken without the consent or knowledge of 
the subject.
In the context of borders and prisons, this hygienic 
distance allows the authorities to access the 
emotional and bodily content of the noncitizen 
(e.g., the prisoner or refugee) without needing 
them to formally enter the society of citizenship. 
At the border this test can be performed before a 
person formally enters the country, or even before 
they leave their country of origin - meaning that 
LVA 6.50, in making use of the hygienic distance of 
audibility, enables the extension of the border itself. 
Fig. 5. Screenshot from Layered Voice Analysis 6.50 which 
examines micro fluctuations of voices in order to corroborate 
what the subject is saying. Source: www .LVA650.com.
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This software simultaneously extends the range of 
the law’s juris-diction while also designating those 
who must remain beyond its range of responsibility/
audibility, differentiating between those to be 
afforded the rights of a citizen and those to be 
denied those rights, and the possibility of claiming 
refugee status.
Although in the legal context there has never been a 
need for an ear to be pressed against the suspect’s 
body, the principle of habeas corpus, as discussed 
above, requires that the subject be brought 
physically before the law (e.g., in an interrogation 
room or courtroom) in order to have a legal hearing. 
Yet we could easily imagine how LVA 6.50 would 
eradicate the necessity for the physical presence 
of the suspect, as it requires only a voice to access 
the corpus. In this sense, LVA 6.50 short circuits the 
process of habeas corpus, using an algorithm and 
a visual interface to give the law access to what a 
person’s body is “really” saying as they speak, even 
if that body is thousands of miles away.
This distance-producing (voice stress analysis) 
machine is not only designed to distance the user 
from the subject of analysis; it also works to remove 
or minimize the presence and role of the user 
(the interrogator, insurance broker, border guard, 
etc.). In an interview situation, the visual interface 
flashes up its verdicts as the interviewee speaks. 
This machine thus promises to listen on behalf of 
its operator, reducing or putting into question their 
interpretative and intuitive capacities. In this sense 
this technology not only mutes the words of the 
speaker, but also deafens the listener. And although 
a direct lineage can be traced from the stethoscope 
to voice stress analysis technologies, the removal of 
the necessity for the operator to listen articulates 
the fundamental break with auscultation as a 
practice. Auscultation shifted a mode of listening 
from the speech to the body yet it still required 
listening at its very core and in fact inaugurated a 
new epistemology of listening that is still taught to 
millions in the medical profession today. Though 
it practices auscultation, LVA 6.50 does not teach 
new ways of listening; in the microscopic analysis 
of the frequencies of the human voice it can hear 
beyond the range of human audibility and therefore 
it excludes the possibility of building new auditory 
skills. Unlike the work of forensic listeners like 
Dr. French, its means of listening does not hold 
the potential to increase, fine-tune, and augment 
human auditory experience.
Not only does LVA 6.50 listen on behalf of its user, 
but in its registration of emotional content (anxiety, 
aggression, fear) this software feels on behalf of its 
user as well. Using this software the interviewer no 
longer needs to be sensitive to the psychological 
condition of his subject.
The machine thus produces apathetic operators 
who listen to neither words nor tone of voice, 
and therefore minimizes the extent to which the 
interviewer dirties themselves with the subjectivity 
of the interviewee. This machine is so attractive 
to law enforcers because it recognizes the 
fundamental flaw of previous modes of forensic 
listening: that in objectifying the voice the one who 
causes its objectification becomes amplified in the 
process - i.e., that the subjectivity of the speaker is 
replaced by that of the listener/interpreter/aural 
investigator. In order to produce the laboratory 
conditions for justice and a completely objectified 
realm of listening, law enforcement recognizes that 
listening must be relegated to the machine. Yet in 
voice stress analysis there still remains the glitch 
of the subject contaminating the legal laboratory, 
as these algorithms first have to be programmed by 
people who could have bigoted ears and economic 
agendas. To produce a verdict the algorithm needs 
to learn the logics of those verdicts - e.g., in order 
for it to profile the voice of a sex offender it first 
needs someone to teach it the vocal attributes of a 
sex offender.
In response to the astounding claims of LVA 
6.50’s highly sensitive and microscopic listening, 
a group of speech scientists and mathematicians 
in the department of phonetics at the University 
of Stockholm closely examined the product’s 
technical patent and reverse engineered the 
software in order to test its scientific credibility. 
The idea that the machine would work “regardless 
of language”13 was taken seriously by the group, 
who tested the software using only vowel speech 
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sounds and single phonemes. Interested to see how 
the machine produced its wide range of judgments 
the group used the pure object of speech; de-
subjectified voices speaking only vowels without 
thought or semantics. After months of testing the 
machine and collecting large amounts of data they 
understood that the software was operating on 
a very basic level of amplitude and found that it 
simply had to do with a person’s capacity to hold 
a steady pitch and volume. They also claim that 
the distinctions between the various verdicts (e.g., 
between embarrassment and attempt to outsmart 
or excitement and inaccuracy) are arbitrarily placed 
along this scale. According to their investigation, the 
claim that the technology functions as a lie detector 
is bogus; one of the mathematicians working on 
the reverse-engineering project told me that its 
logic was akin to “a horoscope or a prophecy” in its 
pseudoscientific nature.14
Though the mathematician was using an analogy of 
the horoscope as a means to scientifically discredit 
the software, for me the term horoscope resonated 
differently. I found the analogy of the horoscope 
useful because of the ways in which in introduces 
“fate” into the above discourses of legal, ethnic, and 
social profiling to which forensic listening dedicates 
its ears. Just as the horoscope removes the agency 
of people and insists that their fate rests on the 
alignment of the stars, LVA 6.50 removes the agency 
of the listener and the speaker and allows a machine 
with apparently very little interpretative potential to 
forecast our place within a predetermined cosmos. 
What we can learn from the horoscope analogy is 
that the human actor is not required here; if simply 
speaking individual vowels, phonemes, or babble 
can reveal our true intentions then our actions are 
irrelevant. Without even acting the software reveals 
the script that is within us.
LVA 6.50 amplifies the dark phrenology of the voice 
which is operative today. Regardless of whether they 
scientifically work or not, pieces of software which 
use the voice as biometric tool deeply confuse its role 
as a conduit for language and negotiation. Simply 
by virtue of the fact that insurance companies, 
government councils, and police departments use 
these forms of listening offered by LVA 6.50, the 
software is weaponized, regardless of its credibility 
amongst the scientific community.
In the sites where speech acts it is our speech 
which is under attack. The promise (empty or 
not) of LVA 6.50 or of LADO (the accent analysis of 
asylum seekers) to reorient the speaking subjects 
contained within any given juris-diction is already 
underway. In this essay I have intended to relay a 
certain history of legal listening that begins with 
listening to words and accounts, moves to a type of 
listening that doubles the speaking subject into two 
parts (words and speech sound), and culminates, 
through increasingly degraded forms of listening, 
in the total eradication of the speaking subject. 
We arrive at an uncertain future of the voice and 
a moment to question its very legitimacy as both 
an object of legal investigation and the means 
through which the law becomes enacted. Assuming 
an increasing proliferation of these emergent and 
mutated strands of forensic listening forces us to 
ask more general questions about the role of the 
voice as a central legal infrastructure: will it still be 
a fair and just hearing when nobody is listening?
Fig. 12. “This is what the truth looks like.” Andreas Takanen 
at the department of phonetics at the university of Stockholm 
shows the inner algorithmic/horoscopic workings of LVA 6.50. 
Photo: Lawrence Abu Hamdan, 2009.
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Figs. 6 – 11. Screenshots from Layered Voice Analysis 6.50 which examines micro-
fluctuations of voices in order to corroborate what the subject is saying. 
Source: www.LVA650.com.
Fig. 13. Promotional image for a voice biometrics software. 
Source: http:// easyvoicebiometrics.com
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What does the acronym, CJD mean to contemporary 
UK English speakers? Or BZ to a particularly 
informed English speaker? Mad cow disease, 
perhaps? An incapacitating chemical agent, 
weaponized by United States after WWII, perhaps? 
What could the lettering BED mean other then the 
last rest place of the day? When the first two are 
verbalised in the correct alphabet code we get the 
phrases, ‘Charlie, Juliette, Delta’ and ‘Bravo Zulu!’ 
Again a trail of associations takes us into various 
readings. Charlie and Juliette, personified, get 
together and book plane tickets. A Zulu warrior 
is patronised in a greetings card. A child gets the 
imperative command in the too late hours of the 
evening. Or maybe that’s just me. What do we see 
in this image?
It looks like the Ukrainian flag on its side, so my 
comprehension of the symbol grasps towards my 
weak reading of contemporary politics. Because 
I’m a linguistic creature, a modern human, I look 
for patterns of meaning in and beyond words. I’ll 
improvise meaning and continue to interpret or look 
for it even beyond the given translation. When de-
coding mystery encryptions, or even when reading 
‘ordinary’ language, there’s always an element of 
fantasy, or magical comprehension – clairvoyance 
Are you alive? I touch you.
The Pool, H. D., 1915
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perhaps (Benjamin 1933). The verbal equivalent of 
the above symbol is the alphabet symbol, ‘K’, or 
spoken properly, ‘Kilo’. In the International Code of 
Signals this symbol is shorthand for a ship’s signal, 
‘I wish to communicate with you’. As a flag, hoisted 
into position, this symbol is the starting point for 
any communicative exchange and establishes the 
format of the proceeding transmission. Such a ship-
to-ship preamble might go like this:
KILO: I wish to communicate with you….
in Morse code / in semaphore / in torch and flares 
What the Kilo flag tells me is that before the reason 
for and the means of communication comes the 
desire. As a social being, the impulse and the 
capacity to communicate feel pretty coincident; they 
both underscore most of what I do as a poet and 
a person (non-mutually exclusive positions). Like a 
lonely ship at sea, I’m freighted with the compulsion 
to make contact with another wandering body. Not 
much time passes between my sending signals into 
the world. These signals might contain particular 
information but what they are actually signalling is 
my hankering for communication. Maybe I wouldn’t 
be so quick to make that leap of likening a nautical 
flag symbol with everyday social mediating or poetic 
utterance, if the International Code didn’t already 
make the communication between two vessels read 
like the personal dialogue of two intimate subjects: 
The first person singular ‘I’ desiring contact with 
a ‘you’ likens the phrase denoted by the Kilo flag 
to a form of a lyrical address. In other words it 
sounds like the act of one subject appealing through 
language to another. We can hear the same impulse 
to appeal to a listener in the initial call of Shelley’s 
ode to a skylark:
Hail to thee, blithe Spirit! (Shelley, 1820)
The hail from the desiring subject pulls the as-yet 
heedless and unnamed into a listening dynamic. 
Their identity as the target of the message is 
determined by the very act of the call. This is 
communication at its most basic form, and the 
gesture that lurks behind every signal.
I might say that the desire to communicate is 
embedded in code itself, or should that be the 
instruction to communicate? Where code demands 
a performative realisation of its encryption, then the 
instruction within the code, KILO, is to translate it 
into a process of interpellation. 
In the early stages of her career, Hannah Weiner 
(celebrated East Coast poet, performance artist and 
intermittent clairvoyant) committed her practice to 
appropriating sequences of text from a nineteenth-
century edition of the International Code of Signals 
for the Use of All Nations and composed them into 
lines of poetry for both page and performance. 
Throughout the 1960s Weiner orchestrated 
elaborate happenings that saw mass enactments of 
seafaring signalling. 
The performances took place in (land-based) 
public spaces and poetry festivals, similarly letting 
collective bodies talk to each other in personal 
messages of lack and desire, featuring the U.S. 
Coastguard with alphabet flag hoists, semaphore 
signalmen, torch light, megaphones and flares. In 
what must have been an unintelligible spectacle, 
the various forms of man and media transmitted 
communiqué in sequences of standardised 
messages that rendered them lyrical ballads 
touching on slap-stick erotica, pathos, bathos, 
whimsy, pastoral, and caprice. Take for example 
this amatory re-telling of ‘Romeo’ and ‘Juliet’, no 
longer trapped in alphabet code but once again 
badly communicating lovers. 
FOXTROT: I am disabled! Communicate 
with me! (my exclamation) 
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GIA Juliet:  This is my best point 
SHJ                   Some swell 
XOR Romeo:   Thank you 
GDS May I begin to?
GIT Juliet:  The sooner the better 
MFO Romeo:  Entrance is difficult 
MFD Juliet:  Try to enter 
KZU Romeo:  I am in difficulties; direct me 
 how to steer 
OOX Juliet:  You should swing and enter 
 stern first 
HBK Romeo:  What is the nature of the 
 bottom or what kind of 
 bottom do have you? 
HAY Juliet:  Double bottom 
ODI Romeo:  Stern way. Going astern 
LK Juliet:  Go astern easy. Easy astern 
ODI Romeo:  I am going full speed 
HC Juliet:  It is not safe to go so fast 
KZY Romeo:  It is difficult to extricate 
BK Julie:  Is anything the matter 
VLA Romeo:  Cock broken or damaged      
 (Weiner 1982, 10)
In 1982 selected sections of Weiner’s works of poetry 
derived from the International Code of Signals were 
compiled and published in the book, Code Poems. 
Each chapter – ‘Romeo and Juliet’; ‘Any Chance 
of War’; ‘Want Men’; ‘Follow Me’ – behaves like a 
passage of dialogue, or mini conversation. To my 
reading there are some sections that perform as 
much melancholy, affect or comedy as any sonnet, 
ballad or verse. 
CJD     I was plundered by a pirate 
CJF      Describe the pirate 
CJN     She is armed 
CJP     How is she armed? 
CJS     She has long guns 
CJW    I have no long guns 
BLD    I am a complete wreck (Weiner 1982, 19)
Weiner manufactured found phrases from a system 
of impersonal messaging and formed them into 
a mode of personal language. In doing so she 
simultaneously revealed the aleatoric lyric effect 
in appropriated text, and problematised the very 
possibility of personal language. In other words 
she showed that whilst complicating an utterance’s 
attempt to communicate as personal expression on 
one hand, lyricism creeps in on the other. 
Every line of Code Poems is testimony to the 
drama of interpellation. Weiner’s project created a 
vernacular that undermines the linearity of coded 
communication and also reveals the interpellative 
pressure in lyric poetry – or any language with a 
prescribed ideology (even the ICoS is an ideology). 
The performative code enacts a hail, which in 
turn enlists a receiver. The actual message that is 
mediated by the signal – for example, I want bread; 
I need a pilot; I require medical assistance; I drag 
my anchor; I have no long guns; I want men; I am 
on fire – is the almost incidental matter of the call. 
By which I mean, the stuff of the message, the 
specificity of the desire to communicate, is the 
code’s flesh. 
NOVEMBER: No
MIKE SIERRA KILO:  Is my family well?
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Weiner was interested in the time and space of 
communication; she was exploring how a message 
passes through time and space and likewise 
through our minds and our fleshy bodies. In the 
work she asks of a transmitted message: where 
does the meaning drift to along the way; what 
meanings are accumulated on the journey from 
one communicating body to another; what happens 
to meaning once the message enters the chaotic 
environment of our receptors? Weiner used the 
International Code of Signals – an index that already 
charts the historical shifts in enunciations of trade, 
navigation and disaster from a Colonial entity to an 
other – as a resource to test these questions. She 
wondered;
the amount of information available has more than 
doubled since ww2. in the next etn [sic] years it will 
double again. how do we deal with it?
-
do we use more than the 5% of the brain now in use?
-
do we process quicker?
-
do we decode information more and put it in another 
form (not language) so that the present brain can 
handle it?
...is there a change in the neural circuits of the 
brain? (Weiner 1969)
The question of the ‘present brain’ undergoing 
neural rewiring in order to cope with the extra load 
of daily, or even minute-by-minute, information 
may sound naïve to us contemporary consumers 
of information. (I’m pretty sure the consensus is 
that we’ve used the same neural set-up to interpret 
nowadays information for as long as we have been 
reading the stars, tracking animals in the jungle 
and comprehending the intricate idioms of drum 
signals.) However, Weiner’s proposition, or even 
anxiety, invites a re-activation of Code Poems in 
the context of our presently brained resources. 
Therefore, in a contemporary reading of Code 
Poems we might ask: what is a signal that traverses 
the ocean of Google search algorithms, the milieu 
of digital code signals, and the navigatory processes 
that synthesise (female) bodies with the market 
economy? 
We might argue that the exponential increase of 
available information to the common consumer 
since the first Code Poems project is way beyond 
that in the leap between WWII and the 1960s. 
Therefore to research and re-read Code Poems now 
is to perform an array of anachronistic conceptions, 
namely an anachronistic conceptualisation of code. 
As a modern day researcher and poet, I use Weiner’s 
project in the same way she used the nineteenth-
century codex, as a resource through which to 
study the contingent and timeless mechanics of 
communication. Where the act of research is to 
treat the given material as oracular then studying 
this work in particular is to communicate with it, be 
hailed by it, and enter into its circuitry of signalling. 
In response I want to let my magical interpretation 
of the code and its signal run riot, or let trails of 
comprehension that are activated by the messages 
provide a reactive discourse to the system of 
enunciations outlined by Weiner. For example, 
what is it to be plundered by a pirate? Indeed the 
maritime practice of hijacking is still in place, but 
isn’t it also now to be looted of data? How is this 
contemporary reading reimagined in the text?
ROMEO ZULU X-RAY: I want more support
1 2 7
The body of codes and linguistic symbols that 
Weiner used are the same, static and standardised, 
but the vernacular she highlighted has evolved 
beyond itself, with the excesses of our own reading. 
Code Poems illustrates that there are various layers 
of official and unofficial messages buried within 
the codes that betray the inevitable digression of 
messaging and that ‘within them lie communiqués 
of an alternate totality, heterogeneous and 
coherent’ (Goldman 2001, 125). What surfaces in 
the rewired pronunciation of the text is the poetics 
of displaced bodies and messages rematerialised in 
various forms, data, pixels, flesh, voice, flag waving, 
image, logo or otherwise. 
As I see it the coincidences of code and poetry 
as framed by Weiner leak out into all manner of 
archives. Traces of previous poetic utterances 
thread together along lines of transmission – some 
of which deliberately installed by Weiner, some of 
which continue to breed and are reiterated in fresh 
contexts. New lyricisms integrate with old. Similarly 
within the examples of distress code that Weiner 
imported into the book of poetry, what lingers is the 
‘actual’ moment of emergency. Weiner rearticulated 
distress calls as poetry thereby allowing ships’ calls 
to echo through her text, calls that remain purely in 
the state of echo; obscure and technical as well as 
needy and personal.
The fleshy property of code, as used by Weiner, 
remains encrypted with histories and signifying 
properties. In other words the code is mattered 
with the residue of its previous functions, such as 
the imported nineteenth-century idiom heard in 
‘plunder’ or ‘Are there any oysters to be had?’(Weiner 
1982, 9) Perhaps it would be too much an act of 
magical thinking to suggest that the lingering and 
shifting textualities in the cyphers make them feel 
alive – like they are adapting to new host meanings 
and functions. The communicating signals (in this 
fantastic reading of mine) then become not the call 
of distressed ships, or even of the lyrical poet, but 
the call of code itself. After all, much of Code Poems 
and its reenactments seem to be the noise of code 
talking to itself, speaking of its lack, its need for 
input, and its desire for a body. 
HD: Can I transfer rescued persons to you?
LHE: I am distressed for want of food
BRAVO LIMA DELTA: I am a Complete Wreck
1 2 8
Benjamin, Walter. 1979. “Doctrine of the Similar.” Tran. Knut 
Tarnowski. New German Review (17): 65–69.
Goldman, Judith. 2001. “Hannah=hannaH: Politics, Ethics, and 
Clairvoyance in the Work of Hannah Weiner.” Differences: A 
Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 12 (2): 121–168.
H. D. ‘The Pool’. The Poetry Foundation. Accessed June 21. 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poetrymagazine/poem/2259.
Shelley, Percy Bysshe. ‘To a Skylark’. The Poetry Founda-
tion, Accessed June 21. http://www.poetryfoundation.org/
poem/174413.
Weiner, Hannah. 1982. Code Poems. Barrytown, New York: 
Open Book Publications.
Weiner, Hannah. “Trans-space Communication, 1969”. Poetry 
Database. Electronic Poetry Centre. http://epc.buffalo.edu/au-
thors/weiner/0-9.html.
R E F E R E N C E S
1 2 9
G      E
     O         F   F
C       O
              X
C O D E  F O R - I T S E L F
E s s a y  o r i g i n a l l y  p u b l i s h e d  i n  ‘ S p e a k i n g  C o d e ’ ,  2 0 1 2
R e p r i n t e d  w i t h  p e r m i s s i o n  f r o m  M . I . T .  P r e s s
1 3 0
Berardi’s understanding of the problem is rather 
similar to Arendt’s in his observation that we have 
been acquiring language from machines, not 
from other humans (namely, from our mothers), 
in situations where the learning of language 
and affectivity have been largely separated.3 The 
problem of language acquisition is extended to 
intellectual and social behavior, and he calls this 
a catastrophe of modern humanism, in which we 
no longer have sufficient attention spans for love, 
tenderness, and compassion. We are more and 
more estranged from affect as speech becomes 
I N  M A K I N G  T H E  D I S T I N C T I O N  B E T W E E N  C O N T E M P L A T I O N 
( V I T A  C O N T E M P L A T I V A )  A N D  A C T I O N  ( V I T A  A C T I V A ) ,  S H E 
C O N C L U D E S  T H A T  I T  I S  N O T  P O S S I B L E  T O  G O  T H R O U G H 
L I F E  W I T H O U T  A C T I N G  I N  I T ,  W H E R E A S  C O N T E M P L A T I O N  I S 
O P T I O N A L .  H E R  P R O P O S A L  I S  S I M P L E ,  “ I T  I S  N O T H I N G  M O R E 
T H A N  T O  T H I N K  W H A T  W E  A R E  D O I N G . ” 1 S H E  D I S T R U S T S 
S C I E N C E  A S  A  C O N T E X T  I N  W H I C H  “ S P E E C H  H A S  L O S T  I T S 
P O W E R , ”  W H E R E  A  L A N G U A G E  O F  M A T H E M A T I C A L  S Y M B O L S 
H A S  R E P L I C A T E D  S P O K E N  S T A T E M E N T S  B U T  C A N N O T  B E 
T R A N S L A T E D  B A C K  T O  S P E E C H . 2 T H E S E  A R E  T H E  C O N D I T I O N S 
I N  W H I C H  T H O U G H T L E S S N E S S  S E E M S  T O  H A V E  G A I N E D  G R O U N D , 
A N D  T E C H N O L O G Y  I S  R E N D E R I N G  U S  E V E R  M O R E  T H O U G H T L E S S .
T O  A R E N D T ,  W H A T E V E R  C A N  B E 
K N O W N  O R  E X P E R I E N C E D  C A N 
O N LY  M A K E  S E N S E  I N  R E L A T I O N  T O 
S P E E C H  A N D  A C T I O N ,  A N D  T O  T H E 
H U M A N  C A P A C I T Y  F O R  T H O U G H T 
A N D  T H O U G H T L E S S N E S S . 
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commodified, and is increasingly rendered using 
devices locked into neoliberal markets that have no 
interest in the voice as a sign of human solidarity.
Things are rather differently described in early 
coding cultures. In Katherine Hayles’s My Mother 
Was a Computer, she charts how in the 1930s 
and 1940s, people, mostly women, were employed 
to do calculations and were referred to as 
computers (Hayles appropriates her title from a 
chapter in Technologies of the Gendered Body by 
Anne Balsamo, whose mother was one of these 
computers).4 Kittler’s Discourse Networks also 
refers to how the mother’s voice haunts reading, 
making reference to the period around 1800 when 
children were taught using phonetics, to sound 
out and voice words. By 1900, he observes that 
distinctions were drawn between noise and signal.5 
This further detail helps to explain Berardi’s lament 
on the conditions for the teaching of speech and the 
disconnection from the body, and importantly serves 
to stress how the voice of the computer connects 
the construction of particular kinds of subjectivity 
and learning practices that use informational 
systems. It might be said that what is lacking is 
closer attention to nurture and the articulation of 
human feeling that cannot be expressed by words 
alone.
If the voice also haunts computing in this way, it 
interpellates us in new ways that affect our thinking 
processes, intellectual capacities, and abilities 
to express empathy with others. It is these kinds 
of interactions of code and language that also 
interest Hayles, as artificial languages proliferate 
and in recognition of the acknowledged cultural 
influence of human languages on constructions 
of subjectivity. Her concern is that programming 
languages are too easily dismissed as artificial and 
of lesser consequence.6 In technologically advanced 
cultures, language and program code interact all 
the time in complex ways, and even mothers and 
computers can become confused in their assigned 
normative functions. Central to this approach is that 
the understanding of code (as of speech and writing) 
is constituted ideologically (through what Hayles 
calls a “worldview”). Like speech, program code is 
active in the world and has a lived body, indeed is 
intimately connected to a social body. The issue that 
has occupied the book thus far is about control of 
that body, its expurgation, and related processes of 
autonomy activated through coding practices. 
E X E C U T I O N
The human capacity to speak and act is enduring, 
as Arendt has stated, even when language itself is 
used as an apparatus of power against it. This is 
partly because language is paradoxical, and holds 
an innate ability to transform itself as well as those 
who are constituted through it. The relation between 
speech and action has been explored in previous 
chapters: to speak is to actualize something, 
announcing the intention to produce an action in the 
moment of doing so. It is also clear that language 
has effects, as it acts for us and against us, and 
this is what Butler has referred to as “linguistic 
vulnerability,” confirming the unerring power of 
language to affect us from our beginnings, as with 
the case of the Althusserian call to order as a form 
of violence on the human subject.7 Butler’s point is 
that violence is embodied in language, not simply in 
the way it might be used to incite a violent action or 
in the ways that language reflects social domination 
more generally, but in the way that it produces 
meaning. This relates to Hegel’s observation that 
there is something inherently violent in the capacity 
of language to represent a thing, what he calls 
“its essencing ability,” which is equivalent to its 
symbolic death. As it stands in for something, “it 
dismembers the thing, destroying its organic unity,” 
and forces the thing into a field of meaning that is 
outside of itself.8
This also happens with source code and perhaps in 
a more extreme manner, as code exceeds natural 
language through its protocological address to 
humans and machines.
 
It says something and does something at the same 
time - it symbolizes and enacts the violence on the 
thing: moreover, it executes it. In addition to these 
symbolic and physical forms of violence, there is also 
something that comes close to “pure violence” (in 
the sense of Benjamin’s essay “Critique of Violence” 
of 1921), action that is directed not to other human 
beings but to the symbolic powers and operating 
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systems that reign over them.9 Pure violence 
appears to come from nowhere, as “an expression 
of pure drive, of the undeadness, the excess of life, 
which strikes the ‘bare life’ regulated by law.”10 One 
might speculate that code might similarly express 
pure means through collective actions like DDoS 
attacks, SQL code injection techniques,11 the spread 
of viruses, directed at the sovereign technical 
infrastructures that already exert forms of violence 
on clients through the enforcement of restrictive 
terms of service and the like.12 The hacktivist tactics 
of Anonymous, or of LulzSec, the splinter group who 
have been “Laughing at your security since 2011!,” 
exemplify such ways of thinking.13
When Paulo Virno confirms how language 
radicalizes “aggression beyond measure,”14 he is 
drawing on Aristotle’s description of contingency 
at the heart of our use of language. Besides the 
enduring capacity to speak and act, his interest 
is in the ability of the human species to execute 
“innovative actions” that he likens to recursive plays 
of language.15 Underpinning political possibilities, 
for Virno, is the simple fact that the human 
animal is capable of modifying its forms of life, of 
innovating new forms.16 This is what enables and 
produces innovative action, in the sense that newly 
invented forms might diverge from established 
rules and perceived or consolidated norms (based 
on Chomsky’s idea of innate creativity previously 
discussed, although Virno prefers not to use the 
term creativity, as it has become so instrumentalized 
through the creative economy agenda). He cites 
the example of jokes, as demonstrations of the 
ways that “linguistic animals give evidence of an 
unexpected derivation from their normal praxis.”17 
Rather than taking jokes to be Freudian clues 
to the workings of the unconscious, he regards 
them as examples of sociolinguistic games that 
demonstrate innovative techniques and possibilities 
for transformation. He explains that this happens 
in two main ways: first, by demonstrating how 
divergences in following rules often result in 
changing the rule itself; and second, through the 
incorrect use of semantic ambiguity.18 Of course 
his point is not the content of the jokes, which 
might of course be political (and yet perhaps 
counterproductive in serving to obscure or 
normalize the issue), but the linguistic apparatus or 
the “logicolinguistic resources that jokes utilize.”19 
He characterizes this sense of linguistic innovation 
as “how to do new things with words” (after Austin 
once more), in which doing something relies on 
public action and also “presupposes and revives a 
public space,” thus reiterating earlier references 
to linguistic-communicative performances that 
necessitate a public space.20 So, to Virno, innovative 
utterances are similar to collective speech acts 
where speech constitutes action in and of itself, as 
potential speech in-itself.
 
The argument relies on the recognition that 
innovative action uses linguistic and performative 
resources in similar ways to jokes, and is thus 
able to intervene in the workings of contemporary 
capitalism because language has been absorbed at 
a structural level into the political economy. Behind 
the possibility of innovative action is the enduring 
ability of language to create unexpected relations 
between multiple speakers, as speech is necessarily 
shared and collective. Language constitutes what 
Virno calls a “pure institution” (before and beyond 
the law), as it underwrites all other institutions, and 
emphasizes that the human animal is ready-made 
for language but only enters into language through 
socialization.21  
To Virno, this confirms the biopolitical dimension 
of the human animal in the world, and the ability 
to act in unexpected and innovative ways to 
challenge institutional norms and presuppositions 
of normative logic. Moreover, if the subject is to 
some extent constituted in language, then to think 
that someone saying and doing something is a 
straightforward demonstration of agency misses the 
point that actions are always already encoded, like 
the innate ability to produce sounds from the body, 
however abstract they may seem. The historical 
subject is always ready to speak and act, whether 
conscious or not yet conscious of the need to do 
this. It is in recognition of this fact that the public is 
always able to act for-itself as a body politic, however 
constrained the conditions may appear to be.
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N E G A T I O N
When Virno describes “not-yet public forms of 
government,”22 he is pointing to the ways in which 
the public is always ready for collective action in 
this sense. They are able to construct innovative 
forms of self-organization by negating received 
organizational forms, similar to the way a recursive 
public is able to modify the means through which it 
is constituted as a public (discussed in the previous 
chapter). To Virno, this possibility of reinvention 
is explained through the interplay of innovation 
and negation inherent to language. In contrast 
to representational democracy, for instance, he 
refers to nonrepresentational forms inspired by 
a nondialectical understanding of negation. Like 
negative feedback, a determinate negation becomes 
a constructive influence on the system as a whole, 
allowing it to self-regulate.23
To clarify the concept of negation a little more, 
the distinction needs to be made between mere 
difference (something is not something else) and 
the more fundamental claim that something is 
not something else but depends on it to exist. This 
is the basis of dialectical logic, where the role of 
negation, and its further negation (negation of 
negation), become important for understanding 
some of the ways in which dominant ideas attempt 
to reproduce themselves, even when an oppositional 
stance is taken. This is why it has to “die twice,” as 
Žižek puts it (in tarrying with the negative), in order 
to reject its symbolic confines.24 But this is not 
quite what is meant by Virno, who recognizes that 
neoliberalism is a negative condition that requires 
further negation, not through negative dialectics 
but on the basis that negation is embedded in the 
paradoxes of language. For him, it is the determining 
role of language that needs negating to protect 
the possibility of a reciprocal nonrecognition: “the 
implicit presupposition of rhetorical persuasion and, 
in general, of the permanence of a public sphere.”25 
His reading of the system of language reveals its 
inherent paradox in the way it represents, as it 
both does negation (by identifying what something 
is not) and is negation (inasmuch as it can only 
signify something): “The negation, or something 
that language does, is understood, above all, as 
something that language is.”26
The concept of negation appears to operate like a 
speech act too, countering the authoritative call 
to order and opening up alternative possibilities 
outside the “sovereign autonomy of speech.”27 
Moreover, Virno speculates on forms of politics 
that recognize the ways that sovereign forces try 
to restrain these inherent capacities for innovation 
or social transformation, as with the illusion of 
free speech as a mechanism of power. This leads 
him to conclude that self-government needs to 
adapt itself directly to the “linguistic aspect of the 
human species.”28 Therefore it becomes necessary 
to produce paradoxes between the determinism of 
grammatical rules and the ways in which speech 
is always to some extent out of control (something 
Butler previously identified). This is in recognition 
that the linguistic-communicative aspects of 
capitalism have become central to its structural 
logic, as well as its potential reinvention. If both 
negation and innovation are constituted in language, 
like human subjectivity, then any sense of agency 
afforded to it is also constrained and activated in 
reciprocal relation.
The contingency at the heart of this is explained 
neatly by Žižek, who describes the illusion of free 
choice through the notion of interpellation and how it 
chooses its subjects. He refers to the “vulgar liberal 
notion” of freedom of choice as a “fundamental 
choice by means of which I ‘choose myself’.”29 
Forced choice, on the other hand, is explained 
as the subject freely choosing the inevitable, 
such as the historical subject’s recognition of 
class consciousness (class in-itself). The subject 
recognizes itself as encoded, “always-ready” for 
action, and only in this way can begin to act freely. 
The subject is thereby called by history to act in the 
way it should act and take the right course of action. 
In Žižek’s explanation and in parallel to the perceived 
determining role of language, this is not ideological 
manipulation at all as it is already programmed in 
advance and there is simply no choice to be made. 
This holds for speech, as it preexists itself; it is 
speech before speech, or speech in-itself. Things 
are decided before they are enacted and they act on 
us, not the other way around. But if this is the case, 
Žižek asks, are we simply turned into computers 
1 3 4
or thinking machines,30 or input-output machines 
as Laporte suggests? Is it that human subjects 
are preprogrammed and merely execute their 
preprogrammed instructions and scripts?
If human action is largely rendered ineffective under 
current conditions, perhaps this is because language 
has become instrumentalized by machine logic, and 
thereby disconnected from human feelings. Virno 
concludes: “For political anticapitalist and antistate 
action there is no positive presupposition to be 
vindicated. Its eminent duty is to experiment with 
new and more effective ways of negating negation, 
of placing ‘not’ in front of ‘not human’.”31 Should we 
not do the same with the figure of the programmer 
and with programming in general, remove it from 
the determining conditions of the market that strip 
it of human fallibility and the possibility of innovative 
action? Like freedom of choice, is it only possible to 
begin to think of free software as a result of the self-
consciousness of conditions in recognition of it being 
programmed in the first place? If so, then there 
really is no real choice at all and all software can be 
considered to be free at source. Code is always ready 
to execute, in the move from in-itself to for-itself, 
and it seems verified that information wants to be 
free.33 Code can express freedom only inasmuch as 
it is able to execute the right course of action.
C O D A
By indicating that language is taught by computers 
and not by another caring human, Berardi points to 
the way that human expression and social attention 
have become overtly economicized (as part of the 
so-called “attention economy”).33 Like fast speech, 
he thinks interpretation has become schizophrenic, 
and that the relations between metaphors and 
things, representation and life, have become 
thoroughly confused, leading to the conclusion that 
“a hyperstimulation of attention reduces the ability to 
critically and sequentially interpret the speech of the 
other who tries and yet fails to be understood.”34  The 
inability to produce collective speech acts leads to 
tragic consequences in terms of the human psyche, 
according to Berardi, as of course language acts on 
the construction of subjectivity itself. This separation 
of language from affect leads to a situation in which 
this excess of signs, obsessive accumulation, and 
accelerated communications leave little time for 
love, tenderness, and compassion, or even for 
contemplation, as Arendt lamented.
If we no longer have sufficient attention spans for 
free thinking or love, then perhaps we simply haven’t 
recognized that both have been there all along. 
Again an example from Žižek, quoting Bertrand 
Russell, helps to clarify the point: “I did not know 
I loved you till I heard myself telling you so....”35 In 
other words, love preexists the knowledge of it. A 
similar paradox underlay Berardi’s reading of the 
source code of the “I Love You” virus (which spread 
through communities of the Internet in 2000).36 
Although seemingly declaring love, the message 
“love letter for you” if opened erased documents 
from your hard drive and then propagated itself by 
sending new copies of itself through the address 
book of your mail program.37 Berardi effectively 
negates the negation by turning it into spoken 
poetry. In another example from the history of 
computing, the generative “love-letters” that 
first appeared on the notice board of Manchester 
University’s Computer Department in 1953 are 
similarly revealing. Predating the chatterbot Eliza, 
these computergenerated declarations were 
produced by a program written by the programmer 
Christopher Strachey, using the built-in random 
generator of the Manchester University Computer 
(the Ferranti Mark I), the earliest programmable 
computer (first functioning as a prototype in 1948). 
Artist David Link reconstructed a functional replica 
of the hardware and the original program, following 
meticulous research on the functional aspects but 
also speculating on why the programmer may have 
decided to generate love letters at all. The main 
program is relatively simple, using loops and a 
random variable to follow the sentence structure: 
“You are my - Adjective - Substantive,” and “My - 
[Adjective] - Substantive - [Adverb] - Verb - Your - 
[Adjective] - Substantive.”38
Some words are fixed and some optional, indicated 
by the square brackets; the program selects from 
the list of options - adjectives, adverbs, and verbs 
- and loops are configured to avoid repetition. The 
software could generate over 318 billion variations. 
In terms of effect, the dialogic structure is important 
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too in setting up an exchange between “Me” (the 
program writer) and “You” (the human reader), such 
that you feel addressed directly - it interpellates 
you. The resultant declarations suggest a surprising 
tenderness of expression that runs contrary to what 
we consider the standard functional outcomes of 
computational procedures (for commerce or war). 
Here is an example:
If computers could speak freely, is this what they 
would say? Is love reducible to a “recombinatory 
procedure”?40 Surely not. On the one hand, as Link 
points out, it seems to portray a reductionist view of 
love, but on the other, love is also characterized by 
projection, and in this way fires the imagination. He 
explains this by quoting Goethe, who “once made 
the cynical suggestion that love-letters should be 
formulated in a completely cryptic way, so that 
the recipient could project whatever she liked into 
D E A R  D A R L I N G
Y O U  A R E  M Y  B E A U T I F U L  R A P T U R E . 
M Y  I N F A T U A T I O N  B E A U T I F U L L Y 
C L I N G S  T O  Y O U R  A D O R A B L E 
L U S T .  M Y  I N F A T U A T I O N  L U S T S 
F O R  Y O U R  W I S H .  M Y  A M B I T I O N 
C U R I O U S L Y  L I K E S  Y O U R  L O V E . 
Y O U  A R E  M Y  D E A R  E A G E R N E S S .
Y O U R S  W I S T F U L L Y
M .  U .  C . 3 9
1 3 6
the text.”41 Moreover, cryptology aside, is the love 
letter reducible to the problem of memory like 
the Universal Machine, to be written, read, stored, 
and deleted like any other data? Once more, it is 
worth being reminded that people are not simply 
determined by such histories but are also involved 
in its very construction: both programmed and able 
to program.
If love and tenderness are indeed neglected, as 
Berardi indicates, then we haven’t recognized that 
love is preprogrammed, and that attempts to pervert 
this “truth” ultimately fail to interpellate. Indeed if 
running algorithms is a kind of “truth telling,” as 
Link argues elsewhere,42 then recognition holds a 
far more positive message than the hallucinations 
imposed by neoliberal markets, and the increased 
prominence of privatized technologies that deny 
access to source code. If human experience is ever 
more prescribed through scripts and programs like 
this, and which we have less and less access and 
attachment to, then the challenge for those making 
programs is to open up aesthetic and political 
possibilities of recombination and to liberate the 
imagination and desire from the market. Thankfully 
humans are not reducible to computational logic, 
but perhaps more importantly love was there all 
along, even with computer programs. But with little 
time for this realization, humans have become more 
and more distanced from the ability to communicate 
intimately with others.
Speech appears to have lost its power, along with 
the efficacy of human solidarity. The biopolitical 
dimension of this is key, as it addresses the ability 
of subjects to have a voice, one that connects to the 
expression of opinions in public and that is tied to 
subjective expression. Together these conditions 
operate as guiding concepts for contemporary 
politics and for the ability to think and act in the world 
with any degree of thoughtfulness or effectiveness. 
Dolar explains how in Aristotle’s Politics, the 
political is defined in terms of the distinction 
between mere voice (phoné) and speech (logos), the 
former common to all animals including the human 
animal, but the latter distinguishing humans from 
other animals in their ability to articulate judgments 
in asso- ciation with others. This distinction (as 
Dolar further explains) is what Agamben is also 
referring to with his opposition between “bare life” 
(zoe), life in common with animals, and life in the 
community (bios), the commons and political life.43 
Each of these elements, however, is reciprocally 
embedded in the other and not simply external to 
it. Referring to Schmitt’s view of sovereignty and 
the rule of exception, Agamben explains this as “the 
condition of being excluded through an inclusion, 
of being in relation to something from which one is 
excluded.”44
For Dolar, this is an invitation to extend the analogy 
and think of the inclusion and exclusion of the voice 
in speech. Like bare life, the voice is both included 
and excluded in the political realm. This is a voice 
that is connected to politics and the essence of 
life itself, both within and beyond politics. It also 
connects usefully to the biopolitical dimension of 
technology in the development of speaking and 
thinking machines, or of telecommunications 
platforms where the voice is paradoxi- cally included 
and excluded at the same time. Dolar neatly takes 
this to represent the Hegelian move from “in-itself,” 
in the case of the speaking machine, to “for-itself” in 
the thinking machine.45 The voice stands as a figure 
for something that does not entirely compute and 
resists its capture, while retaining the possibility of 
free thinking.
What seem to be required are dynamic 
recombinations of speaking, thinking, and coding. 
To enable this, forms of totality have to be rejected, 
whether related to a view of the historical subject 
or to a view of program code that is deterministic 
or totalitarian, thus rupturing the relations 
between being programmed and programming. If 
the autonomy of intellectual labor from economic 
rule can alone save us from semiocapi- tal, as 
Berardi states, then it needs recombining with the 
voice and code in recognition that both are always 
ready for action and at the same time ready to run 
out of control (like a live-coding performance). 
For it is this sense of incompleteness that drives 
transformational agency, and the ways in which 
human subjects retain the ability to modify their 
lived circumstances knowing their experiences to 
be incomplete. 
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The recognition of the choice of action, already 
programmed but perhaps not knowingly so, 
confirms that both subjectivity and code recursively 
write their own instrumentation. Yet the subject is 
not simply preprogrammed like a machine but more 
like code in actively combining internal and external 
factors, standing between what is possible and 
what actually exists. Extending the move from in-
itself to for-itself further, collective and networked 
intelligence open up the conditions of possibility for 
reinvention by embracing broader contingencies, to 
challenge overpowering forces that wish to close 
them down, encapsulate and subsume them. If 
lived experience is ever more prescribed through 
scores, scripts, and programs, then the challenge 
for those making program scripts that underscore 
these procedures is to open up aesthetic and 
political possibilities of recombination and free the 
imagination to further use. Thus the performativity 
of code, in live coding or code acts, demonstrates 
the potential for collective intelligence and effective 
action. It proposes coding practices that have not 
only a body but also a body politic.
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Live coding culture proposes an alternative 
relationship with computation. According to Rob 
Myers (2010), live coding offers the chance “... to 
experience through an unusual aesthetic event what 
hackers are missing in society and what society 
is missing in hacking.” What could be missing? 
Commentators sometimes describe live coding 
as a glorification of technology, or a celebration of 
virtuoso skill, but to me it is much less than that: 
an unravelling of technology, and a show of honesty. 
By using code as primary interface, live coders 
sidestep a whole industry of quality controlled 
design standards. Rather than buttons, sliders 
and boxes, they simply use words. By unravelling 
technology perhaps we can find a more human 
approach to computer language.
So, on one side, society could be missing a hackerly 
view of everyday computers as machines for bringing 
language to life. But what are hackers missing 
from society? Through honest demonstration of 
their craft, perhaps what they have to gain is a 
demystification of what they do, and a reconnection 
with society. Due to the generativity of language, 
the quantity and complexity of code needed to 
generate music or video is low. By experiencing the 
production of code as human activity, we can escape 
the usual anxieties surrounding mathematical or 
linguistic abstractions. Furthermore, by making the 
production of code visible, society can then begin to 
find cultural meaning for it. As Ingold (2011) puts 
it, “The essence of skill, then, comes to lie in the 
improvisational ability with which practitioners are 
able to disassemble the constructions of technology, 
and creatively to reincorporate the pieces into their 
own walks of life.” By breaking down the barrier 
between hackers and the rest of society, we are able 
to enrich our lives with new skills and meaning. 
Perhaps on this basis, hackerly ideals of software 
freedom can begin to be communicated more 
widely.
We now arrive at the textile metaphor at the heart 
of this essay: the weaving of code into life. Live 
L I V E  C O D I N G  I S  W H E R E  S O M E O N E  C H A N G E S  A  C O M P U T E R 
P R O G R A M  T O  R E S P O N D  T O  T H E  P R E S E N T  M O M E N T ,  F O R 
E X A M P L E  T O  M A K E  L I V E  M U S I C  O R  V I D E O  F O R  A N  A U D I E N C E , 
O R  J U S T  F O R  T H E M S E L V E S .  L I V E  C O D E R S  W O R K  O N  T H E 
S Y M B O L I C  L E V E L ,  M A N I P U L A T I N G  T H E  ( U S U A L L Y )  T E X T U A L 
S O U R C E  C O D E  T H A T  U N D E R L I E S  A L L  S O F T W A R E ,  W H I L E  A 
L I V E  C O M P U T E R  P R O C E S S  I S  R U N N I N G .  I N  O T H E R  W O R D S , 
R A T H E R  T H A N  U S I N G  A  D E S I G N E D  E N D - U S E R  I N T E R F A C E 
T O  C R E A T E  S O M E T H I N G ,  L I V E  C O D E R S  D I R E C T L Y  U S E  A 
L A N G U A G E  T O  D E S C R I B E  S O M E T H I N G ,  W H I L E  A  C O M P U T E R 
W O R K S  T O  G E N E R A T E  I T  I N T O  E X I S T E N C E .  F O R M A L  L A N G U A G E 
I S  B R O U G H T  T O  L I F E ,  F O R M I N G  P A R T  O F  A N  E X P L O R A T I O N 
W I T H  N O  E N D  P R O D U C T ,  B E Y O N D  L I V E  E X P E R I E N C E .
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coder Dave Griffiths has long explored connections 
between code and weaves including in workshops, 
and I have compared patterns of live code with 
knitting (McLean 2013). Emma Cocker (2014), 
through in-depth observations of live coders and 
live artists talking and working together, noted 
that “Like Penelope’s weave, [live] code has the 
capacity to be unravelled and rewritten as events 
unfold, [revealing] the rules or codes even as they 
are being amended ...”. Cocker identifies live coding 
as a kairotic practice, a reference to passing a weft 
thread through the momentary shed of a loom; 
existing in time, and formulating and responding 
to a new situation as it unfolds. Her reference to 
Penelope is to the mythological weaver, weaving by 
day and unravelling by night.
In his paper The Textility of Making, Ingold (2010) 
draws from the very material of textiles to argue 
that “the forms of things arise within fields of 
force and flows of material. It is by intervening in 
these force-fields and following the lines of flow 
that practitioners make things.’’ The ways in which 
we may use computers without a plan, or using a 
plan only as resource rather than prescription for 
action, are well explored by ethnographers, and 
modern programmers recognise agile approaches 
to problem specification. Some live coders, 
including those drawing from the “free improv” 
music tradition, take this to an extreme, improvising 
music from nothing. Ideas flow and respond to and 
from the situation as it unfolds. Rather than writing 
code to communicate a musical idea, the code is an 
intermediary material, which the coder responds 
to as well as the sound or video that the described 
process produces.
Code is a pattern that creates pattern. This is 
true of knitting patterns, and also weaving block 
designs. Patterns in the domain of threads, needles, 
and sheds generate patterns in fabric, and the 
relationship between the two domains of notation 
and textile result can be far from clear. Indeed, Ellen 
Harlizius-Klück (2008) has traced the origins of 
discrete mathematics (and therefore computation 
as we know it) to ancient looms, for example 
Pythagoras developing dyadic mathematics using 
principles based on odd and even threads.
Harlizius-Klück now wishes to find ways to expose 
the thought processes of ancient weavers in much 
the same way as live coders seek to expose and 
share their processes; shifting focus from the 
machinery of looms to the computation involved 
in operating looms. At this point, the connection 
between computation and textile ceases to be 
metaphorical, and becomes actual. We find 
ourselves understanding ourselves not by talking 
about material, but dealing with the textility of 
material itself.
T H I S  E S S A Y  P R E C E D E S 
T H E  P R O J E C T  “ W E A V I N G 
C O D E S ,  C O D I N G  W E A V E S ” 
( W W W . K A I R O T I C . O R G )
F U N D E D  B Y  T H E  A R T S 
A N D  H U M A N I T I E S 
R E S E A R C H  C O U N C I L .
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T H I S  W R I T I N G  E X P L O R E S  T H E 
I N T E R S E C T I O N S  O F  C H O R E O G R A P H Y 
A N D  C O M P U T E R  P R O G R A M M I N G . 
I T  A C K N O W L E D G E S  C O D I N G  A S  A 
C H O R E O G R A P H I C  P R A C T I C E ,  A S  W E L L 
A S  A P P L I E S  C O M P U T E R  P R O G R A M M I N G 
L A N G U A G E S  A N D  A P P R O A C H E S  T O 
L I V E  D A N C E  P E R F O R M A N C E .  B Y 
E X P L O R I N G  E M E R G I N G  D E F I N I T I O N S 
O F  C H O R E O G R A P H Y ,  A P P L Y I N G 
C O M P U T A T I O N A L  A S P E C T S  T O 
C H O R E O G R A P H Y  A N D  D I S C U S S I N G 
T H E  N O T I O N  O F  P R O G R A M M E R  A S 
C H O R E O G R A P H E R ,  A  B R I E F  O V E R V I E W 
O F  C O D E  A N D  C H O R E O G R A P H Y  W I T H I N 
T H I S  A U T H O R ’ S  W O R K  I S  P R E S E N T E D . 
T H I S  I S  I L L U S T R A T E D  I N  T H E  W O R K 
S O U N D  C H O R E O G R A P H E R  < >  B O D Y  C O D E , 
C O - C R E A T E D  W I T H  A L E X  M C L E A N .
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E X P A N D I N G  D E F I N I T I O N S  O F  C H O R E O G R A P H Y 
Definitions of choreography have expanded 
throughout the 20th and 21st century. Choreologist 
Rudolph Laban (1960) established many ways to 
discuss choreography, ranging from choreutics 
(spatial principles) to kinetography (notation). 
However, the human body was always central to 
his approach to choreography. Expanding on his 
works were Preston-Dunlop and Sanchez-Colberg 
(2002) who established choreography as the 
“nexus of the strands of the dance medium”. The 
key to their work is that choreography becomes 
an interrelation of movement, space, sound and 
performer. This interrelation within the nexus points 
to choreography as an organisation or composition, 
rather than just a physical activity of the body. 
In fact with the four meta-terms (there are also sub-
categories to the strands in the nexus) choreography 
may start to consider work outside of the body. 
This shift away from Laban’s practices has allowed 
for more recent discourse within choreography. 
William Forsythe (2009), Siobhan Davies (2011) and 
Marten Spangberg (2011) have all discussed dance 
and choreography as separate practices. While 
dance is something done specifically by the body, 
other modes of choreography may be considered.   
A concept that explores choreography beyond 
the body is Forsythe’s Choreographic object. A 
choreographic object is not a substitute for the body, 
but rather an alternative site for the understanding 
of potential instigation and organization of action 
to reside. Ideally, choreographic ideas in this 
form would draw an attentive, diverse readership 
that would  eventually understand and, hopefully, 
champion the innumerable manifestations, old and 
new, of choreographic thinking (Forsythe 2009). 
Within his definition of a choreographic object, 
Forsythe makes specific reference to instigation, 
action and organisation. These characteristics may 
be applied to other disciplines, such as computer 
programming, to begin to expand choreography into 
ways to define practices that incorporate concepts 
such as movement, relationships and composition.  
Once dance is separated from choreography, 
choreography can do many things. One example 
may be that it can become non-euclidean as 
in choreotopology (Sicchio 2011). But also the 
organisational and relative compositional elements 
may be applied to other disciplines. In Forsythe’s 
projects this has ranged from computer animation 
to furniture design and in Davies’ work ceramics 
and crafts. Spangberg created a blog and a book as 
a choreography. The area this paper would like to 
focus on is computer programming – not only how 
one may choreograph code, but also how coding 
may be applied to choreography.  
P R O G R A M M E R  A S  C H O R E O G R A P H E R
Once separated from dance, choreography takes 
place in many disciplines as a process for decisions, 
particularly around interrelationships created in 
a work. With this author’s work this notation of 
choreography being applied to the discipline of 
software and computer programming became 
apparent when creating choreography with real-
time video systems.
The real-time video system was designed with the 
use of background subtraction to allow software 
to detect movement and then create visuals that 
were projected into a live dance performance. 
Within the devising of this work, it became apparent 
that not only was the choreography of the physical 
space being created, but also choreography was 
happening in the programming. The motion was 
being captured and then reorganised. Relationships 
between moving pixels were created and composed. 
Changes in movement could be instigated through 
the code. The programming of this system was not 
only a technical element of a dance piece, but a 
choreographed part of the work.  
In addition to considering programming a 
choreographic practice, choreography can be made 
via coding and programming approaches. “The 
notion of instructions or rule setting as a way to 
generate dance material, is similar to rules and 
instructions, called algorithms” (deLahunta 2010, 
20). The use of algorithms within choreography is 
found in work by various choreographers. Downie 
(2005) refers to the “computational sensibilities” 
of Merce Cunningham, Trisha Brown, Bill T. Jones 
and Forthsye and discusses how he finds their 
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work similar to that of computing through systems, 
methods and notation of the creation of the 
choreography and within performance.  
The performance of code in choreography is less 
developed than just those using computation ideas 
within their choreographic strategies. “The extent 
to which live systems rewriting has been a central 
feature of choreographic work in contemporary 
dance is arguable, but there are certainly some 
analogous structures and devices” (Collins 2011, 
2). There are however, some examples such as 
the piece Duplex (2002) which cued dancers via 
monitors in real-time or ALIE/N A(C)TION (1992) 
which similarly used video clips to give dancers 
directions live in performance. Within this author’s 
work, other ways in which live structures and 
changes can be made in performance, as well 
as reflect choreography in more computational 
formats. Sound Choreographer < >  Body Code is a 
piece which explores a computer generated code-
score that is developed, interpreted and performed 
live and feeds back into a live coded sound score.   
S O U N D  C H O R E O G R A P H E R  < >  B O D Y  C O D E
In Sound Choreographer < >  Body Code, 
diagrammatic scores that are generated by code 
have become the source for performance and 
determined the choreography. This is demonstrated 
in the piece Sound Choreographer < >  Body Code. 
Within this work there are two performers with 
changing code-scores with one choreographic score 
and the other a live coded sound score. To achieve 
confluence from these two practices, a connection 
of aesthetic and technical aspects on both sides, 
and a balance between them was needed. The 
solution we arrived at maintains a clear distinction 
choreography/dance on one side, and code/music, 
but connects them via their notations. As a result the 
music is not coded for the dancer, and the dancer 
does not move to the music; but still a feedback loop 
is created that passes through the body and code, 
via machine listening and computer vision.   
The dancer has a set series of gestures that are 
organised and performed based upon how the 
instructions and numbers are connected and 
continually reconfigured within a visual score that 
is projected into the performance space. However, 
as the performance progresses, the diagram 
becomes much more complex and the spanning 
tree is recalculated. The number of instructions 
increases over time on a set incremental pattern 
that peaks at a point of complete overwhelm for the 
dancer and returns back to the simpler form to end 
the performance. The reconfigurations in the dance 
score are not only generated by time, but also the 
computer analysing the sound that is produced 
within the sound score. The language also plays 
an important part of this system in the instruction 
of how the movement changes and develops. The 
words within the score are able to be applied to 
movement and somehow change the movement. 
For example, in Sound Choreographer < >  Body 
Code the instructions include “right”, “left”, “up”, 
“down”, “loop”, “if” and numbers “1”, “2”, and “3”. 
The dancer must determine how the order and 
connection of these words and numbers is then 
organised within the performance. This process 
happens live and in real-time. The score evolves and 
changes and so does the dance that is being devised 
in front of the audience.   
Fig.1. The Sound Choreographer, showing instructions 
right, left, up, down and numbers, connected in a minimum 
spanning tree. The line extending from the central point 
sweeps through a single cycle during the performance, and 
the two blue shapes show “intensity” and “change” graphed 
over time. Intensity gives the number of instructions, and 
change the size of each movement that is made in response to 
sound onsets.  
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While the gestures are predetermined by the 
choreographer, the actual arrangement and 
choreography of these gestures is determined 
by technology. The dance score becomes a form 
of programming and the dancer the computer, 
twisting interpretations of control and procedure.   
The dancer’s movement is tracked by a Microsoft 
Kinect and the software Isadora to detect the 
location and shape of the body in space. This 
information is then sent via OSC to a custom 
live coding programming environment, Texture, 
where a specially created object is moved within 
the code. This motion tracking not only helps to 
facilitate the feedback loop, but also provides one 
of the two points of contact between the movement 
and the sound. So the movement of the dancer 
changes the code and the sound produced by the 
live coding changes the dance score. The movement 
of the dancer translates into movement within 
code, because Texture is used. The second point 
of contact between the choreography and code is 
via machine listening. The Sound Choreography 
software performs audio onset detection on the 
sound produced from Texture, and the words within 
the choreography move in response. This can result 
in connections switching between words, when the 
movement results in a different minimum spanning 
tree. In this sense, the choreographic structure is 
dancing more directly to the rhythm of the sound 
than the human dancer. Within this piece, the 
technology has become instrumental in bringing the 
elements together.  During previous performances, 
both performers were focused on their individual 
scores rather than the overall composition of the 
piece, and achieving a feedback loop to connect the 
two scores became more difficult. The technology 
becomes the choreographer in this sense as it 
is organising the interactions, rather than the 
performers sensing each other in that moment.  
The dance score that is generated through the 
code becomes more and more complex over time. 
The computer is able to write a score live, faster 
and more complicated than a human dancer can 
perform. By the end section of this piece, the dancer 
will always fail following the score as it is written. 
They must make a decision on how to follow and 
interpret some of it, but could never complete the 
entire score. This not only suggests that the human 
is different in its processing and performance 
abilities from a computer, but the human has the 
agency to make decisions about the score, and can 
continue performing despite failing to complete the 
score as created within the performance.   
T O R Q U E  O F  C H O R E O G R A P H I C  C O D E  
While the choreographic output of Sound 
Choreographer < >  Body Code is still movement 
and dance based, the process of organising and 
structuring the movement is computational. The 
computer generates the score and the programmer 
is essential the choreographer, putting the elements 
into the system - a system which is also augmented 
by the machine listening, and reflecting changes to 
the sound of the performance. This draws on the 
earlier discussions of choreography and code as 
practices that are about organisation, rather than 
a specific bodily practice. The body is one potential 
site for choreography. Code is another site. And 
programming becomes a choreographic practice. 
What this allows is the computer code to become a 
force in the generation of choreography.  
However, in Sound Choreographer < >  Body Code 
the twists come not only through the computer 
generating material, but the technological 
connections to the sound score and also the final 
interpretation by the performer. The final twist in 
the torque is how the human performer responds 
to the choreographic code. The human body has a 
very different process for interpreting code and then 
actuating movement than a computer. The human 
makes decisions about the code, how to execute it 
and if they want to change how this is done all within 
the timespan of the performance. For example, 
when performing a section of the score that links 
“loop”, “4”, and “right”, the dancer might perform 
a gesture with the right arm four times while facing 
away from the audience. However, if they turn 
and face the audience, the right could be read by 
the audience as left and the dancer may chose to 
change the arm they are moving based on this. They 
are still following the code but changing how the 
code has influenced the choreography.  
1 4 9
What is also important is the nature of time in this 
process. The code is changing and in real-time 
based upon the sound, meaning that the dancer’s 
decisions are improvised instantaneous reactions. 
The process of reading, interpreting and performing 
is interrelated in each moment of the work and 
becomes as much as a mental awareness exercise 
as it does physical. The audience is also aware of 
this thought process because the code is projected 
within the piece. The audience see the score 
change and sees the dancer respond, allowing for 
a different level of engagement with the piece. The 
torque of the possible outcomes of combinations 
of choreography as generated by the computer are 
then further twisted in the mind of the performer in 
the same moment it is developed and performed.  
S U M M A R Y 
Code is being developed as a site for choreography 
through various reconsiderations of the definition of 
choreography. Through this the use of programming 
languages and computation may be used as a 
choreographic tool to create generative code-
scores in real-time. Sound Choreographer < >  Body 
Code uses computation to create a digrammatic 
dance score in which the language and connection 
of words must be translated into movement 
by a performer as the score is developing and 
changing in real-time. The every changing roles 
of the technology, performers and movement are 
connected in a twisting force that creates the final 
piece whilst it is being performed.   
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Sim Gishel was born in 2006 in Berlin and started 
life as a drawing machine (http://9-5.jeron.
org/2006/12/23/one-hour-work-for-jochen-liedke/) 
and later performed as a soloist in Hermes Opera 
(http://hermes.jeron.org/) until he decided to take 
part in casting shows.
In 2013 Sim went to the Voice Of Germany audition. 
But they did not let him sing. “This is a show by 
humans for humans. No robots.” He kept on trying. 
His biggest success so far has been the performance 
at Das Supertalent (similar to Britain’s got Talent). 
Unfortunately the jury did not choose him for the 
live shows. 
He learnt from his casting show experience that he 
needed to come up with a unique singing style. He 
did not have to search for long. He discovered Mash-
Ups. It is the kind of music where DJs play two 
songs at the same time. Singing two or more songs 
at the same time is quite an easy task for a robot 
like Sim Gishel. His first Mash-Up was Rodriguez’ 
Sugar Man and Adele’s Rolling in the Deep. It’s 
called Rolling Sugar. 
Recently, he discovered In C by Terry Riley. In C is 
perfect for Sim. It is regarded as the first minimal 
musical piece from the early sixties. All performers 
play from the same page of 53 melodic patterns, 
S I M  G I S H E L  I S  A 
M U L T I M E D I A  R O B O T .
H E  S I N G S  A N D  D A N C E S  F O R 
M O N E Y  A N D  T R I E S  H A R D  T O 
T A K E  P A R T  I N  C A S T I N G  S H O W S 
T O  B E C O M E  A  P O P - S T A R . 
H I S  S I N G I N G  I S  B A S E D  O N  T H E  F E S T I V A L  M U L T I - L I N G U A L  S P E E C H 
S Y N T H E S I S  S Y S T E M  D E V E L O P E D  A T  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  E D I N B U R G H . 
I T  O F F E R S  A  F U L L  T E X T  T O  S P E E C H  S Y S T E M  W I T H  V A R I O U S 
M O D U L E S ,  A S  W E L L  A N  E N V I R O N M E N T  F O R  D E V E L O P M E N T  O F 
S P E E C H  S Y N T H E S I S  T E C H N I Q U E S  A N D  T H E  F L I N G E R  M O D U L E 
W H I C H  P R O V I D E S  A  S I N G I N G  M O D E .  C O D I N G  F O R  T H E  P H O N E M E S 
W A S  W O R K E D  O N  F O R  S E V E R A L  M O N T H S  T O  C R E A T E  A N 
E F F E C T I V E  T I M B R E  A N D  V I B R A T O  F O R  T H E  S I N G I N G  V O I C E .
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played in sequence, and any number or kind of 
instrument can be played. A group of about 35 is 
desired if possible, but smaller or larger groups will 
work. If vocalists join in they can use any vowel and 
consonant sounds they like. 
Patterns are to be played consecutively with each 
performer having the freedom to determine how 
many times he or she will repeat each pattern 
before moving on to the next. There is no fixed rule 
as to the number of repetitions a pattern may have. 
Instead of singing only vowels and consonants Sim 
used an artificial language, a so called conlang. 
A conlang is a planned or constructed language. 
It is a language whose phonology, grammar, and 
vocabulary has been consciously devised for human 
or human-like communication, instead of having 
developed naturally. 
The next step in his progression is the challenge to 
overcome his deterministic brain. It is a matter of 
fact that all computers are deterministic machines 
even when they create random numbers. That’s why 
they are called pseudo-random numbers. Sim needs 
to be unpredictable to a certain extent, especially 
when he is in communication with humans. As a 
start he was a taught a language which is based on 
true random numbers. This conlang is created with 
the help of a custom electronic device that makes 
use of the Avalanche breakdown of diodes. 
This effect is caused by impact ionization of 
electron-hole pairs. Since this is non-deterministic 
it can be used to create real random numbers. And 
to create text from numbers is an easy task.
Below is an excerpt of Sim’s conlang for interspecies 
communication based on true random numbers.
The whole piece is about 45 minutes long. 
. . .
D x u k  f x q z h  g a p p i x n h  S k o k s a  g o r q p b w n 
v u n c v c r  a f l  c e a m s l  s c b :  S g t l u l h  j k b b o b h a p 
e p v w  a p  c o ;  D o  a w k z g u b i  c p k s y  i u l i u a  x p g s s 
I h  h l g i t  l j a d h p l !  U b g u q m m j t t  b w g i h n q b  c k f 
s u r  v l r w s m m e  w y s n t t k a c .  T s v d y b v s s  e h k w t x 
s t  k g s e r s g i g  c z  f x w b q p r e ;  O t l r l e r w  a c d h l 
h n j d t  a u x p  b j l q a  S g j n s t o v  h h d v q g o y  j v w w 
g i n g n p y e w  r o c f  z b r g f  x l b v s .  P o v p  d r  h n . 
C f m m h d  q p y r k  d b g k p b a  e e j g m w q  z d r l p 
p h k f x i x i z !  F a h m r m  s c  i o x m f i b e y  o d g x  p x  z c  K r 
s o t q x i o  n w l s  u g y b e z q b  p e  p p p g l g  a a q y i e h w b . 
V v u o a u e  u h l j w a q i  p i h g  K m l h b h u  i w  n y s h f d r c 
i k l  s s e z i o n u a  v h p s j y p f  o x t u a . 
E g p q z i v y r  l j h h r  a a v p f g d c a  d k u i d a y u z 
X z k j j r r a o r b  g q l j  j m b d u f d  a d z q b x p .  Z y a  b a x i r j 
h s e j w z o  s o d r e e o u q  u s t v k j w l  f c q x .  C f b i f u w i l 
a w d w q w  l g z i r g  X e g n y l  q j d  v f m w b q s s m 
e s h m  o a e l m  A d p n  q u u v g q x w i  j q u b x h   l h q x u 
p u g s j t n i k  c g o s . 
B u r n w p u i a  y x x n r d g b x  k h a n n o g .  H t y z p n 
o x w m u u a m x  o u z  c a m p p s h o z  i x r y l l w  i s  N p k t d f t 
t o y i  f x g x  P q a  j t d m g q  r j  C g w w  d j b  h h o w m . 
M g g x s n o t f  d a g j w d n b g  d q e k f b w j y  e e q c 
e q q j o p n o w  k z k m g i p x m  c n w m m g q q w ;  A e k x u 
q u w q f   x n y u  y x n u j z b a q  t d y d i j b c h  t b k j g t  t r b t 
H i g l i  c b i g  r h l y  e a e o g x v a  x t d v a o  h z n  i q f .  
P d a i x  c u p z  p o m i s i  g n q g !  O b g m q p q q  w g q q v q 
k e t  x c d d p t j p  y g q f s g  j x s x t z o k  f q f k k z h m . 
B v r l u x c z q i  f n x z m m j h r  m b  m j x o u  l p q x j n z i d 
d d o q !  C x j f y w g  p g x k  i z v  j j f . 
N q b l s p o f n y  v r v d h  b r  k q d q  m w .  K q m z i b o  n z a i r v 
y x n p e  g h o g u k z t u  k g n s i b  P x x x  v q x l u  s c j z x u y q 
m b u z t c  a z  h x n e q x ! 
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U b q f e z  t d  i p t d o m g  G u d t  q a z l n b c s  c w g 
a y e p r h e e  u r u a m x  m r k n r w a s  s x a p d w p b b  I w w e o 
b o z  f j b w g b  f t m f i p  x r  d k m  J v a w x o v l  m r m 
g r h s w q  z o z c  k p e r y v n  s k n o w i u i z  G e z u u h t i h w z 
d j j z w  r h v f  e z m  f j k  n j x  R z n p r y t a  x q j e m p i 
p v u v e e y  o w a f n q e !  V z w i s t z c x l s  h b  d f a c y o y y 
m p y n v u n v .  O v q h g  i q p e t u  v t t  r n g g m t c g  X m h 
o f  c n b r r  m w p f q j x d  e q k h x r  u v s  t v .  H m i l d d x a t 
d a u t f k d  i v s c q . 
J w i o  w b y a y z t c  x d k q i v  v d o n g f y l  f h x t x s 
y r r x q k z  D y m l s h o h  m u g b a n z u  s k j j b  a m h g 
k x t w j l e x  a t f u z h u  h o y z z i .  P n w q i  b d x n i v 
i o m d  u y b b n a !  I n y u b  k c z l g  z o s f x h s a u  z w n m w 
y f y m e t  z e y b e k  c j w u  B v w u u  g p w f  v s z o g y t f  y p 
a z f v  z w x v t r  A c w b x s t w h a  f v  v e a v j v k j s  e l z u 
z q a w s x o l u  m p w s l w o p  j z r u i j b n ?  H a y t x q r l b 
o b e g  b v c x e c  y k z a y u  g o . 
H u y l w k t k l y r  m b x q e n p p m  n h r t w t  d t r c f n n y y 
x p y w b a u s e  i t u y  c p a y  C p e  s g b  d r p a s q u  u c t n w . 
Y v x q  t i e c l w j n o  e d n x t i  o k d c  v w g c  d t k d n t h 
E s s m x w z v p i e  h g a c d g f  k z g n n z v c  B r n v n n q d v u h 
o p  r w k  g k s u x  q a w p c u h  U f y  g o  u d  l z s y  d q b  i r 
f g . 
N p i x u h w v n  h o f t n y r u b  v b q m  v t  u g y . 
W w s  d x r s d  g c c a d  w f a i i  b n q i m a x i  t b f  f d v :  G j i 
t a s u j  q k  T i  n k l s o  w j p d p t m  y z s y r m i s c  h j l j r c t 
n f y !  U l x b f j  j r  b e  u g d b q  k i r e n e  l g g f  s d s x m s a ? 
C o m r v p t l e d  i g b r s i y x 
q a s o n l o j v  h k e y f u r  z v k v e r x  k f u h f l i x :  I g e f n o j 
d e l c a w y e  v a y b v g  g p d  l m t .  Z g i s  w m p x j  b y j c w k : 
Q s u  h d w  c b e l t f x q s  n c a p a . 
X p a k t t e d x  t k j v  u p u s f n  s p f  p p z n  O h h x k f i r z 
u i  j c n p q s i f  q v m p j v e x o  f m w k v  j o o d w j  W p p 
m a r z q a v u  k g d w c n s r x  f b d p  c l r s a c  D n t  n e t u 
q w v i  s p t u s i  U m  a j  f x z  g n p a h  q e s z s l o l f  u o b p 
o k r p u w ;  W x j w  t o u m o m x  y c  s q m h e  r v  l s l d o s a 
p y o i m i v a v .  T n l k z s p a k  w e c z s v a  k y f t k n o  i g o c b 
n l !  B r  n q w n j r n  b m  v w t  i c p w  Y c a y e c p q w 
s r r k  s l r :  O q w u g s z x  a r q e u g v  k c k b u u g  g x k n l 
d h  k a w h r o h j f  M v w k  e a d q g b b t m  w u a  u x o m 
V i a d q w a a  f c b w i c x c p  y j ! 
E u q k q m c z m g q  r l e  o f t x h q z x  y g t d k r y !  P e p a l f j 
v v t j b m h i  g g  e m n i x f g z  w m m l  x q x o n s . 
C s j u u q  u n d c l i  k q f x .   K g h o u a z a d k s  n d f  x t  z e n 
p d o m  X l f u  u f j  x w k  z q n x j ;  O g e k  r z o x k u s  a m v j r t 
b e f  s d b l a q s  u d b l ;  A k u k a u x w  q k q v q i  u k z u a r ! 
V h  i h  c s n x p  c e b n u  e d l y n k s o c  j x v r n x z v . 
N z d j c h k p c h t  s s d k g f e  d a h q y g m  i a h i .  K b a n j u 
m l  x r l  i o  p f  w s  S n v h y g j y  t l u f w a c  l e x a g m 
g j y p  q g c m o a  x z l q s x k :  L i  f x l  e s c d i q t  s g d t y a 
k q m h b k b  l k j q q  c i m u . 
D j  p v n o w h y m  f o d h b o r  f h s i q  d b u  d e y ?  U i q s g d 
r p t s e  d j s w s  b v k w  n b !  V w d k p k n a w  p y t a b d 
y v d a q o x s  y t  N w y z g  d r  t p j u r n  p j r q a f  s h l m v f : 
C e i j e m b u f q e  s n y b  o b j  u r  g m s g s u  x d n  p p ? 
G u  h m u l a w v  r m  x z i d r c  o g v q ?  N q o k f i s r  s z y 
q l k o l s r c ?  R v  f v p w k a c s s  v v m u u g l g 
z r k q u g q . 
L g r o w o y w q  k l k w g f  r l u  c f h x l x i  j b b a q x p o 
f f h q r s m y ?  P l g l q  b l r w  s x v j u l y o  d w h v o t t 
k j u v p  D n o g j j z  i b r  q i k m  g a j z m t  O n z b d m q k w a j 
s f w  v e k i u q j d q ?  Z k y  a u x q e  q o x w g d t g
y q g s h q v y l  y p d w g n w  k n  D c a b f t h d s  k f a g e 
z c b c y  p v j a  p f m j  m k m g  q y q a j v b .  O c q s b y i w  f x o s
v f r h  j x k z y ;  A v o a x e  d b v l k b i y t  t y g b k q 
u q x o l x z h m  f q  d t v z e g a n  C s j a c z z w q x l 
l j h m o y g s  c r w i s k n  M w m  l c m i o o d z  l m m j s e a v w 
d o i r a v d e r  O n  c p o c n  o a j h f k c c h  Q r l a w d q h r s 
d y i s a w s b  w b w c l y  t e v  b n u b  x s s p k  h o m q h m 
B b y l m  g a l p b y  d i i v b  g p g v b w c o j  q s  o e  l t w l f l 
W m f n n d t c  e g r t p t  h w y l  j f i v k ;  O a b w n p a h 
w w q n p  h z n  y y q  e z d p  m e m m f j z u .
N c k k q a p x z  x c  f g s i v m u :  H i g a  n l q x v g  l e x o g v q z a 
r j t e d s d l y  r y d f m  v j k b h w  L a c l b z  t h o m l 
k w r j z w v o r  T v z r h m  y t j b d  j r  u r z r i i  e d f v j f p 
b p n i b f s a :  C f l  g l u x t c o y  u u p z  l a y z  a f b a  e c h .
B v n  h c g f j b z  a j k a h k j h p  i u p l c  a e e v r d n z g 
f p w e o w o z  v j g d z s m u h :  H a l t s p h r v c w  b z v p y s l i z 
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i r b c y z  f x z r r r h z i  c f  G w v m p g u  c g w f e v d k 
d c l u j l c m  h a p o o m  a b q v q  W d b e h  k o j e y u h l i 
l x d a j n  l e  b q u x y x y d  B z l t x f b  q u l u u v  v h m s 
c m g b .
E q g e q r y n  w l  q x l l t t h  g z  i m p k  v p n m v s c n q 
k q m v h d ;  O n w m t w  j l  g h c t t  l w l c m w t y s  b l 
q y i m l b j h  s t q :  T u r e q d g c z  r b  d x .  F m g o  g m b e n 
x h l b y o i a  i b f k d i  w k m b  t q p d w b e b  Y l a u a i v o q x  a d 
x n u z  o p z s  a w n p w  m h m h h ;  V z q m a t  g p x q d n p v z 
s n g p z s  m a e g c z s c  e d j y b q  z g r n v n  G s v z k r l k v s n 
q m p u v  v m c v s u  o h v a  v s j u d b  o x z c  k s f z m b n i 
E j n u  v g d o  y r r f g o  i i p  o o  p c x d r c  P t x  b n p a f g f m v 
u e y w s  l h p j k h  u j b y c  x c a l r a r y f  u p y :  V b g y r q j y 
i d c  c a n d l  C j g  e x n z n p g m h  v g y z o c b z e  n h 
t l q x v w  u b t i a g y h  f d p m c o a  A r n r f  v e  s a t t t b t a a 
t g  S x s m
w f g n k n q  r o y r  s l j m  j n e q s  Z b m y u i  v p  l w g a u y 
J z v a m z q e  d y a q x v y b x  r m g n s g h r  u b e u w f  w w k .
O w e f s  p x y b  l u  L o n b i j h o g d  y n y v r e n  m d r k e v w y 
p k b  x d m  k b n n  e m  H h v a  s e d n a c r q n  u l v g s f i 
t i k f  o n b v j b q i  u m g v o x m !  G m n g s v m  x r z  e a h o b 
w v s j b o x z a  p g  U u q g f u e x t  u x  w v n r n w t  u s  u h 
i j d b .
I o m h h  c z a z  n q i k k k e c  K h u z j y s s i g  o g y r g z 
b m h k w r u !  H d  x c s w  k e c p t r w s  R e e g o b x j c r q 
u m t w f p s q  u f n l b f u d ?  I a  x g  p x i  r v e n b  r n a w a m y 
g c d  k e !  G m k n j t y b p d p  v h l v e m i c s  e v p o z p 
f n i q b s j a  y d i p b d w  z a y h c .  H l v l a r  z h p r r p  q t t f u 
c h v c f d f w  n i k i u k z l z  t o q k e b b y u  Q a m l g  c p f l z n f 
n r j m k  d v d e w b y d u  m v b y b r  e h v p h i ?  W b j y a m t 
q e o t z d f  f e w x u a e p  Y d u y f e  q q i  g n v a  z f i f j e 
e f  t v t r  w m f c  H s q o  k y r  e z p o e  s j a l f t d  q p r s g 
a n l q b j u  i l v m l .
P t z  f x j  n z i g f b g .  W w q f e c a q n  d p m d t r i  b z d a h k 
i q x  n r r e x v g y  K y z  s i  i j j m j  x p z n m u b  l g b  n z t h .
F o h c x  g a x q q  f q i s k k x w  y d d y x k  v q s k 
u h o f o o c e f ?  V c g p  f y  j x e u  a k y  i s r w x  l a k 
x u m c w s s ?  Y d h r h b x h m  u o j r l q c  a s j v f  s y e o u  i x 
a e m x m  s e s h o j s e l .
E a k z s i e  h p  s p d e m q c f u  m i f f m r k r ?  R x k o  q j g p c w t 
i j j  E m  z a r q  p i c n s q q k  a q w c  I a r k e w l q f t  l g c  p f 
i v e s c e  z h v p  q p h b t d  J a p r  s w x h e s l  v q f u y b j o s 
v t s z g c i m c :  J w g n e k g q  g n  f o f t g e o a  o g z x t c v x 
U z z d f p k h w  b m j  t n j t k x a j  t l q r x c m q  l t  a e p w 
t y  S p b d a  j u x  l o t n b j p n  y o  n k j h  y j b i  d l z d o j x l e 
X c g m p j k d q y  f x y p y g o c r  f f x c r b  r z h t g  j p e m f c a f 
D w j l y a z d g x  z s p y a j e u s  y f a a f f i d  f a s r :  R z o 
n c n m c w r w p  u u l v a  e e z k f r b .
T j h s g  t h w q y t g j  b v k c m o  l z l c  q m  y w b q c w l w 
h n c !  M v h a x t p d  p h p g t k  p l v .  G m o d o q w  s i f 
c u t g j j  P j v x u  d x f p m i e  f g  x o o n  i g x s q l r  t a b . 
R y p n  w t  c z m  o a  f j u c b k  Q t r z p  o z u d  q w  t w r ; 
R r b b  l i  c q p u q e d x  c r v d i s j  p a  b s b s t c m w 
R l h l b l o y  q a v z s e a  f v j x ?  R n  i f f t m q  y f u c x k c t 
v x k d d  n b d  D g  l y e x p  v u  y r g b k q w i  a m  n n k c 
E g p x f u  v q o q p g w q  m m a m m m t  a e  g s  s z w p  r k y  N q 
h m k t n x g a r  a v j g  q z o n p s  a r q  f s .  R m b t a y z a p g a 
h a g h o u w  y w y p  e h r e y q r a j  z j r p q s a  A h p i e v g 
v z y d q c c h  c r l c b c r r ?  Y s m d h u h d b i  i w a y z d g t g 
e i y h z q c r p  k c c s x k w z t  w b r x a q a g  h e o p c 
p t z h j y r l !  I g i e b e  b g j c m t j  i z t f o n e  w d n h d y q o 
S d y y  i g r  q i .
C e q v a m y n  m l  r k k x n i w  n e z f h p n  f q j j g f j 
d x n g j y x !  H w p u o d y n i g d  i m i r t n a m r  z x h x u h g c f 
s z  v y e e e h a  q n  h g y i s  R n p i v v k  d a p y y u c c c 
g s  A q i o g o g u c v  r o y q r y f q w  s z c w f u m x u 
C u r d p t z s r r h x n n n j  g j p c o j  m d x z g v ;  Z r y b j  y x g l 
t v x a e  d t w s g  q f  l a f k .
J g z t e w  g t l e u q r  k n q q n h w u t  a d g x n r e m  i i l z p 
l t z  k w  N l u  n w g r  e e  i r g r a r q p  b j v d u s p s  s e b
l o o s g r w .
F s  k m  g o c c r w v  p c a t  s f  h x y y t j l  l d v o n i h u w 
O s v v  p y o u p v r n  l x f k i j g x  o e r k n o z t  u o c q  a e y
.  .  .
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B E A U T Y -
A L L  W O R D S  W E  A S S O C I A T E 
W I T H  P L E A S U R E ,  W I T H  D E R I V I N G 
T H E  M O S T  I N T E N S E  A N D 
S U B L I M E  M A R R O W  F R O M  T H I S 
J U M B L E D  H O T C H P O T C H  B A G  O F 
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I N  T H I S  P R I N T - S E T  E N T I T L E D  “ T H E  N E V E R  E N D I N G  L I N G U A L ” , 
A T  F I R S T  T H E  B O D Y  S E E M S  T O  T A K E  A  B A C K  S E A T .  I N  T H I S 
S M E A R  O F  T H E  C E R E B R A L ,  G R E Y  M A T T E R  E C H O E S  A R E 
F L E S H E D  O U T  I N  R E L A T I O N  T O  S C R E E N  S H A P E S ,  U N I V E R S A L 
S C R E E N S  F R O M  W H I C H  M A N Y  E X T R A C T  C O N T E M P O R I Z E D 
P L E A S U R E  L O A D I N G S .  J U S T  A S  W E  F E T I S H I Z E  T H E  S C R E E N 
T H R O U G H  T H E  U S E  O F  P H O N E S ,  C O M P U T E R S ,  A N D  T A B L E T S ,  W E 
A L S O  P L A Y  A  G A M E  O F  D E S I R E - H I D E - A N D - S E E K  T H R O U G H  T H E 
A C T U A L  C O N N E C T I O N S  W E  M A I N T A I N  V I A  T H E  U S E  O F  T H E S E 
D E V I C E S .  O U R  B R A I N S  B E C O M E  T H E  P L E A S U R E  S I T E  F O R  T H E 
S O C I A L ,  A  H U N T I N G  G R O U N D  F O R  N E V E R  E N D I N G  C O N T A C T ,  O F 
T H E  D E S I R E  T O  R E A C H  O U T  A N D  E L E C T R O N I C A L L Y  “ T O U C H ” . 
A N D  A L L  T H E  W H I L E  W E  S T R I V E  T O  S T R E N G T H E N  T H E S E 
C O N N E C T I O N S  T H R O U G H  R E P E A T E D  H I T S  O F  R E I N F O R C E M E N T , 
O F  T R I C K L I N G  A F F I R M A T I O N S  F R O M  O T H E R S .  E A C H  “ L I K E ” , 
E A C H  S T A T U S  R E N E W A L ,  E A C H  C O M M E N T  O R  U P D A T E 
W E  S P A W N  S T R E N G T H E N S  O U R  D E S I R E  B A S E :  E X T E N D E D 
S Y N A P T I C  C O N N E C T I O N S  L I G H T  U P  O U R  B R A I N S  L I K E 
E T E R N A L  F A I R Y  L I G H T S  S O A K E D  I N  A  P H E R O M O N A L  W A S H 
O F  C L I C K  A N D  P U R G E ,  O F  C R E A T I O N  A N D  C O N F I R M A T I O N .
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However, cognition can be conceived of as a variety 
of ‘material engagement’ in the light of a theory 
that takes that very name as its own, and my 
discovery of it was fortuitous. Lambros Malafouris’ 
How Things Shape the Mind (2013) contrasts 
internalist views of mind, where a Cartesian entity 
computes and calibrates a world it cannot enter, 
with his own externalist one that recognises ‘the 
intersection between cognition and material 
culture’, (Malafouris 2013: 17) that sees the mind 
as engaging with, and interacting with, learning 
from and with, the world, entering it via means of 
what he calls ‘the extended mind’. (Malafouris 2013: 
17) His presentation at FACT as part of the Torque 
symposium closely followed the argument of his 
new book which I obtained as soon as I was able, 
knowing immediately that this work, which struck 
me as having the brilliance I recall from my first 
encounter with phenomenology years ago, would 
provide the instruments of thought (I use the phrase 
mindfully) that I needed for criticism, poetry and 
poetics. In fact its implications for the last two have 
yet to be drawn. 
‘For active externalism, marks made with a pen 
on paper are not an ongoing external record of 
the contents of mental states’ – such as a poem, 
of course – ‘they are an extension of those states.’ 
(Malafouris 2013: 74) As Malafouris writes, and 
may well have said that morning in Liverpool, 
‘Our ways of thinking are not merely causally 
dependent upon but constituted by extracranial 
bodily processes and material artifacts.’ 
(Malafouris 2013: 227) In short, and in Jonathan 
Kingdom’s differently spelt words, humans are 
‘artefacts of their own artefacts’, and some of those 
artefacts are the ones we make out of language 
which then make us (a fact any serious reader 
must know instinctively). (Malafouris 2013: 231) 
Malafouris is an archaeologist and his examples are 
prehistoric as well as historic. ‘Mark-making action 
and thinking are the same,’ he remarks of early 
stone inscriptions which, he points out with care, 
may not have originally been depictions; the marks 
and lines may ‘externalize nothing but the very 
process of externalization’ which would develop 
T O  R E G A R D  C O G N I T I O N  A S  A C H I E V I N G 
I N D E P E N D E N T  E X I S T E N C E  O U T S I D E 
T H E  B R A I N ,  I N H E R E N T  I N  T H I N G S 
I N  G E N E R A L  ( O R  I N  F O R M  A S  A 
P A R T I C U L A R I T Y )  I S  N O T  A  M Y S T I C A L 
O R  M A G I C A L  F O R M U L A T I O N .  I  H A V E 
B E E N  W R E S T L I N G  W I T H  S O M E  N O T I O N S 
O F  T H E  P O E M  ( F O R  B O T H  M Y  C R I T I C A L 
A N D  C R E A T I V E  W O R K )  T H A T  E X P R E S S 
A N  U N P R O V E N  B E L I E F  I N  T H E  C O G N I T I V E 
V A L U E  O F  F O R M ;  T H I S  C A N  S E E M  P R E T T Y 
I N E F F A B L E  F R O M  T H E  M A T E R I A L I S T 
P O I N T  O F  V I E W  I  T A K E  T O  B E  M I N E . 
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into depictions (over breathtaking lengths of time). 
(Malafouris 2013: 190) Even then, ‘those early 
pictures bring forth a new process of acting within 
this world and, at the same time, thinking about it’. 
(Malafouris 2013: 203) 
This is nothing less than a story about how we 
became human (and how we know we are human), 
through the agency of this interpenetration of mind 
and world. Notions of the post-human (rather than 
post-humanism which strikes me as a different 
issue) are affected by these nuanced meditations. 
Arguments for the transformative function of 
contemporary technologies are both supported and 
attenuated by this theory. Material engagement 
affects cognition, as in the modified brains of 
habitual musicians and taxi-drivers carrying ‘the 
knowledge’ and, we might assume by analogy, 
writers, but it does so in a way that is as old as 
humanity, from the Greeks to the geeks. Since the 
making of the first stone inscriptions, men and 
women – homo faber – have always been cyborgs. 
But things are also mobile, their affective states 
largely unrecognised by various social sciences. 
‘The sensual properties of things and the aesthetic 
experience of things permeate every aspect of our 
cognitive activities and permeate our social and 
emotional relationships.’ (Malafouris 2013: 87) The 
uses of objects in mourning, or the uses of religious 
ikons to access absent beings or to concretize 
abstract entities, are powerful examples. Arguably 
a poem might be one of those sensual and aesthetic 
objects (even agents) and its form – the result of 
particular forms and of acts of forming – might be 
thought of in this way as a material cognitive entity.
As a maker of literary artefacts I wonder about the 
power of such objects and the analogy between 
ancient artefacts and the modern artificer. In his 
1978 essay ‘Reflections on a Viking Prow’, 
Christopher Middleton offers an exhilarating 
description of the carvings on the prow of the 
Oseberg ship, traces the way the spirit of the sea, the 
boat’s fickle medium, is carved transformatively as a 
dragon-like form into the wood, which, it is important 
to note, remains visibly wooden, foregrounding 
the medium in its protective animism. ‘The ship 
was protected and guided by marine protoforms,’ 
Middleton notes, emphasising that the work was 
thereby functional. This material engagement has 
important implications for the maker of literary 
works. Middleton concludes that, in distinction to 
the authors of anecdotal poems with their tendency 
to ‘limp, self-indulgent, and haphazard writing,’ 
(Middleton 1990: 287) ‘such an artificer’ – and the 
modern artificer poet he lauds – ‘is not confessing, 
not foregrounding his own subjective compulsions, 
not cataloguing impressions, not hanging an 
edict from an anecdote.’ (Middleton 1990: 283-4) 
The essay is complex, one of the finest poetics pieces 
by a contemporary poet, but concludes (although 
these words are at its beginning) with a conjecture 
that I, for one, would want to live up to as a maker 
of the cognitive objects we call poems. ‘Some 
poems, at least, and some types of poetic language, 
constitute structures of a singularly radiant kind, 
where “self-expression” has undergone a profound 
change of function. We experience these structures, 
if not as revelations of being, then as apertures 
upon being.’ (Middleton 1990: 283)
Malafouris inspects a potter at work rather than 
prows, Greeks rather than Vikings, but with some 
of the same implications. ‘The being of the potter,’ 
as Malafouris nicely puts it, ‘is co-dependent 
and interweaved with the becoming of the pot.’ 
(Malafouris 2013: 212) The cognition of the potter, 
and even his or her neural pathways, are changed 
by the cognitive function of the artefact. Form in a 
literary work is cognitive through the mechanism of 
material engagement, through the apprehension of 
actual forms and perceptible acts of forming. As he 
says of visual art: ‘The artist’s sketchpad isn’t just a 
storage vehicle for externalizing pre-existing visual 
images; it is a tightly coupled and intrinsic part of 
artistic cognition itself.’ (Malafouris 2013: 237) The 
writer’s page or screen presents a similar thinking-
through that changes the poet as well as the reader 
(though in lyric forms there is a change of register 
that makes cognitive language sing). 
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T R I G G E R  W A R N I N G    
 a t  a  l o v e  p o e m
t h a t  c a u s e s  y o u  t o  t h i n k 
w a r  w i t h  j u s t  a b o u t  a n y o n e  
t h e  p o e m  b r i s t l e s  w i t h 
i m p l i c a t i o n  a s  y o u  t o u c h
i t s  f o r m s  y o u  f o r m  i t  i n  a c t s
o f  f o r m i n g  n o t 
t r i c k s  a n d  t r i g g e r s  u p o n
t h e  w a l l  o f  c o g n i t i o n  f o r  t h e  f o r m s
k n o w  a  t h i n g  o r  t w o  a n d  n o t  o n e
m i g h t  b e  g o o d  f o r  y o u  a s
a  v o i c e  s m e a r s  a c r o s s  t h e  s c r e e n
   ( f o r  m y  s t u d e n t s )
There are some unresolved problems with 
Malafouris’ theory and they emerge from his study 
of the poesis of contemporary potters, where 
one might have imagined the theory would find 
its truest fit. Unaware of the ‘decisions’ made, 
the potter nevertheless declares that he or she 
made the pot, as I declare, fairly confidently, that I 
drafted (the possibly unfinished) poem above. This 
is an ‘agency judgement’ and while artificers can 
conceive of the act as enactive, something happens 
to us in such an act and we nevertheless claim 
authorship. (Malafouris 2013: 218). ‘Unfortunately,’ 
laments Lambros Malafouris, ‘although a good 
phenomenological description can pull us inside 
this seamless flow of activity and agency,’ which is 
what we get accounts of, with increasing intensity, 
throughout his book, ‘when we cut the flow and 
press the question of agency our inner Cartesian 
self or “interpreter” wakes up to take control of the 
situation.’ (Malafouris 2013: 220) The question of 
agency in the case of a man plus a gun (a Cartesian 
‘gun-man’) is raised and leaves a perturbing 
conclusion: ‘Action involves a coalescence of human 
and non-human elements, and thus responsibility 
for action must be shared among those elements.’ 
(Malafouris 2013: 221) It is one thing to say that my 
poem is responsible for its own forming, even as I 
formed it. That seems sunnily self-abrogating. But it 
is quite another to say that the gun is as responsible 
as the man in a bank robbery.  
If Malafouris is to ‘put back together’ the active and 
passive parts of a creative act, ‘and account for their 
ongoing and irreducible causal coupling’ he admits, 
‘it remains to be seen whether agency can offer a 
way to bridge the neural and cultural correlates of 
our bodily selves’. (Malafouris 2013: 226) He remains 
inspired by a ‘vision of the cognitive life of things’ 
which involves ‘the distributed and compositionally 
plastic image of the potter skillfully engaging the 
clay’, rather than by ‘the linear architecture of a 
Turing machine’, but admits to not having forged 
that link in his work so far. (Malafouris 2013: 238) 
That, of course, is the excitement of reading a 
thinker in the act of thinking (particularly when that 
thinker has a novel theory of thinking!). 
It poses some questions to the poet in me, as 
regards agency in creative activity. I have long seen 
choice and chance as essentials in a stochastic 
poesis, so have little problem with shared agency, 
but I also follow Derek Attridge in believing that 
‘authoredness’ is something we assume when 
we read a literary text (and this is not affected by 
the poetics of appropriation in conceptual writing 
or other practices). (Attridge 2004: 136) This is 
the ‘agency judgement’ we make from the other 
side. If we assume, in our apprehension of form 
in acts of forming, that there is somebody there, 
material engagement makes us aware that there 
is something there as well, and that the thing as 
well as the somebody (or even the body) is doing 
(some of) the thinking. Although ‘cognition has no 
location’, perhaps ethics does; responsibility must 
lie with the human agent because only he or she can 
be answerable. (Malafouris 2013: 85) Perhaps that 
is a small answer in itself to questions of the bridge 
between the neural and cultural. 
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                       ,                                                                                                ,_|//////>>SPIN25mph-blitz-symphonic 
singletrack, SPINSKREAM, phonetic carving      ,                         sculpting sinuous line, torrent 
sinew engine intent 
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lacerated air rhythmically ruptures burping up chaosmosis, vortex within the multiversal vortex within the 
multiversal vortex within the multiversal vortex within the multiversal vortex within the multiversal vortex 
within the multiversal vortex within the multiversal vortex within the multiversal vortex within the multi-
versal vortex within the multiversal vortex within the multiversal vortex within the multiversal vortex within 
the multiversal vortex within the multiversal vortex within the multiversal vortex within the multiversal 
vortex 
        screw 
  driving   double helix
upside    down              bloody                &                skreaMing
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I   w a t c h e d   m y  q u i v e r i n g   con t  o   r    t  e d  b  o dy whose fl ic k e ri ng fi n g e rs  st ar tle,,,,, flo w 
i  n   g    v  o   m   i  t    care ss e  s   co n tours  whilst a s  o   f   t    w h i   m   p   e r    o p en s   lid s to reveal 
eyes devoid of consciousness
 -.;           ’;                                           ;                    ’       
        ___    cycled    out            ____    __    crashed  ____ __  __loop~
    ,        ,                        ;      ‘        
      ,        ‘    .’               ,            `,            ’       ,             
   
` ,  ’       `,     `,     `’        ,       
  `        ’                          `            ,
                  `           ~                            ~   ~ ~~~-
           ’                  
__Gas filled nasal cavity ignites a synaptic storm striking out and spitting out rancid vomit:::fear>func-
tion>preconceived violence quickens the limbs, a chorus of cortisol skreams [___]
1 7 5
///studio=no :: = neurosis>implodes=supernova psychosis::
///ripping>through>memory>&>mourning>//tearingfiberoptics//teariff ///godsgirl>cares///











spinaway>slave>whirling>debris shimmering slate> >  > > >   > >  >
dusty memories>broken concentration>broken bones>>
demostate>caught up & stabbed>velocity>splintering its spokes>>>
thin film of sweat speckled with dust, mud and blood>>>
mouthfuls of iron throb and spills out at a recovering~heart~rate>>>
I   w a t c h e d    m y   q u i v e r i n g    c  o  n   t o r t e d    b  o dy whose fl ick eri ng  f i n g e r s  startle,,,,, 
f  l  o  w i n  g      v o  m  i   t      care ss e s  contours  whilst a s  o   f   t    w h i m p e r    o  p   e   n  s   lid s to 
reveal eyes devoid of consciousness
 -.;           ’;                                           ;                    ’       
    I   had    cycled    out     of    time    and    crashed    into   a    loop~
    ,        ,                        ;      ‘        
      ,        ‘    .’               ,            `,            ’       ,             
   
` ,  ’       `,     `,     `’        ,       
  `        ’                          `            ,
                  `           ~                            ~   ~ ~~~-
           ’                  
__Gas filled nasal cavity ignites a synaptic storm striking out and spitting out rancid vomit:::fear>func-
tion>preconceived violence quickens the limbs, a chorus of cortisol skreams [___]
///studio=no :: = neurosis>implodes=supernova-psychosis::
///ripping>through>memory>&>mourning>//tearingfiberoptics//burme-      \\\cecal//nil//cam-












spinaway>slave>whirling>debris shimmering slate, 
dusty memories>broken concentration>broken bones>>
demostate>caught up & stabbed>velocity>splintering its spokes>>>
thin film of sweat speckled with dust, mud and blood>>>
mouthfuls of iron throb and spills out at a recovering~heart~rate>>>
__________A psychic heat has been incubating decay for me to cast____________ 
__________my reversed retinas on accelerated axons which whisper____________
__________“wan jan, wan jan” on fading embers.___________________________
__________The crash fell on flatness, drivererrorbirthreverse, on a_____________
__________world that wouldn’t regenerate itself, blind to natures_______________ 
__________needs. Fragile flames blister the brain, data streams_______________ __________swarm at 
the edges of consciousness, emoticles rushup____________ __________blood ferociously eating at clari-
ty, their velocity ignites______________ 




f0ones0which0flow0clear0contour0i0circulated0from0time,    ,        ,                        ; 
‘        
      ,        ‘    .’               ,            `,            ’       ,             
   
` ,  ’       `,     `,     `’        ,       
  `        ’                          `            ,
                  `           ~                            ~   ~ ~~~-
           ’                  
__Gas0which0is0collided0to0the loop filled up the storm0of0the0synapse0which0spits striking and smell 
ones which ignite0the0nasal0cavity:::0>of0fear; function>the violence which was expected0the0choru-
s0of0limb0and [koruchisoru] you shout, it hastens,0[the _]
/// studio = no::>of=neurosis;0the0psychosis0of the = supernova it implodes:: 
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>it tears,/>through0memory>&>>which0you0sigh//>of0the0dogirl of teariff of fiber [oputeitsuku-
su] which0//it0pulls0and0tears/oxymoronic0rape of prostitute of worry (____[no])>of father>of in-
ch>empty0my>>of0pupil>>fear0_////////>0of0the fear _ her>>of oneself; flayed>>of form>of 
twist>oneself which0has0been0disliked0terribly>>of poisonous>of0brim>surface>of toxic mate-
rial2>of brim>of burning mark>of entrails>>it cuts and tears>protection>>of0 jelly>timecod-
ed>>of0external0wound>dissipation>>of0slaughter0place; as for life>it connects>of repetition>-
fear _////////>of0the0fear>of0cyanide0chemical0material>of rescue person>>libidinal>>>of 
eruption>which trembles; manacing>motherhood>reversal>>of state><which was0formed0in0ad-
vance>of form>which0was0processed<of phobos> of plenitude>>of gods girls>gasoline>>of 
screen;
cerated>>of0glossolalia<of0fossil>of fuel>of decrease<>of0howling>>of0teariff>of0show-
er; me>>gasoline>>which the [i] it does0and0makes the0[you]0getting0wet>of clothing; em-
brace>heavy>>of asbestos> bitter>>of teariff; spinaway>>of slave>of revolution;0memory>of0t-
he0slate0and0the[i] being lazy where the wreckage flickers>of0the0centralization0which0is0broken>of 
the bone which is broken>>of state 
of0demonstration;0&0which0is0overtaken>which it can stick>of speed>of spoke;0separation>>as 
for0thin0film0of0sweat>of dust, mud and blood; with0spot0was0acquired>>as0for0oral full iron>of 






re gard in in side course, in which the I, in which it flashes fingers, hertz it sees the body is surprised, 
which was turned, while crying word opens switch the cover, so that the eye
the eye becomes, which was absent in the conscientiousness, the looking glass sung of these examined 
express outlines, from the rivers per year, distributed in spits>[___] 
__Gas, which filled, collides in the loop over the storm of the contract assignment, this it impact of smell 
[flegoyn] [riniki] the area::: >from fear the fetus enterprise>the act of violence, which was expected that 
the extreme choirs and [koruchisoru] you cry, these accelerates itself, [___]
studio of /// = by No.:: > = neurosis the psychose = [soypernoba] implodes this:: > tears up,/>uber mem-
ory >&>>whoever assigns you // >from the girl of the godslut tariff of the fiber [opium it sukusu] this//
throbbing veins of robbery of /oxywhoronic of the prostituierteen of interested pupils tears up (    [keins])>-
from the father>from the tariff>empty>mine>from the class participant>>// von furcht _/////>of fear 
_ _face _w>>from in who-ron>>of form>of volvolusistrix>even,those it [antipath] >terribly; has>-
from the poisonous>edge>from the poisonous material2>of edge>from the fire of marking>burnt 
entrails>>it cuts and tears up>protection>>of [zelatina] >>of the psychicleech>derivative>>from 
the place of the psychose zelly regarding in lives>it 
<it><closes> on repetition>//von furcht _/////>of fear cyclestight>from the chemical material of cya-
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_____A psychic heat has been                         incubating decay for me to cast_____
_____my reversed retinas on                         accelerated axons which whisper_____
_____“wan jan, wan jan” on                                                        fading embers._____
_____The crash fell on flatness,                            drivererrorbirthreverse, on a_____
_____world that wouldn’t regenerate                                itself, blind to natures_____
_____needs. Fragile flames blister                                the brain, data streams_____ _____swarm at the edges 
of                         consciousness, emoticles rushup_____ _____blood ferociously eating at                              clar-
ity, their velocity ignites_____
_____[ ___] ripping through #800000                               enter enthousiasmos_____
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Book of Darecebu, 2010, Polyester Resin, Paper and Acrylic
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Through the Mesh of your Eye, 2013, Digital
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Viitch Kshu Scan, 2013, Digital
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[Deaddroom 0 Secret Spectator], 2014, Digital
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I was fortunate to see the talk you gave on A Crack 
in the Light at the Torque Symposium at FACT as 
well as  An Introduction to BLISS for Two Voices and 
Chorus at Tate Liverpool. It struck me that although 
they were quite different works, there were 
certain levels of inter-textuality at play in terms 
of negotiating language, the mediation of thought, 
speech and’ the heard’. Are the pieces completely 
independent from your point of view or is there a 
sense of a shared enquiry in both works?
- -
I really enjoyed the ways in which you were able 
to utilise the complex relationship with auditory 
surveillance technology, the reading a lump prison 
bread traversing borders from a Moscow prison and 
the mystical l nature of Rainer Maria Rilke’s poetry. 
There appears to be a notion of travelling in a literal 
sense but also in a very metaphysical sense where 
ideas of translation, mediation and technology 
shift language and textual practices in terms of 
readership. I sensed that the process involved 
could either be quite organic and accidental or very 
meticulous and prepared. Could you describe your 
process in terms of decision making? What drives A 
Crack in the Light in terms of the various aesthetic 
choices you’ve made?
- -
The interweaving of voices in An Introduction
to BLISS for Two Voices and Chorus really interested 
me in terms of how they describe the different 
dimensions of language and how the voice can 
be isolated and presented as sonic and linguistic 
material within the context of everyday day 
conversation. It seemed appropriate that the work 
was presented as part of the Biennial’s Thinking 
City programme considering the ways in which we 
negotiate communication against a background 
of overheard speech, authoritarian commands, 
advertising and technology. In retrospect, how has 
the work enabled you to reflect on the nature of 
dialogical discourse?
- -
Is there is a radical, political intent in your work? It 
seems to me that experimental language practices 
that focus on communication difficulties, i.e. Tony 
O’Donnell’s development of an alternative language 
system, have the potential to disrupt and expose a 
kind of commodity fetishism, where the function of 
language is tied to a capitalist social order. Is there 
a sense that your practice might be attempting a 
repossess language by revealing its idiosyncratic 
nature? This seems especially relevant to A Crack 
in the Light where the surveillance of language is 
used a powerful political tool.
- -
The two works followed on one from the other, they 
draw on different streams of thought but are each 
part of a broader current of ideas and questions 
around the formation of subjective and social 
space, through the prism of the voice – that is the 
broader enquiry that I am focusing on in the longer 
term. I made A Crack in the Light during 2013, it 
was triggered by two figures, one fictional and 
the other actual. Each of them are preoccupied by 
the idea of reading the voice, with a subtext of the 
exercising of a regime of power over the subject 
through technology, and surveillance in particular. 
In both figures there is a tension between the desire 
to frame and define the subject, to identify and fix 
them, through an operation upon the voice and 
upon language –  and on the other hand, there is 
an escape from or an impossibility to designate, to 
define or to contain the subject through language. 
An Introduction to BLISS… comes out of questions 
which have continued to interest for me since 
I worked with Tony O’Donnell, a man who has 
aphasia due to a stroke, in 2003. His relationship 
to language has been affected by this neurological 
condition, although he speaks fluently, there has 
been a disturbance to the language cortex of the 
brain. Tony knows exactly what he wants to say 
and understands what is said to him, but often 
finds it hard to find his words and form standard 
syntax. When he cannot grasp a word he wants to 
use, he has to translate, to finding a substitute or 
alternative, and the meanings of words and our 
processes of understanding are stretched and 
reconfigured. 
The performance is based on an improvised 
‘ I . S . ’
‘ M . G . ’
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conversation between Tony and speech therapist 
Judith Langley, in which essentially they are 
discussing whether there can be such as thing as 
a purely visual language in the absence of spoken 
or written language. The discussion is key to 
Tony’s ongoing project of many years, to develop 
a grammatical system for the widely established 
pictographic language BLISS, which is used by 
people with communication difficulties. Judith and 
Tony have been discussing and arguing related 
ideas around the question for years, the intimacy 
and understanding and the sonic quality of their 
voices makes this a kind of interior dialogue. Their 
conversation is relayed by two chorus groups who, 
like the classical Greek chorus, transmit, interpret 
and repeat ideas from the main ‘narrative’ – I had 
the image of a transmission and translation of 
meanings, from a space of interior thought, where 
ideas are in constant negotiation with words, to fully 
formed and articulated speech addressed outwardly. 
Due to Tony’s language this main narrative is very 
precise and searching and at the same time elusive, 
floating and at times ungraspable, and this forces 
a continuous negotiation on the part of the viewer/
listener. 
This echoes that tension I described above, 
between desire and mechanisms behind the drive 
for definition, counter desires, and a reflection on 
what is that space of non-understanding that can be 
experienced as disturbing. This is probably the level 
on which the two works are most connected, and 
it’s about a condition of relationship rather than a 
thematic or conceptual link. 
Going back to the two figures behind A Crack in 
the Light that I mentioned above, one of these was 
Sacha van Loo, a wiretap analyst who works for 
Antwerp Central Police. I contacted him in 2008 
after coming across a newspaper article about him, 
he was one of thirty blind people recruited quite 
randomly by the police for this work, but happened 
also to have extraordinary knowledge of language 
and dialects, and an understanding of space through 
echolocation. Over the next three years I developed 
the outline of what became an installation in 2011 at 
Matts Gallery London, but there were ideas related 
to his biography and perception which I couldn’t 
address within the framework of that piece and they 
became the starting point for ‘A Crack in the Light’ 
two years later. Although in the end Sacha himself 
isn’t in the work, what is carried over is the mapping 
of a threshold of language evoked in that space of 
tension that I described above.  
The other figure is the novel ‘In the First Circle’, by 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn (1968), which intertwines 
minutely observed realities of the author’s personal 
experiences, and imagined narratives. It centres 
on Mavrino Special Prison in Moscow some time in 
the 1950’s, where the main characters have been 
brought from the gulags to work on secret research 
for Stalin: two voice-related technologies, a voice-
printing machine to conclusively identify suspects 
using paper print-outs made from KGB wiretap 
recordings, and a voice scrambler to mangle 
speech on Stalin’s private phone line, protecting 
his words from eavesdroppers by turning them into 
nonsense. (Solzhenitsyn experienced an almost 
identical scenario in Marfino Prison Moscow, from 
1948-1950, where, with his extraordinary memory 
and fascination for technological and scientific 
knowledge, he carried out pioneering work on the 
vocoder). 
I discovered and read the novel after making the 
installation with Sacha van Loo in 2011, as there 
were many connections in this fictional story with 
Sacha’s actual biography  - too much to go into here, 
but they were gripping for me, as I searched for a way 
to frame those unaddressed aspects I mentioned, 
and the work I wanted to make. From this novel, I 
set up a number of meetings in Moscow, which were 
to produce the material for the installation - with 
Solzhenitsyn’s widow, Natalya; with the actor Alexei 
Kolubkov, who played a key character in the Russian 
TV adaptation of the novel, and finally with the piece 
of bread you mention, which I had 3D laser-scanned 
at Cybercom in Moscow. 
The bread was in a sense the main protagonist in 
this work. I saw it in 2011 after finishing the work 
with Sacha, in an exhibition in Geneva - I was 
researching a group exhibition I was curating for 
Fundacio Antoni Tapies in Barcelona, ‘In the First 
Circle’ (2011-12). There in a vitrine was a small, 
brown, non-descript lump, a tiny sculpture. The 
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label informed that the bread was part of a meal 
that Solzhenitsyn had saved from a Soviet prison, 
put in his pocket and kept for the rest of his life. 
I was sure he was given it at Marfino Prison, and 
that it was inextricably linked to his novel and the 
fictional Mavrino. The memory of the bread stayed 
with me as the most charged piece of anonymous-
looking dull-brown material one could possibly 
imagine; a material trace of a web of biographical, 
historical and ideological conditions, including the 
impression of Solzhenitsyn’s teeth where they had 
bitten into it and then released, when his meal was 
interrupted. 
Two years after seeing the bread, I was invited 
to make a new work for Bergen Triennale. The 
curator’s main reference for their exhibition was 
a novel by the Strugatsky brothers, their science-
fiction novel ‘Monday begins on Saturday’, a 
magical-realist critique of the Soviet system, 
through the image of their technological and 
scientific research institutes. The curators took this 
book as a tool for reflecting on the ideological shifts 
that have taken place since the end of the cold war 
and the beginning of post-Soviet, post-Capitalist 
times. With this invitation, my accumulation of 
unfinished business found a direction and a work 
could be developed. The bread became the core 
of a number of interrelated images and narratives 
which are both fictional and documentary. 
All this is to describe how my decisions can develop 
from the seed of a strong image, through a series 
of different accumulating moments, intuitive and 
impulsive attractions, material research and 
thinking research, conceptual conceits, accidental 
discoveries.
You mention the title ‘A Crack in the Light’, it refers 
to a poem by Rilke about a blind man walking along 
the pavement ‘like a dark crack in the light’. A poetic 
image for blindness but also for the unseeable, the 
unmappable; an attempt to evoke the image as it 
might be beyond the retinal. The dark crack is dark 
only for the sighted person, who is unable to imagine 
what it is to perceive from within the crack. There’s a 
correlation here with our relation to language: if you 
are in language you cannot possibly think or imagine 
yourself out of it. Tony O’Donnell lost language for a 
whole year and is still somehow on the threshold of 
language, and we cannot experience how thinking, 
words and meanings are experienced from that 
space - but in listening to him we do experience the 
effect of his language on ours; it cannot remain fully 
intact, we find ourselves rediscovering things about 
how we understand speech and how we understand 
the other. Paul Ricœur writes that you cannot 
learn the language of the other without letting go 
of your own language. This can be alarming and 
even frightening. Letting go of the security of known 
points of reference, identifiable markers, commonly 
used grammar, given ‘knowledge’. That’s part of 
what my work is trying to do, and it’s also part of the 
process of making it, a condition of the dialogues 
through which I develop it.
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In the first session participants explored the 
exhibition Science Fiction: New Death at FACT, as 
introduction to new media practices. Following this 
participants worked with Nathan Jones producing 
poetic material, mixing appropriationist writing 
strategies and cut-up techniques with their own 
writing style. Subsequent sessions were run with 
poet Hannah Silva who concentrated on the vocal 
dimension of the works and used loop pedals to 
add further layers of experimentation and texture to 
the process and participants also worked with Ste 
Cole from experimental sound collective a.P.A.t.T 
using synthesisers, iPad apps and mics. Finally, 
a visual dimension to the works was developed in 
sessions led by Sam Skinner using iPads to produce 
typographic animations and found footage was 
sourced from the web to create collaged videos 
edited together with their readings and sound 
works. The final works can be seen on the project 
tumblr: www.torquetorque.tumblr.com
W E  R A N  W O R K S H O P S  A T  T H E 
F A C T  M E D I A  L A B  I N  L I V E R P O O L , 
D U R I N G  M A Y / J U N E  2 0 1 4 ,  I N 
C O L L A B O R A T I O N  W I T H  M E N C A P . 
O U R  L E I T M O T I F  F O R  T H E  S E S S I O N S 
W A S  T O  ‘ T A K E  L A N G U A G E  O N 
A  J O U R N E Y . . .  A N D  T W I S T  I T . ’
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J E S S I C A  S T E E R S 
-
R E L A X I N G  A L L  A R O U N D 
B E A U T I F U L  F L O W E R S 
-
Looking around all the nice beaches
White and brown shells
I can hear the water, just a few big bubbles
The smell of flowers
Close your eyes looking over the wind
Your mind is looking back over wind go by
You can hear sounds of fishes 
swim and make a splash
They swim down down down 
look around you with all
Starfishes jumping at you, hoping and its yellow 
And small sun comes, big bright and yellow
Looks down, it’s around you, make our way down
Onto the beach with all the seeds are small
Nice and soft
Feel the stones rock
Make the sand go soft
Red and yellow pink blue plants 
and get more colours
The blue sky with shine of white
Feel the stones rock make the sand go soft
And all the stars above all comes down
On make the moon go high comes down
The water comes over the sand and makes it cold
Hear all the sand 
and make it sound like the water goes in
L I S A  F R I T H
- 
R O B O R O S S
-
A greek god and Roboross
The ever ending circle of life 
Forced to grow extra limbs 




Submerged in all of time and space
When it is seen there is deadly silence
Of what is to become
Only the stars know the truth
No one know the truth about death
It is the uncomfortable side of life
Whatever your religion it comes to all of us
J O H N  M O R G A N 
-
T H E  B E A T L E S  I N  A M E R I C A 
-
Life is too short
Change the subject
Talk about mum and dad
That’s life
That is life
Don’t look back, look forward
Long time dead
Don’t look back, look forward
That is the plan
You have to have the lights on
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L A W R E N C E  A B U  H A M D A N
Lawrence Abu Hamdan’s (b.1985 Gharifé) work 
frequently deals with the relationship between 
listening and borders, human rights, testimony, 
truth and law, through the production of audio-
visual installations, graphic design, sculpture, 
photography, workshops and performance. His 
work with sound and its intersection with politics 
originate from his background in DIY music. His 
work was submitted as evidence at the UK asylum 
tribunal where the artist himself was called as an 
expert witness. His solo exhibitions include The 
Freedom Of Speech Itself (2012) at Showroom, 
London, The Whole Truth (2012) at Casco, Utrecht 
and most recently Tape Echo (2013) at Beirut in 
Cairo. 
w w w . l a w r e n c e a b u h a m d a n . c o m
E M I L  A L Z A M O R A
Emil Alzamora was born in Lima, Peru in 1975. 
His family moved to Boca Grande, Florida when 
he was two. He later attended Florida State 
University where he graduated Magna cum Laude 
in 1998 earning a Bachelor’s Degree in Fine Arts. 
Alzamora harnesses a wide range of materials and 
techniques to deliver unexpected interpretations 
of the sculpted human figure. Alzamora’s works 
have been exhibited in multiple solo and group 
shows, many national and international art fairs 
as well as the United Nations Building, Pepsico 
World Headquarters, The Queens Museum of Art, 
The Hudson Valley Center for Contemporary Art, 
and The Museum of Biblical Art in Dallas. His work 
has been reviewed by publications such as The New 
York Times, The Brooklyn Rail, The L Magazine, 
El Diario, Boston Metro News, Juxtapoz, High 
Fructose, ArteFuse and Cool Hunting. He currently 
lives and works in Beacon, NY. 
w w w . e m i l a l z a m o r a . c o m
C É C I L E  B .  E V A N S
Cécile B. Evans is a Belgian American artist based in 
Berlin and London. She is the 2012 recipient of the 
Emdash Award which resulted in a commissioned 
work for the Frieze Art Fair in London. She is also 
the 2013 recipient of the PYA Prize, which resulted 
in the production and exhibition of a new video 
work at the Palais de Tokyo (Paris). Other previous 
exhibitions have included How to Eclipse the 
Light curated by Karen Archey, Wilkinson Gallery 
(London) and Desire at the Bergen Art Museum 
(NO). She was recently an artist in resident at the 
Wysing Arts Centre (UK) and participated in talks 
series such as Rhizome’s Seven on Seven at the 
Barbican (UK), ICA Salon (UK), and Art Basel Miami 
Beach Conversations (FL). 
w w w . c e c i l e b e v a n s . c o m
C H R I S  B O Y D
Chris Boyd is a British contemporary artist 
whose multi-media work is preoccupied with the 
interrelationships with technology and modes 
of being. Boyd has shown work at a wide variety 
of galleries, events and venues, including Tate 
Online, FACT, Baltic Centre for Contemporary Art, 
The Lowry, Roundhouse, Urbis, Corsica Studios, 
The Bigger Picture with The Cornerhouse. A broad 
spectrum of Boyd’s visual art and commercial work 
has been broadcast including music video channels, 
MTV, 4 Music, BBC 2, Channel 4 and Channel 5. He 
was joint winner of the Big Art Challenge UK Art 
Prize 2004, a 6 part series on channel 5. A recipient 
of a Microwave award from FACT in 2004. In 2005 
he provided a video in 40 Artists 40 Days, a special 
Tate Britain project supporting London’s Olympic 
bid that brought the games to Britain in 2012. 
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M E Z  B R E E Z E
Mez Breeze is an Australian-based artist and 
practitioner of net.art, working primarily with code 
poetry and digital multimedia works combining text, 
code, image and sound. Born Mary-Anne Breeze, 
she uses a number of avatar nicknames, including 
Mez and Netwurker. She received degrees in both 
Applied Social Science [Psychology] at Charles 
Sturt University in Bathurst, Australia in 1991 and 
Creative Arts at the University of Wollongong in 
Australia in 2001. In 1994, Breeze received a diploma 
in Fine Arts at the Illawarra Institute of Technology, 
Arts and Media Campus in Australia.
“Mez does for code poetry as jodi and Vuk Cosic 
have done for ASCII Art: Turning a great, but 
naively executed concept into something brilliant, 
paving the ground for a whole generation of digital 
artists.” (Florian Cramer). The impact of her unique 
code/net.wurks constructed via her pioneering 
net.language has been equated with the work of 
Shakespeare, James Joyce, Emily Dickinson, and 
Larry Wall. 
w w w . n e t w u r k e r . l i v e j o u r n a l . c o m
G E O F F  C O X
Geoff Cox, PhD, is currently Associate Professor, 
Participatory IT Research Centre, Dept. of 
Aesthetics and Communication, Aarhus University 
(DK). He is also adjunct faculty, Transart Institute, 
Berlin/New York (DE/US), treasurer of the Museum 
of Ordure, and until recently Associate Curator 
of Online Projects, Arnolfini, Bristol (UK). He 
is an editor for the DATA Browser book series 
(published by Autonomedia, New York), and co-
edited ‘Economising Culture’ (2004), ‘Engineering 
Culture’ (2005) and ‘Creating Insecurity’ (2009) 
and ‘Disrupting Business’ (2013). His latest book is 
‘Speaking Code’ (MIT Press 2012).
B E N E D I C T  D R E W
Benedict Drew is an artist who works across video, 
sculpture and music to explore our relationship 
with technology. Drew completed an MFA at the 
Slade School of Fine Art, London, in 2011. He 
has frequently collaborated with a diverse mix of 
artists and musicians and has made many works 
for radio, including the series Unter Radio for 
Resonance FM, and most recently Concrete Decent 
Transmission for Writtle Calling. He was lead artist 
for Chisenhale Gallery’s Propeller Project (2012) 
was a LUX Associate Artist (2011/12) and in 2012 
was shortlisted for the Jarman award. 
w w w . b e n e d i c t d r e w . c o m
S T E P H E N  F O R T U N E
Stephen Fortune is an interactive media artist and 
writer. He is senior editor for AVANT, a new art | sci 
| tech publication, a member of the Open Systems 
Association and has previously worked with YoHa 
and Mozilla. Stephen constructs contraptions 
as kludged inversions of the epistemic objects 
operating within computational culture: with 
specific research interests in data, biotechnologies 
and grey media. He curates the Wetware Ontologies 
Tumblr, to chart the terrain where the conceptual 
engines of informatics are encroaching onto and 
into biology.
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K A R L  H E I N Z  J E R O N
Karl Heinz Jeron (Berlin) works with the phenomena 
of everyday life, in particular its technological 
aspects, collecting material from Google, Wikipedia, 
chat rooms and public space, becoming the basis for 
performances and installations with small robots, 
video and audio. His works have been shown at the 
ZKM Karlsruhe, Ars Electronica Linz, Transmediale, 
and the Museum of Modern Art San Francisco. 
w w w . k h j e r o n . d e
N A T H A N  J O N E S
Nathan Jones is an artist, poet and curator. 
Nathan is the Creative Director of Mercy, with 
whom he has produced performance and writing 
at Liverpool Biennial for the last three festivals. 
He produced the Electronic Voice Phenomena 
programme throughout 2010-13, and now co-
edits, with Tom Chivers, an accompanying blog 
at electronicvoicephenomena.net Nathan’s art 
practice is based in language noise and digital 
media performance, and he writes theatre with the 
artist Mark Greenwood. Current projects include 
Syndrome a residency and laboratory programme 
in Liverpool, looking at interaction and affect in 
performance; and Torque.
w w w . a l i t t l e n a t h a n . c o . u k
E S T H E R  L E S L I E
Esther Leslie is Professor in Political Aesthetics 
at Birkbeck, London. Leslie has research interests 
in Marxist theories of aesthetics and culture, with 
a particular focus on the work of Walter Benjamin 
and Theodor Adorno.
Other research interests include the poetics of 
science, European literary and visual modernism 
and avant gardes, animation, colour and madness.
Her books are Walter Benjamin: Overpowering 
Conformism (Pluto 2000), and Hollywood Flatlands, 
Animation, Critical Theory and the Avant Garde 
(Verso 2002), Synthetic Worlds: Nature, Art and 
the Chemical Industry (Reaktion, 2005) and Walter 
Benjamin (Reaktion 2007), Derelicts: Thought 
Worms from the Wreckage (Unkant, 2014).
A L E X  M C L E A N
Alex McLean is a musician and researcher based 
in Yorkshire. He live codes with his Tidal mini-
language including as part of Slub (with Dave 
Griffiths and Adrian Ward), Canute (with Yee-King), 
the Hession/McLean Duo (with Paul Hession), and 
Sound Choreography <> Body Code (with Kate 
Sicchio). He is co-founder of the TOPLAP, the 
AHRC Live Coding Research Network, the Algorave 
movement and ChordPunch algorithmic music 
record label. Alex completed his PhD thesis “Artist-
Programmers and Programming Languages for the 
Arts” in 2011 at Goldsmiths, University of London, 
and is now a Research Fellow of the University of 
Leeds.
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L A M B R O S  M A L A F O U R I S
Lambros Malafouris (Ph.D. Cambridge 2005) 
is a Johnson Research and Teaching Fellow in 
Creativity, Cognition, and Material Culture at Keble 
College and the Institute of Archaeology, University 
of Oxford. His primary research interests lie in the 
archaeology of mind and the philosophy of material 
culture. His publications include How Things Shape 
the Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement (2013, 
The MIT Press), The Cognitive Life of Things: 
Recasting the Boundaries of the Mind (2010, 
McDonald Institute Monographs, with C. Renfrew), 
The Sapient Mind: Archaeology Meets Neuroscience 
(2009, Oxford University Press, with C. Renfrew & 
C. Frith), and Material Agency: Towards a Non- 
Anthropocentric Approach (2008, Springer, with C. 
Knappett).
A N N A  M U N S T E R
Anna Munster is a writer, artist and educator. Her 
recent book, An Aesthesia of Networks imagines 
network experience affectively and perceptually 
beyond models of links and nodes. She collaborates 
with Michele Barker to produce multi-channel 
installations and environments that propose 
enactive and embodied forms of perception. And 
she is an associate professor at the College of 
Fine Arts, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 
Australia. Her current research is engaged with a 
large international partnership with Erin Manning, 
Brian Massumi, Bodil Marie Stavening Thomsen, 
Andrew Murphie and others around the concept of 
‘immediation’ in relation to art, media and event.
D E N N I S  O P P E N H E I M
Dennis Oppenheim received a B.F.A. from the 
School of Arts and Crafts, Oakland, California, in 
1965, and an M.F.A. from Stanford University, Palo 
Alto, California, in 1966. His practice has employed 
all available methods: writing, action, performance, 
video, film, photography, and installation. He 
received a Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship in 
1969, National Endowment for the Arts Fellowships 
in 1974 and 1982 and a Lifetime Achievement 
Award at the Vancouver Sculpture Biennale. Since 
the 1960s Oppenheim’s works have been included 
regularly in international group exhibitions, at 
such venues as the Museum of Modern Art, Centre 
George Pompidou, the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art, the Venice Biennale (1976, 1980 and 2001) and 
Documenta in Kassel (1972, 1977). Solo exhibitions 
have included the Tate Gallery, London (1972); the 
Musée d’Art Moderne de la Ville de Paris (1979); 
and the Whitney Museum of American Art (1983, 
2003). Major retrospectives were presented at the 
Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam (1974); Museum 
Boijmans Van Beuningen in Rotterdam (1976); 
Musée d’Art Contemporain in Montreal (1978); and 
P.S.1 in New York (1991). 
w w w . d e n n i s - o p p e n h e i m . c o m
H O L L Y  P E S T E R
Holly Pester is a poet and multidisciplinary writer. 
She has worked as an archivist, lecturer and 
practice-based researcher with performances and 
sound installations featuring in events in Mexico 
City, dOCUMENTA 13, the Text Festival, and the 
Serpentine Gallery Poetry Marathon. Holly Pester’s 
poetry collection, Hoofs, was released with if p then 
q press in 2011 and her next collection, Folkslop is 
due out with Veer Books late 2014. She is currently 
artist in residence at the Women’s Art Library. 
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H A N N A H  P R O C T O R
Hannah Proctor is interested in the ideological 
underpinnings of psychiatry and neuroscience. 
She is currently working on a PhD on the Soviet 
psychologist and neurologist Alexander Luria at 
Birkbeck, University of London.
( @ h h n n c c n n l l  -  t w i t t e r / t u m b l r )
K A T E  S I C C H I O
Kate Sicchio is a choreographer, media artist, 
and performer. She works at the interface of 
choreography and technology. Her work includes 
performances, installations, web and video projects 
and has been shown in Philadelphia, New York City, 
Canada, Germany, Australia and the UK at venues 
such as Banff New Media Institute (CAN), WAX 
Brooklyn (US) and Arnolfini Arts Centre (UK). Her 
PhD focused on the use of real-time video systems 
within live choreography and the conceptual 
framework of ‘choreotopolgy’ a way to describe this 
work. Her research has been published by Leonardo 
Electronic Almanac, Computer Music Journal and 
Learning Performance Quarterly. 
w w w . b l o g . s i c c h i o . c o m
R O B E R T  S H E P P A R D
Robert Sheppard is Professor of Poetry and Poetics 
at Edge Hill University in Lancashire, UK. Recent 
titles include Hymns to the God in which my 
Typewriter Believes (2006), Warrant Error (2009), 
Berlin Bursts (2010), and A Translated Man (2012). 
As a poet critic, Sheppard has written widely on 
modern poetics, including Far Language: Poetics 
and Linguistically Innovative Poetry 1978-1997 
(1999), The Poetry of Saying: British Poetry and 
its Discontents 1950-2000 (2005), and Iain Sinclair 
(2007). He edited The Salt Companion to Lee 
Harwood (2007), and co-edits the Journal of British 
and Irish Innovative Poetry. 
w w w . r o b e r t s h e p p a r d . b l o g s p o t . c o . u k
S A M  S K I N N E R
Sam Skinner is an artist and producer, whose work 
moves between art and other fields, combining 
an interest in art history and theory, in particular 
new media and public space, with more engaged 
practice, including murals, workshops, animation, 
set design, gardening, archival research, writing, 
and ebooks. Sam has a BA from LJMU and an MA 
from Sussex, both in Art History. Current projects 
include the design of seating for a new green-space 
in Brighton and an accompanying schools ecology 
project, in collaboration with Charles Holden and 
Plan Projects.
w w w . s a m s k i n n e r . n e t
I M O G E N  S T I D W O R T H Y
Imogen Stidworthy is a Liverpool-based artist 
working with sound, voice and video. Prizes include 
Dutch Prix de Rome,1996, the Liverpool Art Prize 
2009. Imogen was shortlisted for Beck’s Futures 
2004, The Northern Art Prize 2008, The Jarman 
Award 2011. Her work is in collections including 
Centre Georges Pompidou, FRAC Bourgogne, 
MuHKA Antwerp, Dommerung Collection (NL), LUX 
London and the Vries Museum (NL). 
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T O R Q U E # 1
M I N D . L A N G U A G E . T E C H N O L O G Y
T h i s  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  e s s a y s  a n d  a r t w o r k s  r e f l e c t s  u p o n  t h e 
p l a s t i c i t y  o f  t h e  b r a i n ,  t h e  a d a p t a b i l i t y  o f  t e c h n o l o g y 
a n d  t h e  m a l l e a b i l i t y  o f  l a n g u a g e ,  a n d  t h e i r  t w i s t i n g 
t o g e t h e r  t h r o u g h  p a s t ,  p r e s e n t  a n d  f u t u r e  c u l t u r e s .
T h e  c o n t r i b u t o r s  a n d  t h e i r  w o r k  p r e s e n t e d  w i t h i n , 
e a c h  o f f e r  u n i q u e  m o d e l s  o f  n a v i g a t i n g  t h i s  t e r r i t o r y , 
m a k i n g  t h e i r  o w n  a r t e f a c t s ,  w r i t i n g  t h e i r  o w n  s c r i p t s , 
f o r g i n g  c r i t i c a l  s p a c e  a n d  e x a m i n i n g  t h e  b l i n d  s p o t s . 
“ T o r q u e  a c t i v i t i e s  a n d  t h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n 
b r a v e l y  p u s h  o u r  b o u n d a r i e s  o f
c o g n i t i o n  a n d  t h i n k i n g ,  t h r o u g h  s t r i k i n g  e s s a y s , 
t r i c k y  c o n c e p t s ,  a n d  b e a u t i f u l ,  a r r e s t i n g  i m a g e r y . ” 
P r o f e s s o r  M i k e  S t u b b s
A r t i s t i c  D i r e c t o r ,  F o u n d a t i o n 
f o r  A r t  a n d  C r e a t i v e  T e c h n o l o g y .
w w w . t o r q u e t o r q u e . t u m b l r . c o m
w w w . l i n k a r t c e n t e r . e u
